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INTRODUCTION 
There is a documented increase in the volume of regulatory activity 
during the last ninety days of presidential administrations when the Presi-
dent is a lame duck, having either been defeated in a bid for re-election or 
being at the end of the second term in office. This includes an increase in 
the number of final rules issued as compared to other periods. The phe-
nomenon of late-term regulatory activity has been called “midnight 
regulation,” based on a comparison to the Cinderella story in which the 
magic wears off at the stroke of midnight.1 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See Jay Cochran, III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase 
Significantly During Post-Election Quarters 4 (Mar. 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/The_Cinderella_Constraint(1).pdf. 
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This Article looks closely at one species of midnight regulation—
namely, midnight rules. This Article defines midnight rules as agency rules 
promulgated in the last ninety days of an administration. This Article fo-
cuses on legislative midnight rules (normally issued under the notice and 
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)), because 
they are the most visible and often the most controversial actions taken in 
the final days of administrations and because they are usually the most 
difficult to alter or revoke among the various midnight actions taken by 
outgoing administrations. However, because late-term activity goes beyond 
legislative rulemaking, this report also discusses, to a lesser extent, other 
phenomena such as the issuance of non-legislative rules including interpre-
tative rules and policy statements; non-rule regulatory documents, such as 
guidance documents and executive orders; and the use of other presidential 
powers, such as the pardon power and the ability to entrench political ap-
pointees into protected employment positions in the new administration. 
This Article documents the existence of the midnight rules phenome-
non both quantitatively and qualitatively, using numerical measures of the 
volume of rules and qualitative analysis of some rules as illustrations. The 
Article reviews various explanations for the existence of the phenomenon, 
ranging from the simple human tendency to work to deadline, to more 
complicated political factors that may affect the timing of rules. The Article 
also reports on interviews of officials involved in rulemaking to inform the 
analysis of the causes and effects of the midnight rulemaking phenomenon.2 
This Article also addresses midnight rulemaking from a policy perspec-
tive, asking whether there are reasons to be concerned about the 
phenomenon. Midnight rulemaking and midnight regulation generally have 
been strongly condemned by commentators and media from across the 
political spectrum.3 There are at least two possible sets of concerns regard-
ing the increase in rulemaking at the end of an administration: first, 
midnight rules may be of lower quality than rules issued at other times 
during administrations, and second, midnight rulemaking may involve 
undesirable political consequences, mainly the unwarranted extension of an 
outgoing administration’s agenda into the successor’s term. It may be very 
difficult to arrive at firm conclusions on either of these potential objections 
                                                                                                                      
 2. For a list of the interviewees, with information on their experience and affilia-
tions, see supra note *. 
 3. For examples of negative commentary on midnight rulemaking of the last two 
transitions, see Michael Fumento, Regulatory Freight Rolls On Unchecked, WASH. TIMES, June 
3, 2001, at B3 (attacking Clinton administration midnight rules as timed to avoid public 
scrutiny and not in the public interest); Matthew Blake, The Midnight Deregulation Express: In 
His Last Days in Power, George W. Bush Wants to Change Some Rules, WASH. INDEP. (Nov. 11, 
2008), http://washingtonindependent.com/17813/11-hour-regulations. 
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to midnight rulemaking, but this Article will attempt to do so from various 
perspectives. 
Because rulemaking often involves values and policy preferences that 
are not conducive to objective measurement for quality, it is very difficult to 
measure the quality of rules. Various metrics have been used to attempt to 
measure the quality of midnight rules, including length of time that the 
rules were reviewed at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Another possi-
ble measure of quality is durability, relying on the premise that low-quality 
rules are likely to be less durable than higher quality rules. In addition to 
examining existing studies of the durability of midnight rules, this Article 
includes the results of an original empirical study of the durability of the 
midnight rules issued in the last three presidential transition periods as 
compared with rules issued by the same administrations in non-midnight 
periods.4 
The political desirability of midnight rulemaking is also difficult to 
judge and views on it are likely to be controversial. There are no clear 
standards for judging whether midnight rules are politically undesirable. 
Arguments that midnight rules are politically undesirable center on three 
related factors: first, that the outgoing administration is projecting its agen-
da into the future; second, that midnight rules are timed to avoid 
accountability; and third, that the outgoing administration is placing a 
burden on an incoming administration to sift through the high volume of 
material left at the end of the term. This third concern is related to the 
prior two. The incoming administration is placed in the position of having 
to review rules adopted late in the prior administration due to the potential 
problems with midnight rules; they may be of lower quality if they were 
adopted pursuant to a hastier process than normal; they may not have been 
open to sufficient public scrutiny; and they may represent projection of a 
rejected political agenda that the incoming administration will not wish to 
carry out. 
In many cases, however, midnight rules may not suffer from serious po-
litical problems and may actually be beneficial, both for the public and the 
incoming administration. Because of the politically innocuous human ten-
dency to “work to deadline,” the pace of work will naturally pick up as 
                                                                                                                      
 4. A disclaimer is in order here. The study I conducted for the Report on which this 
Article is based includes comparative numerical counts of rules, but the data have not been 
examined for statistical significance or in light of potential external factors for which a more 
sophisticated study would control, such as economic factors or political factors not included 
in the study. In other words, it has not been determined whether the differences in numeri-
cal counts are statistically significant or could be explained by factors such as economic 
growth or distress. The reader should therefore be cautious when evaluating the original data 
reported in this Article. 
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agencies try to finish the tasks on their agendas as the end of the term 
nears. Assuming agencies are pursuing rulemaking (whether regulatory or 
deregulatory) that is generally in the public interest, the fact that it takes a 
deadline for agencies to finish their rulemaking is unfortunate, but it does 
not necessarily make the rules undesirable. Further, some midnight rules 
may help the incoming administration by finishing up the “old business” on 
the agenda so the new administration can focus on their “new business.” 
Further, there is the possibility that late-term rulemaking reflects the out-
going administration’s ability to rise above the political fray once the 
election is over and act in the public interest in ways that are less likely 
when interest group pressure is higher. 
Regardless of the policy or political desirability of midnight rules,  
recent incoming administrations confronted with a high volume of last-
minute regulatory output by the previous administration have employed 
common strategies to deal with midnight rulemaking. The goal of the strat-
egies is to stop rulemaking activity until the new administration has taken 
control of the government by putting in place its appointees to high-level 
positions. Although the details vary, common elements of these strategies 
include an immediate freeze on the publishing of new rules in the Federal 
Register, withdrawal of rules from the Federal Register that are awaiting pub-
lication, and suspension of the effectiveness of rules that have been 
published but have not yet gone into effect. All of these actions are de-
signed to halt regulatory activity until appointees of the new administration 
are in charge. 
The administration of President George W. Bush was the first to take 
action aimed directly at its own midnight rulemaking. The President’s Chief 
of Staff ordered all agencies to stop issuing proposed rules after June 1, 
2008, and to stop issuing final rules after November 1, 2008. While agencies 
did not universally meet this deadline, the volume of midnight rules during 
the George W. Bush (GW Bush) administration was reduced, even though 
the total volume of rules issued in the administration’s entire final year was 
not lower than for past outgoing administrations. The deadline apparently 
encouraged agencies to finish their work earlier in the administration’s final 
year, which would reduce the volume of midnight rules and also make the 
rules issued in the final year less amenable to rescission or alteration by the 
incoming administration or Congress. 
This Article concludes with a series of recommendations concerning 
midnight rulemaking adopted by the Administrative Conference of the 
United States (ACUS). These recommendations include reforms aimed at 
the propensity of outgoing administrations to engage in midnight rulemak-
ing and the powers of incoming administrations to deal with the midnight 
rules promulgated by their predecessors. 
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I. EVIDENCE THAT THE PROBLEM EXISTS 
The phenomenon of midnight regulation has received attention from 
politicians, academics, and the media during the last several presidential 
transitions. The first systematic look at the general phenomenon of mid-
night regulation was a research paper written by Jay Cochran under the 
auspices of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.5 Cochran 
chose a very simple metric of regulatory output: the number of pages pub-
lished in the Federal Register. Cochran recognized that this metric is 
imprecise because it does not distinguish among the various regulatory 
documents that are published in the Federal Register and does not account 
for the relative verbosity of rule writers, blank pages, and other variations. 
However, as Cochran concluded, there is no reason to suspect the existence 
of systematic variations in the relationship between total regulatory output 
and pages in the Federal Register.6 Further, all agency rules and many other 
important agency actions are published in the Federal Register. Thus, the 
number of pages in the Federal Register is a reasonably good proxy for over-
all regulatory output. 
Cochran found that “[t]he daily volume of rules during the final three 
months of the Carter Administration—as approximated by page counts of 
the Federal Register—ran more than 40 percent above the level it had  
averaged during the same months of the non-election years 1977, 1978, and 
1979.”7 Cochran also concluded that the “midnight regulation” phenomenon 
was not new, and that going back to 1948, “regulations during the post-
election quarter . . . increase roughly 17 percent, on average, over the  
volumes prevailing during the same periods of non-presidential election 
years.”8 Cochran carefully tested for explanations of the midnight regulation 
phenomenon other than the simple “Cinderella constraint,” employing 
variables such as political party control of Congress and the Executive 
Branch, turnover in Cabinet membership, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
and congressional days in session. Cochran found that while some of the 
other factors have a small impact on the volume of regulation in the mid-
night period,9 the predominant factor is the presidential election which 
brings about the Cinderella constraint. 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See Cochran, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. at 2 n.4. 
 7. Id. at 2. 
 8. Id. at 3. 
 9. Cochran found that “each one percent rise (or fall) in GDP generates about a 1.3 
percent rise (or fall) in regulatory output.” Id. at 11. He also found that “[p]artisan effects for 
both the legislative and executive branches were positive but not significant,” and that for 
each day that Congress stays in session during the midnight period, midnight regulation 
increases .3%, which Cochran characterizes as statistically significant but small. Id. at 11–12. 
Cabinet turnover appears to be strongly associated with midnight regulation. The prediction 
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Ever since Cochran’s study documented a consistent increase in regula-
tory activity at the end of presidential terms, there has been a working 
assumption that the midnight regulation phenomenon is real. Others have 
confirmed the existence of the phenomenon. For example, in 2001, Wendy 
Gramm, former head of OIRA, testified that there were over 26,542 Federal 
Register pages published in the last three months of the Clinton administra-
tion, eclipsing the Carter administration’s record of approximately 24,500 
last-quarter pages.10 In 2005, Jason Loring and Liam Roth published a study 
of the durability of midnight rules, in which they detailed and compared the 
number of rules issued by three agencies (National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)) during the mid-
night periods of the administrations of George H.W. Bush (GHW Bush) 
and Bill Clinton.11 Although they did not focus on documenting the mid-
night rulemaking phenomenon, their study noted that the pace of  
rulemaking during the midnight periods of the two presidential transitions 
they studied increased somewhat as compared with the remainder of the 
administrations’ last years in office.12 
There have been additional studies of the pace of regulatory activity, all 
of which confirm the existence of the midnight rulemaking effect in differ-
ent ways. For example, Veronique de Rugy and Antony Davies found: 
[I]n non-transition quarters, pages are added to the Federal Register 
at a constant rate—roughly one-fourth of the pages added during a 
calendar year will be added each quarter. However, for quarters in 
                                                                                                                      
is that when there is more turnover in Cabinet membership, there will be more regulation, 
because the transition to a new Department Head may bring new priorities and a change in 
views concerning pending initiatives. See id. at 12–13. Of course, the highest degree of 
turnover occurs when the incumbent or the incumbent’s party is replaced, but Cochran 
observes an increase in regulatory volume in post-election quarters when the incumbent is 
reelected. Cochran suggests that this may in part be due to the change in Cabinet member-
ship that often occurs after re-election. See id. at 13. 
 10. Congressional Review Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural 
Res. & Regulatory Affairs, Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Dr. 
Wendy L. Gramm, Distinguished Senior Fellow Dir., Regulatory Studies Program, Merca-
tus Ctr., George Mason Univ.). Various reports on the number of Federal Register pages 
published during the Clinton Administration’s last quarter are discussed in Jack M. Beer-
mann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 948 n.2 (2003). 
 11. See Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the “Mid-
night” Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1441 (2005). 
 12. Id. at 1454 tbl.2 (40% of all rules issued by the EPA, OSHA, and NHTSA in last 
eleven months of the GHW Bush administration and 51% of all rules issued in last eleven 
months of Clinton administration were promulgated during final three months). 
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which a presidential election occurred, the number of pages added 
exceeded the 25 percent baseline 13 out of 15 times.13 
De Rugy and Davies’s study confirmed that the only valid explanation 
for the increase in regulatory activity during transition quarters is the fact 
of transition itself.14 In another study using the same data set, the authors 
reported that “after 1970, the number of pages added to the Federal Register 
increased drastically after an election, especially in 1980, 1992, and 2000, 
when there was a switch between political parties. There was a smaller 
increase when the ruling party stayed in power, such as in 1988.”15 
In a more comprehensive study, Anne Joseph O’Connell has document-
ed the yearly and quarterly pace of rulemaking activity from 1983 through 
2009.16 She found an increase in rulemaking activity in most administra-
tions’ last years, especially in cabinet departments.17 More pertinent to this 
Article’s definition of the midnight period, she found increased rulemaking 
activity in the last quarter of the Clinton and GW Bush administrations.18 
She characterized the data on the last quarter as follows: 
In terms of presidential transitions, cabinet departments finished 
more important actions in the last quarter of President Clinton’s 
Administration (83 actions) than in any other quarter in the data 
for that presidency (the next highest was the second quarter of 
1996 with 55 actions). Similarly, cabinet departments and executive 
agencies promulgated more final actions (95 and 22 actions, respec-
tively) in the final quarter of President George W. Bush’s 
Administration than in any other quarter of his presidency (the 
                                                                                                                      
 13. Veronique de Rugy & Antony Davies, Midnight Regulations and the Cinderella 
Effect, 38 J. SOCIO-ECON. 886, 887 (2009). In some quarters the effect was relative mild, 
while in others, such as 1949 and 1961, the effect was striking. See id. fig.2. The only quarters 
in which the 25% baseline was not exceeded were in the Ford-Carter transition and after 
Reagan’s re-election. Id. 
 14. Davies and de Rugy looked at alternative explanations such as inflation, unem-
ployment, the misery index, congressional session days and differences in party control 
between the presidency and Congress. They found no statistical significance for any of these 
factors as a potential explanation for the increase in rulemaking during the midnight period. 
Id. at 889. 
 15. Jerry Brito & Veronique de Rugy, Midnight Regulations and Regulatory Review, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 168 (2009).  
 16. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 471 (2011). 
 17. “Cabinet departments under President Reagan and President George W. Bush and 
all types of agencies under President George H.W. Bush completed more rulemakings in the 
final year than in any previous year of those Administrations.” Id. at 503. See also Anne 
Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Adminis-
trative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 952 (2008). 
 18. O’Connell, supra note 16, at 505. 
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next highest were 72 and 20 actions in the third quarter of the  
final year for cabinet departments and executive agencies,  
respectively).19 
O’Connell found no other factor than simple timing adequate to explain the 
increase in rulemaking in the last quarter of administrations.20 O’Connell’s 
study also documented an increase in initiation of rules at the end of  
administrations.21  
Another study documenting the existence of the midnight rulemaking 
phenomenon is a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report written by 
Curtis W. Copeland.22 The primary focus of Copeland’s Report is the status 
of midnight rules issued by the GW Bush administration. The Report  
contains data concerning the volume of midnight rules in the GW Bush 
administration.23 
The primary focus of this Article is on rules issued pursuant to notice 
and comment, not on interpretative rules, policy statements, guidance  
documents, executive orders, and other rule-like documents typically issued 
without notice and comment. Even if there is an increase in non-notice and 
comment activity during the midnight period, documents issued without 
notice and comment lack durability when compared to rules issued after 
notice and comment. This makes them both less problematic, because the 
incoming administration can revoke or alter them without notice and  
                                                                                                                      
 19. Id. at 504. 
 20. Id. at 501–07. 
 21. Id. at 498. O’Connell reports that GW Bush’s administration proposed more rules 
during the third quarter of its final year than in any other quarter of its eight years. Id. at 
498–99. In another study, O’Connell noted that three departments, the Departments of 
Transportation, Agriculture, and Interior, issued more NPRMs during the final quarter of 
the GHW Bush administration “than during any other political transition period.” 
O’Connell, supra note 17, at 948. 
 22. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4077, “MIDNIGHT RULES” 
ISSUED NEAR THE END OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: A STATUS REPORT (2009). 
 23. Id. at 2–3: 
From November 1, 2008, through January 2009, federal agencies sent GAO a total 
of 341 ‘significant’ or ‘substantive’ final rules, a 51% increase from the number of 
such rules sent during the same period one year earlier (225 rules). During the 
same November 2008–January 2009 timeframe, the agencies sent GAO 37 major 
rules, compared with 23 during the same period one year earlier (a 61% increase). 
The surge in rulemaking at the end of the Bush Administration is also apparent in 
the number of significant final rules that OIRA reviewed pursuant to Executive 
Order 12,866. According to the Regulatory Information Service Center, from  
September 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008, OIRA reviewed a total of 190 
significant final rules—a 102% increase when compared with the same period in 
2007 (when OIRA reviewed 94 significant final rules).  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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comment, and less likely to be done, because given easy revision, it may not 
be worth the effort to issue them at the end of the term.  
Nonetheless, there is a noticeable increase in the issuance of non-notice 
and comment rule-like documents such as interpretive rules, policy state-
ments, and guidance documents during the midnight period. Some agencies 
issue many more guidance documents than actual rules, possibly to avoid 
the rigors of the rulemaking process and the relatively stringent judicial 
review of rules.24 Agencies are known to treat non-legislative rules as if they 
are binding law, despite the fact that the APA’s notice and comment proce-
dures were not employed in promulgating them.25 Some late-issued 
guidance documents have been attacked as midnight regulation, but these 
attacks focus on a particular document rather than on the general phenome-
non of guidance documents issued in the midnight period.26  
To substantiate the increase in non-legislative rulemaking during the 
midnight period, I conducted a simple empirical study on the volume of 
interpretative rules, policy statements, and guidance documents during 
midnight and non-midnight periods in the last three presidential transi-
tions:27 GHW Bush to Bill Clinton, Bill Clinton to GW Bush, and GW 
Bush to Barack Obama.28 The findings are that in each midnight period, the 
issuance of guidance documents, policy statements, and interpretative rules 
was higher than the non-midnight period in the prior year, and that the 
bulk of this activity comprised guidance documents and draft guidance 
documents. A significant number of the documents issued were policy 
statements and very few were interpretative rules in both midnight and 
non-midnight periods. The exact numbers are as follows:  
                                                                                                                      
 24. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before 
a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 573–74 (2003); Peter L. Strauss, The Rule-
making Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468–69 (1992). 
 25. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Robert 
A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should 
Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1328–55 (1992). 
 26. See e.g., Michael Bennett Homer, Frankenfish . . . It’s What’s for Dinner: The FDA, 
Genetically Engineered Salmon, and the Flawed Regulation of Biotechnology, 45 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 83, 130–31 (2011) (endorsing characterization of January 15, 2009, publication 
of FDA guidance document on genetically engineered animals as “midnight regulation”). 
 27. For a disclaimer concerning the data reported here, see supra note 4. 
 28. For the midnight period, I used October 20 through January 20 of the transition 
year, so that this study used the definition of midnight rule used throughout this report. For 
the non-midnight period, I used the same dates one year earlier. I searched the Federal 
Register database in Westlaw with a query designed to pick up all interpretative rules (and 
interpretive rules), policy statements, and guidance documents during the relevant periods. 
The search was as follows: TI(“INTERPRETATIVE RULE” “GUIDANCE DOCUMENT” 
“POLICY STATEMENT” “INTERPRETIVE RULE” “INTERPRETATIVE RULE” 
“GUIDANCE DOCUMENT” “POLICY STATEMENT” GUIDANCE) & date(aft oct. 20 
xxxx) & date(bef jan. 20, xxxx). 
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level.’ ”30 President GW Bush issued 10 executive orders after Election Day 
2008, out of a total of 280 for his presidency.31 His usual pace would have 
produced only 7.7 executive orders during the post-election period. Since 
1977, the highest number of executive orders issued between the election 
and leaving office was by President Carter, who issued 36 executive orders 
after Election Day 1980, compared to 319 during his 4 years in office. This 
means that Carter issued executive orders at double the rate after the 1980 
election as he had before, which is consistent with his then record-setting 
regulatory activity, as indicated by pages published in the Federal Register. 
However, 10 of these orders were issued on his last day in office to carry out 
his agreement with the Government of Iran to free 52 Americans taken 
hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.32 President GHW Bush issued 14 
executive orders after Election Day 1992, out of a total of 165 for his 4 years 
in office. At the rate for his entire presidency, Bush would have been  
expected to issue 8.8 executive orders during the 72 days after the election, 
or more than a third fewer than he actually issued. The increase in President 
Clinton’s rate of issuing executive orders was similar to Carter’s. Clinton 
issued twenty-two executive orders after the 2000 election, out of 363 in 
total for his 8-year presidency. Once again this represents a more than 
doubling of the rate of issuing executive orders as compared with his  
administration’s term as a whole. Had he maintained his previous rate, he 
would have issued between 9 and 10 executive orders after the election. 
                                                                                                                      
 30. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34722, PRESIDENTIAL 
TRANSITIONS: ISSUES INVOLVING OUTGOING AND INCOMING ADMINISTRATIONS 13 (2008) 
(alteration in original), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/ (quoting Kenneth R. 
Mayer, Executive Orders and Presidential Power, 61 J. POL. 445, 457 (1999)). In an article by 
William Howell and Kenneth Mayer, the authors perform a more qualitative analysis of the 
increased use of Executive Orders at the end of presidencies. William G. Howell & Kenneth 
Mayer, The Last One Hundred Days, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 533, 538–40 (2005). 
 31. The data for this discussion of Executive Orders is from the American Presidency 
Project’s list of Executive Orders. John T. Wooley & Gerhard Peters, Executive Orders, THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/executive_orders.php 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
 32. Id. For a discussion of this episode, including President Carter’s actions as he left 
office, see Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini: Presidential Transitions and 
International Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 303 (2001). 
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sixty-five per month during his final four months in office.35 For whatever 
reason, presidents tend to grant the bulk of their pardons and clemencies at 
the end of their time in office. 
Another category of midnight activity comprises personnel decisions. 
One common late-term action taken by outgoing administrations is converting 
the positions of political appointees to career status; this is referred to as 
“burrowing in” or “burrowing.”36 Nina Mendelson reports the magnitude of 
this practice as follows: “In the last two years of the Clinton administration, 
one hundred political appointees moved to civil service positions . . . . In 
the administration of President George H.W. Bush, approximately 160 
individuals made such career moves.”37 There are legal requirements that 
must be followed to do this, and according to the Government Accountabil-
ity Office, these requirements are often not followed.38 Burrowing has 
raised alarms in Congress, but on at least one occasion, an official of an 
outgoing administration justified burrowing as a way to ensure continuity 
of leadership through the transition in the especially sensitive area of na-
tional security: “In a January 2008 report to the [Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)] Secretary on the transition, the Homeland Security Advi-
sory Council recommended that the department ‘consider current political  
appointees with highly specialized and needed skills for appropriate career 
positions.’ ”39 
                                                                                                                      
 35. HALCHIN, supra note 30, at 9 tbl.1 (citing data from United States Department of 
Justice, Office of the Pardon Attorney). President George W. Bush’s data, not included in 
the CRS report because the report was issued before GW Bush left office, show a dramatic 
increase in percentage with a comparatively small number of exercises of the clemency 
power. GW Bush averaged fewer than 2 pardons and clemencies per month during the non-
midnight period and 8 pardons per month during his final four months in office. See Pardons 
Granted by President George W. Bush (2001-2009), U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ 
pardon/bushpardon-grants.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2012). 
 36. See BARBARA L. SCHWEMLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34706, FEDERAL 
PERSONNEL: CONVERSION OF EMPLOYEES FROM APPOINTED (NONCAREER) POSITIONS TO 
CAREER POSITIONS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 1–2 (2008); see also Mendelson, supra note 
24 at 559–61. 
 37. Mendelson, supra note 24, at 563 n.27 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD-02-326, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: PERSONNEL PRACTICES: 
CAREER AND OTHER APPOINTMENTS OF FORMER POLITICAL APPOINTEES, OCTOBER 
1998–APRIL 2001 2 (2002) [hereinafter GAO, 1998–2001 Personnel Practices]; U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-2, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE PATRICIA 
SCHROEDER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: PERSONNEL PRACTICES: CAREER 
APPOINTMENTS OF LEGISLATIVE, WHITE HOUSE, AND POLITICAL APPOINTEES 5 (1995)). 
 38. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-381, PERSONNEL 
PRACTICES: CONVERSIONS OF EMPLOYEES FROM NONCAREER TO CAREER POSITIONS MAY 
2001–APRIL 2005 4–5 (2006); see also L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS20730, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS CRS-2 (2001). 
 39. BARBARA L. SCHWEMLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34706, FEDERAL 
PERSONNEL: CONVERSION OF EMPLOYEES FROM APPOINTED (NONCAREER) POSITIONS TO 
CAREER POSITIONS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 9 (2008) (quoting HOMELAND SECURITY 
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In addition to conversions from political to career status, outgoing offi-
cials make important appointments and promotions in the career service.40 
Mendelson acknowledges that outgoing administrations must fill positions 
to keep the government operating properly, but she concludes that some 
personnel decisions are made to “embed people with particular ideological 
or programmatic commitments . . . .”41 This, she says, “seems to increase 
the prospect that a new President will face a resistant—even subversive—
bureaucracy.”42 
There are many more actions that presidents have taken as they leave 
office, including actions that protect federal land from development under 
various programs.43 While these actions are often significant and sometimes 
irrevocable (or not easily revoked), they do not warrant separate sustained 
attention in this Article because they do not involve important policy com-
mitments. They often elicit criticisms similar to those leveled at midnight 
rulemaking: they are hastily done, without adequate input from affected 
interests, and are contrary to principles of democracy and accountability. 
The field of international law and relations presents special issues concern-
ing midnight actions, and these are not considered in this Article.44 
In sum, the midnight regulation phenomenon is real and includes the 
production of midnight rules and other actions by outgoing administrations. 
In the final quarter of each administration, the volume of regulatory activity 
increases, including increases in agency rulemaking, issuance of agency 
guidance documents and other non-legislative rules, an increase in the  
issuance of executive orders, an increase in the use of the President’s pardon 
power, and an increase in the movement of politically appointed personnel 
to career positions.  
                                                                                                                      
ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, REPORT OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION TRANSITION TASK FORCE 6 (2008) (footnote omitted)). 
 40. See Mendelson, supra note 24, at 606. 
 41. Id. at 610. 
 42. Id. at 612. 
 43. Perhaps the most famous episode in this area is President Grover Cleveland’s 
midnight designation of twenty-one million acres of federal land as forest reserve to protect 
it from logging. Congress passed legislation overriding the designation, but Cleveland used 
his pocket veto against that legislation. The matter was not cleared up until after Cleveland’s 
successor took office. See Combs, supra note 32, at 331–32. President Clinton designated 
numerous national monuments, and expanded the boundaries of existing monuments, in his 
last year in office, including several in November 2000, and January 2001, after having 
designated none in his first seven years in office. See Beermann, supra note 10, at 973–76. 
This designation provides even greater protection than inclusion of the land in a national 
park or forest. 
 44. See generally Combs, supra note 32. 
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II. NORMATIVE ISSUES SURROUNDING MIDNIGHT RULEMAKING 
Since the phenomenon was first widely discussed after the publication 
of Cochran’s study, midnight rulemaking has consistently provoked negative 
reactions in the media, in government, and among commentators. This Part 
asks why. Looking at the midnight rulemaking phenomenon from a norma-
tive perspective involves investigating why it occurs and asking whether 
there are categories of midnight rules that present special normative con-
cerns not shared with other categories of such rules. The first Section looks 
at the political background of midnight rulemaking as part of the effort to 
discern a basis to construct a normative critique. The second Section lists 
the normative arguments that have been or could be made against midnight 
rulemaking and responses to those arguments. The third Section offers 
some conclusions on these aspects of this Report’s investigation. 
Many of the interviewees who were consulted for this Article shared a 
basic understanding of the nature of the midnight rulemaking phenomenon. 
In the view of most of the interviewees, midnight rulemaking results mainly 
from a rush to finish pending tasks and perhaps add a few tasks that might 
not have been performed but for the impending takeover by an administra-
tion with different policy views. The interviewees by and large did not see 
midnight rulemaking as an effort to sabotage the incoming administration 
or illegitimately project the outgoing administration’s policy into the future 
in contravention of the apparent will of the electorate. These views are 
discussed further below. 
A. Political Background of Midnight Rules 
To understand midnight rulemaking, and why it has been so widely 
criticized, it is important to construct a picture of the political background 
that leads to midnight rulemaking. The political background might also 
help evaluate whether midnight rules are likely to suffer from the quality 
concerns that some people have about them. 
As discussed in my prior work, the increased output of agencies at the 
end of administrations can be thought of as arising largely from three over-
lapping but distinct phenomena—namely, hurrying, waiting, and delay.45  
1. Hurrying 
“Hurrying” is the urge of an outgoing administration to get as much 
done as possible at the end of the term. Outgoing administrations may 
hurry not only because they need to finish tasks before the impending 
deadline, but also because they want to enact as many of their policies into 
                                                                                                                      
 45. See generally Beermann, supra note 10. 
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law as possible before an incoming administration with different views takes 
office, perhaps fearing that the incoming administration’s policies will pro-
duce inferior results.46 
The need to hurry to finish rules, even those that may not be particu-
larly controversial, may arise, in part, from the tendency for rulemaking to 
slow down at the beginning of a new administration47 while the incoming 
administration puts its appointees in place, a process that seems to be taking 
longer in recent transitions.48 This delay at the outset of a new administra-
tion may now seem inevitable given the strategies that incoming 
administrations have adopted to deal with the problem of midnight rule-
making. Further, because all of the procedural steps and substantive 
analyses required in rulemaking take a long time, it should not be surprising 
that much rulemaking is completed very late in each administration’s term, 
when officials hurry to finish work on rules that began earlier in the term.49 
Agency staff may also face the real possibility that the new administration 
will place a low priority on their pending rules and may never complete 
work on them, which also leads to hurrying to finish before the transition. 
                                                                                                                      
 46. As William Howell and Kenneth Mayer explain, at the end of a term, especially 
when the new President is of a different party, outgoing Presidents act to extend their 
policies into the future. See Howell & Mayer, supra note 30. 
 47. See O’Connell, supra note 16, at 501 (“[T]he first year of an administration is 
associated (in a statistically significant manner) with fewer rulemakings.”). O’Connell 
reports that rulemakings that spanned more than one administration took, on average, more 
than twice as long as rulemakings that were completed during one administration. See id. at 
514. Of course, as O’Connell recognizes, it’s unclear which factor is the primary cause—due 
to the passage of time, a long rulemaking process is likely to span two administrations, and a 
rulemaking that spans two administrations is likely to take longer due to the slower pace of 
regulatory activity at the beginning of administrations. See id. 
 48. Anne Joseph O’Connell reports that on average it took Presidents Clinton and 
GW Bush more than six months to staff Senate-approved positions in cabinet departments 
and executive agencies. ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WAITING 
FOR LEADERSHIP: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S RECORD IN STAFFING KEY AGENCY POSITIONS 
AND HOW TO IMPROVE THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 10 fig.5 (2010). O’Connell reports 
that “the Obama Administration had in place 64.4% of Senate-confirmed executive agency 
positions after one year,” compared to 86.4% in the Reagan administration, 80.1% in the 
GHW Bush administration, 69.8% in the Clinton administration, and 73.8% in the GW 
Bush administration. Id. at 2. 
 49. O’Connell characterizes the data as follows: 
Cabinet departments under President Reagan and President George W. Bush and 
all types of agencies under President George H.W. Bush completed more rule-
makings in the final year than in any previous year of those Administrations. 
President Clinton’s cabinet departments, executive agencies, and independent 
agencies, and President Reagan’s executive and independent agencies, all as 
groups, also increased their final actions in the final year from the preceding year. 
O’Connell, supra note 16 at 503. 
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Hurrying occasionally involves initiatives that are started and complet-
ed very late in an administration’s term, not simply to finish what’s already 
on the agenda, but to do more to project the administration’s policies into 
the future. An outgoing administration could conceivably initiate rule-
makings to promulgate rules quickly before the end of the term. Although it 
is unlikely that the volume of such rules would be very high, this might be 
the type of midnight rule that would elicit condemnation as illegitimate and 
possibly of lower-than-normal quality.  
Hurrying at the end of a term gives rise to the concern that rules issued 
during the midnight period will be of lower quality than rules issued at 
other times. There is some evidence that OIRA review is shortened during 
the midnight period,50 and there are suggestions that some rules are rushed 
from proposal to completion near the end of Presidents’ terms.51 While the 
evidence supports the former claim, the latter suggestion lacks substantia-
tion. 
As discussed above, O’Connell’s analysis of her data for her report on 
the duration of rulemakings suggests that generally, midnight rules are 
considered for a longer period of time than non-midnight rules, although 
there is a slight increase in relatively short rulemakings (180 days or less) 
among rules finalized during the midnight period.52 An example of a mid-
night rule that went from proposal to promulgation very quickly involves a 
                                                                                                                      
 50. See Patrick A. McLaughlin, Empirical Tests for Midnight Regulations and Their Effect 
on OIRA Review Time, (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 08-40, 
2008), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/WPPDF_Empirical_ 
Tests_for_Midnight_Regulations.pdf (concluding that the number of significant rules 
reviewed during midnight periods increases and the time OIRA spends reviewing them 
during midnight periods decreases); JERRY BRITO & VERONIQUE DE RUGY, FOR WHOM 
THE BELL TOLLS: THE MIDNIGHT REGULATION PHENOMENON 13–14 (Mercatus Policy 
Series, Policy Primer No. 9, 2008) (discussing implications of McLaughlin’s study). REECE 
RUSHING, RICK MELBERTH & MATT MADIA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & OMB WATCH, 
AFTER MIDNIGHT: THE BUSH LEGACY OF DEREGULATION AND WHAT OBAMA CAN DO 
(2009). This OMB Watch report states that in the 2008–2009 transition, OIRA review was 
very short in some cases:  
OIRA spent an average of 61 days reviewing regulations in 2008, but dispensed 
with many of Bush’s Midnight Regulations far quicker. OIRA reviewed a pro-
posed draft of the Health and Human Services Department’s provider conscience 
regulation in just hours, and reviewed the final regulation in 11 days. OIRA ap-
proved the Interior Department’s oil shale leasing regulation after only four days.  
Id. at 4. 
 51. For example, Anne Joseph O’Connell cites a rule on Oil Shale Management issued 
on November 18, 2008, as having been issued just four months after it had been proposed. 
O’Connell, supra note 16, at 472 n.3 (citing Oil Shale Management—General, 73 Fed. Reg. 
69,414 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3900, 3910, 3920, 3930). 
 52. See O’Connell, supra note 16, at 517 tbl.1. See also id. at 519 (“There is, however, 
still a quickening in the rulemaking process in the midnight quarter.”). 
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regulation governing inter-agency cooperation under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act.53 This rule was proposed on August 15, 2008, with a 30-day 
comment period.54 The comment period was extended for an additional 30 
days55 and then the final rule was promulgated with minor modifications on 
December 16, 2008, only 4 months after the initial proposal.56 
Another example of a relatively short process for promulgating an im-
portant rule involves the Clinton administration’s midnight rule on air 
conditioner and heat pump efficiency. This rule was proposed on October 5, 
2000,57 and promulgated as a final rule in the Federal Register on January 
22, 2001,58 after a sixty-day comment period and a public hearing held a 
little less than a month after the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 
was issued. This was a complex and lengthy rule that Susan Dudley says, 
“hurtled through the regulatory process at lightning speed.”59 However, as 
with many rules, including midnight rules, the regulatory process did not 
begin with the issuance of the NPRM. In fact, this rule had a lengthy pro-
cedural history that included a congressionally-mandated 1994 deadline and 
then, after that deadline was missed, a 1995 congressionally-mandated delay, 
a conference on the issues in 1998, and an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking issued in 1999.60 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,272 
(Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).  
 54. Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,868 
(proposed Aug. 15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
 55. Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 52,942 
(proposed Sept. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
 56. Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
76,272. A partial impetus for this rule was apparently a 2004 GAO Report concluding that 
certain aspects of interagency consultation under the Endangered Species Act needed 
clarification. See Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 
at 47,869. There is nothing in the record that explains why the administration waited until 
the midnight period to promulgate the revisions. Another example of a rushed regulatory 
process is the August 2008 proposal concerning OSHA risk assessment. See infra note 148. 
 57. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products: Central Air Conditioners 
and Heat Pumps Energy Conservation Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,590 (proposed Oct. 5, 
2000) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430). 
 58. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products: Central Air Conditioners 
and Heat Pumps Energy Conservation Standards, 66 Fed. Reg. 7170 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be 
codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430). 
 59. See Susan E. Dudley, Midnight Regulation at All-Time High, HEARTLAND 
INSTITUTE (March 1, 2001), http://heartland.org/policy-documents/midnight-regulations-
all-time-high, quoted in Howell & Mayer, supra note 46, at 551. Dudley states that the rule 
was issued “[o]ver the objections of other administration officials, and contrary to many 
public comments . . . .” Id.  
 60. For the complete history of this regulation, see Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 188–91 (2d Cir. 2004), discussed infra Section IV.B.2.b. The Abraham 
decision rejected the GW Bush administration’s efforts to rescind the rule promulgated in 
the waning days of the Clinton administration. Id. at 206. 
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However, it appears that short regulatory processes are the exception 
rather than the rule, even with regard to midnight rules.61 The published 
scholarly articles and media reports criticizing midnight rulemaking cite 
only a few examples of rushed rules. One article cites the GW Bush admin-
istration’s midnight rule on shale oil development as having been proposed 
only four months before it was finalized.62 While it is true that the NPRM 
was issued on July 23, 2008, slightly less than four months before the final 
rule, an Advance NPRM had been issued in August 200663 with another 
notice extending the comment period issued in September 2006.64 The 
agency also held “listening sessions” with representatives of governors of 
affected states in 2006 and 2007.65 Thus, this rule had been under  
consideration for more than two years before it was issued, hardly a last-
minute rush job.  
There are reasons to believe that hurrying is unlikely to result in rules 
of substantially lower quality than rules issued during other periods. For 
one, attention to any individual rule during the long rulemaking process is 
likely to be episodic. In this regard, Sally Katzen, OIRA Administrator 
during the final days of the Clinton administration, reported in an  
interview that during the midnight period of that administration (which 
produced a high volume of Midnight Rules), the administration did not 
rush rules through, but rather performed multiple steps simultaneously that 
at other times would have been performed seriatim.66 Each rule is likely to 
                                                                                                                      
 61. OMB Watch claims that comment periods were shortened during the 2008–2009 
midnight period:  
The administration proposed a handful of rules between July and September 2008 
that it wanted to finalize by year’s end. Agencies allowed only 30 days for public 
comment for several of those rules. (The public comment period usually lasts 60 
days.) . . . In October, the Interior Department proposed stripping Congress of its 
power to prohibit mining on federal lands in emergency situations—a power that 
Congress had used in June to prohibit uranium mine leasing near the Grand Can-
yon. Interior allowed only 15 days for public comment on the rule. An Interior 
Department official defended the shortened comment period, saying the public  
already had been given a chance to comment on an earlier draft of the rule that 
was released in 1991.  
RUSHING, MELBERTH & MADIA, supra note 50, at 4–5 (footnote omitted). 
 62. See O’Connell, supra note 16, at 472. 
 63. Commercial Oil Shale Leasing Program, 71 Fed. Reg. 50,378 (proposed Aug. 25, 
2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3900). 
 64. Commercial Oil Shale Leasing Program 71 Fed. Reg. 56,085 (Sept. 26, 2006) (to 
be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3900). 
 65. Oil Shale Management—General, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,414, 69,415 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to 
be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3900, 3910, 3920, 3930). 
 66. Telephone Interview with Sally Katzen, former Administrator of OIRA and 
current Senior Advisor, Podesta Group, Government Relations and Public Relations Profes-
sionals (Nov. 3, 2011).  
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receive attention at particular moments and then get passed along to the 
next step, so the question isn’t how long the rule has been pending, but 
rather, how much attention the rule received during the time it was under 
consideration. Further, even during non-midnight periods, many rules must 
be rushed through the process to meet statutory and other deadlines. More-
over, judicial review ensures that agencies cannot relax quality standards to 
an extent that survival on judicial review is thrown into question. 
Despite these reasons for questioning whether midnight rules are actu-
ally rushed through, O’Connell suggests that the timing of rulemaking 
activity may make it more likely that the agency’s ultimate decision is found 
“arbitrary and capricious.”67 She raises this possibility with regard to mid-
night rules actually issued and to agency withdrawal of rules shortly after a 
new President takes office.68 O’Connell apparently believes that courts are 
likely to be more suspicious of agency action taken during the midnight 
period and at the outset of an administration, perhaps due to the increased 
role that politics may play at such times. 
2. Delay 
The second general category of reasons that rulemaking might increase 
at the end of the President’s term is “delay.” Delay is related, in many in-
stances, to the factors that produce hurrying. The production of rules may 
be delayed by factors both internal and external to the administration.  
Delay includes apparently innocuous procrastination, when other priorities 
make particular rulemaking proceedings seem less urgent until the deadline 
of presidential transition approaches. The intrusion of other priorities may 
have led to delays, such as delays in rulemaking that resulted from the need 
for multiple agencies to respond to regulatory issues that arose in the wake 
of the attacks of September 11, 2001.69 There are also obvious cases of ex-
ternally imposed delay, for example, when Congress (via appropriations 
riders) prohibited the Department of Labor from issuing its ergonomics 
rule until the final year of Clinton’s term.70 The rule on efficiency of air 
                                                                                                                      
 67. See O’Connell, supra note 48, at 526–27 (citing Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1201–02 (2009)). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 159 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(describing OSHA’s reliance on need to focus attention on September 11 attacks as one 
reason for delay in promulgating rule). 
 70. See Beermann, supra note 10, at 960–61 (discussing appropriations riders that 
made it impossible for the Department of Labor to issue its ergonomics rule until the final 
year of the Clinton administration). Appropriations riders also affected the timing of rules 
related to mining during the Clinton administration. See Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. 
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conditioners and heat pumps at issue in Abraham was also delayed by Con-
gress during the Clinton administration.71 Judicial decisions requiring 
attention to one rule may divert resources away from others. 
Delay in completing rulemakings also results from factors built into the 
rulemaking process. As mentioned above, at the outset of a new administra-
tion, there may be delays in putting key personnel in place to oversee the 
rulemaking process. However, the effects of this should be minimal in the 
eighth year of an administration, when midnight rulemaking usually be-
comes an issue. By the administration’s final year, complex analytic and 
procedural requirements are likely to contribute much more to lengthy 
rulemaking processes than personnel vacancies. If a rule is politically con-
troversial and if interest groups are arrayed in various positions concerning 
the agency’s rulemaking plans, time is needed for the agency to arrive at the 
best rule that is also politically tenable. 
3. Waiting 
The final general political explanation for midnight rulemaking is 
“waiting.” Waiting involves an outgoing administration waiting until the 
midnight period, usually so that rules can be promulgated after the election 
when political accountability is lower. To some, this is viewed as the most 
problematic sort of midnight rulemaking, because it seems to exacerbate 
accountability problems inherent in the administrative state. However, 
there are difficulties in and disincentives to waiting that make it somewhat 
less likely to occur than it might be assumed. The main reason that waiting 
is not likely to explain midnight rulemaking is the reality that virtually 
every midnight rule has been publicly proposed well before the election.72 
                                                                                                                      
Meiners & Andrew Dorchak, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Politics, Midnight Regulations 
and Mining, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 580–83 (2003). 
 71. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 188–91 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 72. Amy Goldstein, ‘Last-Minute’ Spin on Regulatory Rite; Bush Review of 
Clinton Initiatives Is Bid to Reshape Rules, Wash. Post, June 9, 2001, at A1, quoted in 
Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in 
Rulemaking Settlement, 51 Duke L.J. 1015, 1039 n.91 (2001): 
[V]irtually all the regulations finished by federal agencies shortly before Clinton 
left office had been developed over years, according to government documents, 
outside policy analysts, and officials of the Bush and Clinton administrations. 
Some had been delayed by lawsuits or because Republican-led Congresses of the 
mid- to late-1990s had explicitly forbidden federal agencies to work on them. 
Moreover, the regulations completed during Clinton’s final weeks in office were in 
step with a brisk pace of regulatory work throughout his two terms—and with a 
longstanding practice in which presidents of both political parties have issued 
many regulations just before they departed. 
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As Professor Jim Rossi has stated, “Midnight Regulations often reflect the 
culmination of a lengthy rulemaking process, a process that is sometimes 
held up against the agency’s wishes for political or budgetary reasons.”73 
There are not many instances of rules proposed just before or even after the 
election. Thus, the outgoing administration’s intentions are normally known 
to the public well before the election. 
There are also strong disincentives to waiting. For one, waiting until af-
ter the election means that the political benefit enjoyed by the outgoing 
administration will be muted. Further, waiting until after the election to 
promulgate a rule reduces the value of the rule because it might be rescind-
ed or revised by the new administration, and even if it is left intact, it might 
not be enforced with enthusiasm by the incoming administration. Waiting 
also entails a risk that the rulemaking process will not be completed before 
the transition, and the rule will never be issued74 or will be issued so late 
that the incoming administration can prevent it from being published in the 
Federal Register. 
Despite these reasons for suspecting that waiting is not a serious prob-
lem, critics have accused midnight rules of being timed to fly under the 
political radar. For example, the outgoing Reagan administration was ac-
cused in a magazine article of holding off on some initiatives until after the 
election so that regulatory actions were not held against Vice-President 
GHW Bush in his campaign to be President.75 One example cited is a rule 
promulgated soon after GHW Bush was elected that subjected transporta-
tion workers to random drug testing.76 The Teamsters Union had endorsed 
Bush for President, and the article contains speculation from a trucking 
lobbyist that the endorsement might have been affected if this rule had been 
issued before the election.77 Scholars have accused the Clinton administra-
tion of waiting until after the election to promulgate controversial mining 
regulations, although the authors’ only evidence was the timing of the issu-
ance of the final rules.78 
                                                                                                                      
 73. Rossi, supra note 72, at 1039. 
 74. This happened, for instance, with regard to the OSHA risk assessment proposed 
rule, discussed above, that was ultimately withdrawn by the Obama administration. See infra 
note 148. 
 75. See Ronald A. Taylor et al., Here Come Ronald Reagan’s ‘Midnight’ Regs, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Nov. 28, 1988, at 11, cited in Anne Joseph O’Connell, supra note 16, at 479 
n.29. 
 76. Id. at 11. See Control of Drug Use in Mass Transportation Operations, 53 Fed. 
Reg. 47,156 (Nov. 21, 1988) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 653). 
 77. Taylor et al., supra note 75, at 11. 
 78. See, e.g., Morriss et al., supra note 70, at 583 (“Under the terms of the appropria-
tions rider, BLM could have issued the regulation at any time after January 30, 2000 (i.e., 
the end of the required comment period following the NAS report under the appropriations 
rider). Even allowing time for consideration of the comments that BLM received during the 
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Waiting may be a more logical strategy when the incumbent hopes or 
expects the next President to be of the same political party.79 It may help 
explain the timing of deregulatory action in the midnight period of the GW 
Bush administration. Given that the need for stricter regulation following 
the 2008 financial crisis was a campaign issue, perhaps the outgoing Bush 
administration did not want to burden Republican candidate John McCain 
with the necessity of explaining why deregulation was still appropriate. 
Waiting may also explain some presidential actions not involving rule-
making, especially pardons and related clemencies. Presidents tend to 
increase the use of their pardon power during the midnight period, perhaps 
to avoid political consequences for controversial pardons.80  
4. Other Elements 
There are additional elements of the political background of midnight 
rulemaking that are not completely captured by the discussion of hurrying, 
waiting, and delay that may help explain the phenomenon. One of the 
common criticisms of midnight rulemaking is that it has negative effects on 
presidential transitions in two ways. First, a high volume of midnight rules 
diverts the incoming administration’s time and energy from moving forward 
with its agenda to looking back on the midnight rulemaking of its predeces-
sor. Due to concerns over the quality of midnight rules and the possibility 
that midnight rules will undercut the new administration’s policies, incoming 
                                                                                                                      
final round of public comment, the almost eleven-month delay before the regulations issu-
ance suggests that the post-election timing was not accidental.”). 
 79. See Reagan Readies 451 Regulation Changes before Leaving Office, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 
18, 1988, at 8. 
 80. For example, after issuing very few pardons during most of his 8 years in office, 
President Clinton exercised his power to grant pardons and clemency 176 times on his last 
day in office. He also granted approximately 60 pardons in December 2000, for a total of 
approximately 236 uses of the pardon power in the last two months of his presidency. Presi-
dent Clinton granted two of his most noteworthy pardons at the end of his term, to Mark 
Rich, a wealthy democratic financier who was a fugitive from justice at the time the pardon 
was granted, and to Patty Hearst, the granddaughter of the late media mogul William 
Randolph Hearst, who was kidnapped by a revolutionary group with whom she participated 
in an armed bank robbery, apparently of her own free will. The large number of end-of-term 
pardons, and the fact that some of the pardons were controversial, supports the inference 
that President Clinton waited to exercise the pardon power until he was about to leave office 
so that neither he, nor his Vice-President, who was running to succeed him, would suffer 
political heat due to the pardons. See Pardons Granted by President William J. Clinton (1993–
2001), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clintonpardon_ 
grants.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (listing all of President Clinton’s pardons including 
141 granted on the last day of his term). See also Amy Goldstein & Susan Schmidt, Clinton’s 
Last-Day Clemency Benefits 176; List Includes Pardons for Cisneros, McDougal, Deutch and Roger 
Clinton, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at A1 (“Just two hours before surrendering the White 
House, President Clinton gave parting gifts that lifted 176 Americans out of legal  
trouble . . . .”). 
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administrations have no real choice but to review midnight rules upon 
taking office. If the volume of midnight rules is very high, this can consti-
tute a serious impediment to a smooth transition. Second, politically 
controversial midnight rules can place the incoming administration in an 
awkward position, requiring it either to expend political capital to reverse 
the prior administration’s rule, or to enforce a rule that is contrary to the 
incoming administration’s political preferences and those of the electorate. 
Some midnight rules involving internal governmental operations may 
also have their own special political background, which may be related to 
the transition issues discussed above. This category includes inter-agency 
consultation requirements and rules involving enforcement of restrictions 
on the use of federal funds. Midnight rules that change governing law in 
these areas beg the question: why now and not years earlier so that these 
new requirements would have governed the outgoing administration’s  
conduct? Given enforcement discretion and discretion over the range of 
intergovernmental consultation, it is difficult to imagine a good reason for 
midnight rulemaking in these areas. In the consultation area, for example, if 
consultation requirements are being increased, the outgoing administration 
likely had sufficient discretion to engage in the consultations anyway, and 
now wants to impose the requirements on its successor. Conversely, if  
consultation requirements are being eased, the outgoing administration 
probably had the discretion to simply ignore the input from the consulta-
tions it now wants to eliminate. Why not leave that determination to its 
successor?  
An example of a midnight rule involving consultation is a rule issued on 
December 16, 2008, by the Departments of Commerce and the Interior, 
governing consultations for certain projects under the Endangered Species 
Act.81 This rule eliminated some consultations with habitat managers and 
biological experts, and it prohibited global warming as a factor in some 
remaining consultations.82 Being issued so late in the GW Bush administra-
tion meant that the earliest projects governed by the new consultation 
requirements were likely to be undertaken by the Obama administration. 
Without any explanation for why this consultation requirement was not 
removed when projects by the GW Bush administration were undertaken, 
the timing raises concerns. 
Midnight rules governing the enforcement of restrictions on the use of 
federal funds raise similar concerns. This is an area of great enforcement 
discretion, and midnight rules here seem designed primarily to limit the 
incoming administration’s options or force it to act to rescind the rule. An 
                                                                                                                      
 81. Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,272 
(December 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
 82. Id. at 76,280, 76,282–83. 
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example from the Clinton administration, which was technically not a mid-
night rule since it was issued in July 2000, involved the standards governing 
enforcement of the statutory prohibition on federally-funded family plan-
ning clinics against using abortion as a method of family planning. The 
Clinton administration had suspended the Reagan administration’s so-called 
“gag rule” in February 1993, but did not promulgate a substitute until July 
2000.83 Without a rule in place for more than seven years, the Clinton 
administration operated in a legal limbo, perhaps unable to enforce the 
statutory prohibition. Only when political transition was looming did the 
administration find it desirable to promulgate a substitute regulation.  
Another example, also related to abortion, raises similar timing concerns. 
On December 19, 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services 
promulgated a rule requiring recipients of federal health care funds to certify 
that they would allow their employees to refuse to provide medical services 
they find contrary to their moral or religious values.84 This new, controver-
sial, funding requirement would be enforced by the incoming Obama 
administration, which was likely to have different views on the subject.85 
William Howell and Kenneth Mayer offer another political explanation 
for midnight rulemaking and other midnight action by outgoing administra-
tions. They argue that because a lame duck President’s political capital with 
Congress is reduced, the President must act unilaterally to get anything 
done.86 During the midnight period, Congress has no incentive to cooperate 
with a President who will not be running again, especially when the incum-
bent’s party has just lost the White House. Howell and Mayer theorize that 
during periods when the President is unlikely to convince Congress to enact 
his priorities, he is more likely to act unilaterally through executive orders 
and in ways that require cooperation only from within the executive branch, 
such as agency rulemaking.87 Thus, midnight regulation might partly be the 
result of the President’s inability to enact his policies legislatively. 
When the incoming President is of a different political party than the 
incumbent, another factor that may contribute to midnight rulemaking is 
the desire of the outgoing administration to make the transition more diffi-
cult for the incoming administration. Dealing with midnight rulemaking is 
                                                                                                                      
 83. See Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning 
Service Projects, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,270 (July 3, 2000) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59). 
 84. Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Sup-
port Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072 (Dec. 19, 2008) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
 85. This rule was rescinded in part by the Obama administration. See Regulation for 
the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 
9968 (Feb. 23, 2011). 
 86. See Howell & Mayer, supra note 30, at 538–43. 
 87. See id. 
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time-consuming and politically costly. Given the familiar pattern of regula-
tory freezes, extensions of effective dates, withdrawals of rules proposed late 
in outgoing administrations, and withdrawals from the Federal Register of 
final but not-yet published rules, midnight rulemaking imposes known costs 
on incoming administrations. Simply put, midnight rulemaking forces 
administrations to look backward, even when looking back at midnight rules 
may have negative political consequences, at the time when they would 
much prefer to be moving forward on their own agendas.88  
For example, in what is perhaps the most widely-reported instance of 
an incoming administration revisiting a midnight rule, the GW Bush  
administration faced serious public criticism when it delayed the effective-
ness of a midnight rule reducing the acceptable level of arsenic in drinking  
water.89 There was concern among senior officials in the incoming GW 
Bush administration that this rule had been rushed through and that it 
would be very expensive for many municipal water systems, especially in 
western states. Due to these concerns, on the rule’s original effective date of 
March 23, 2001, the EPA issued a notice delaying the effective date of the 
rule for sixty days.90 This action provoked a substantial public outcry with 
accusations that the new administration was rolling back important envi-
ronmental protections. The GW Bush administration’s next step was for the 
EPA to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking on April 23, 2001, to delay 
the effective date of the rule for an additional nine months to allow further 
study.91 The comment period was open for two weeks, and on May 22, 2001, 
the EPA promulgated a rule delaying the effective date of the arsenic rule 
for the nine months proposed.92 In the final rule delaying the effective date 
                                                                                                                      
 88. See Nina A. Mendelson, Quick off the Mark: Empowering the President-Elect, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 464, 465–66 (2009); Morriss et al., supra note 70, at 557–578; 
Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of Presidential Transitions, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (2006). 
 89. Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Moni-
toring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142). See 
BRITO & DE RUGY, supra note 50, at 5. 
 90. Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Moni-
toring: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,134 (Mar. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142). The Notice contained the GW Bush administration’s typical reasons 
for acting without notice and comment and with no delay in the effective date of the  
action—namely, that it is exempt as a rule of procedure, that notice and comment would be 
impracticable and contrary to the public interest, and that the imminence of the effective 
date provides good cause for making the delay effective immediately. 
 91. Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Moni-
toring, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,580 (proposed Apr. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 
142). 
 92. Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Moni-
toring: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,342 (May 22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142). 
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of the arsenic rule until February 2002, the EPA stated that the National 
Science Foundation was studying the health issues related to arsenic levels 
in drinking water and the National Drinking Water Advisory Council was 
studying the compliance cost issues related to the rule. When the National 
Science Foundation’s study supported the new standard,93 the EPA  
announced that the rule would go into effect as promulgated.94  
B. Normative Views of Midnight Rulemaking 
Many people from different political perspectives react negatively to 
the phenomenon of midnight rulemaking.95 Although the Constitution 
provides for a fully-empowered administration to remain in office for more 
than two months after the election, many observers, from both ends of the 
political spectrum, find fault when outgoing administrations continue to 
exercise all of their powers and indeed increase the pace at which they act 
after the election. This is especially so when the people have chosen a new 
President of a different party with a different regulatory philosophy. Mid-
night rulemaking has been criticized on many grounds ranging from 
principled objections to increases in regulatory activity by administrations 
as they leave office, to practical concerns over the quality of midnight rules. 
This Part sets out and analyzes the major criticisms that have been leveled 
at midnight rulemaking.96 The discussion begins with objections based on 
principle and concludes with objections based on policy concerns. Many of 
these objections overlap in obvious ways. 
1. The Principled Objection: For many, it seems that the root of criti-
cism of midnight regulation is the view that, on principle, the President and 
agencies should not increase the pace of regulatory activity at the end of the 
term and, if anything, should slow down after the election and leave major 
decisions to the new President.  
                                                                                                                      
 93. See SUBCOMM. TO UPDATE THE 1999 ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER REPORT, 
ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER: 2001 UPDATE (2001), available at http://www.nap.edu/ 
openbook/0309076293/html/R1.html. In fact, the National Science Foundation concluded 
that even the Clinton administration had underestimated the negative health effects of 
arsenic in drinking water. Id. at 14 (“The results of this subcommittee’s assessment . . . 
suggest that the risks for bladder and lung cancer incidence are greater than the risk esti-
mates on which EPA based its January 2001 pending rule.”). For further discussion of the 
merits of the arsenic rule, see Special Report: The Arsenic Controversy, REGULATION 42 (2001), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv24n3/specialreport.pdf. 
 94. See Press Release, EPA, EPA Announces Arsenic Standard for Drinking Water of 
10 Parts per Billion (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://yosemite1.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ 
b1ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/6d26c015b807156e85256af6007b9bed?OpenDocument. 
 95. See O’Connell, supra, note 17, at 913 (noting that most commentary of midnight 
regulation and crack-of-dawn activity has been disapproving). 
 96. For a catalog of criticisms of midnight rulemaking, see BRITO & DE RUGY, supra 
note 50, at 7–8. 
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2. Projection of the Agenda: Perhaps the most important basis of the 
principled objection to midnight rulemaking is the perception that the 
outgoing administration is illegitimately attempting to project its agenda 
beyond its constitutionally prescribed term.97 On this view, once an election 
has intervened, the agenda of the incoming President should be paramount. 
3. Accountability: Midnight rulemaking is often criticized because it 
occurs during a period of reduced accountability. After the presidential 
election, the incumbent President’s accountability is almost non-existent, 
especially with regard to a two-term President who is extremely unlikely to 
ever again stand for election to any position.  
4. Democracy and Participation: Closely related to the accountability 
objection is the argument that midnight rulemaking is contrary to principles 
of democracy. Once the people have elected a President of an opposing 
party, they have in effect rejected the outgoing President’s policies and have 
opted for the policies of the incoming President, and it is undemocratic for 
the outgoing President to continue to act in accordance with the policies 
espoused by the losing party in the presidential election. The democracy 
objection is stronger when the various steps of the rulemaking process that 
allow for public input and influence are rushed to meet the Inauguration 
Day deadline.  
5. Political Motivations: Midnight rulemaking is sometimes criticized as 
being overly political, done to score political points for the party that is 
leaving office, cause political pain to the incoming President and the incom-
ing President’s party and reward the outgoing President’s political allies. 
While all regulatory action is political to some extent, the balance between 
policy and political concerns is worse during the midnight period. 
6. The “Unseemly” Objection: Midnight rulemaking has been criticized 
as “unseemly” and tending to discredit the government and the regulatory 
system as a whole.98 Because many people find midnight rulemaking dis-
tasteful, episodes every four or eight years of this conduct reduce people’s 
respect for the law and government regulation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 97. For example, Mendelson has stated that “the agency’s choice in the last few weeks 
to proceed regardless of the new President’s views suggests an unsatisfied craving for  
power.” Mendelson, supra note 24, at 564. 
 98. See, e.g., Jay Cochran, Clinton’s “Cinderellas” Face Regulatory Midnight, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 13, 2000, at 17A (“Respect for the law erodes when it changes for no other apparent 
reason than the fact that an administration’s drop-dead date draws near.”), cited in O’Connell 
supra note 16, at 527 n.179. 
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7. The Transition Objection: Another objection to midnight rulemaking 
is that it makes the transition between administrations difficult99 because it 
distracts the incoming administration from its forward-looking agenda, 
forces it to expend time and effort reexamining midnight rules, and forces 
incoming administrations to incur political costs to revise or rescind mid-
night rules. 
8. Midnight Rulemaking is Wasteful: Given that a substantial propor-
tion of midnight rules are reexamined and many important ones will be 
revised or rescinded, midnight rulemaking is wasteful.100 Resources could be 
saved if outgoing administrations would coordinate their regulatory activity 
with the incoming administration during the midnight period. 
9. The Quality Objection: Midnight rules are criticized as likely to be 
of lower quality than rules issued during non-midnight periods. 
These criticisms of midnight rulemaking are far from universally 
shared. In fact, in the interviews conducted for this Article, most of the 
current and former government officials interviewed did not agree that 
midnight rulemaking is a serious problem. These interviewees included 
people from both major political parties who served during midnight peri-
ods or during the beginning of administrations. Their views included 
answers to all of the criticisms of midnight rulemaking discussed above. 
Further, many of the published criticisms of midnight rulemaking focus 
more on the substance of the rules than their timing. 
The defenders of midnight rulemaking begin from the premise that 
there is nothing illegitimate when the President continues to govern 
throughout the constitutionally-prescribed term, including the increased 
volume of rulemaking during the so-called midnight period. Most of the 
interviewees found hurrying to finish at the end of the administration an 
inevitable and defensible feature of government and they did not see nefari-
ous motives in the increased regulatory activity at the end of the term. The 
defenders of midnight rulemaking find outgoing administrations’ desire to 
project their agendas into the future as an expected feature of our political 
system and conclude that incoming administrations have adequate tools to 
deal with the problem.  
 
                                                                                                                      
 99. For a general look at presidential transitions, see Beermann & Marshall, supra note 
88. 
 100. See O’Connell, supra note 17, at 913–14. O’Connell poses two somewhat contradic-
tory reasons why midnight rulemaking hurts social welfare. The first reason is that it is 
wasteful because it imposes procedural costs on the new President or Congress when they act 
to rescind it. The second reason is that even if a midnight rule is a good one from the social 
welfare perspective, because it is a midnight rule, the incoming administration may reflexive-
ly act to rescind it, thus forgoing the social welfare benefits of the rule. Id. 
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The accountability objection is met with the reply that virtually all 
agency action completed during the midnight period had been on the  
agenda for years. There is no evidence that administrations wait until after 
the election to avoid accountability in a substantial number of cases. There 
may also be a positive aspect to the reduced accountability that exists after 
the presidential election, when Presidents, perhaps concerned with their 
legacies, may take beneficial actions that interest group pressures might 
have prevented before the election. 
Defenders argue that the democracy objection may be met with the  
rather formalistic response that the outgoing President was elected to serve 
the complete four-year term and thus actions taken, even at the end, are 
consistent with norms of democracy. There is also the more practical  
response that the incoming administration has tools to deal with midnight 
rules.  
As is discussed further below, there are several replies to the charge that 
midnight rules are excessively political. First, all rulemaking and other 
regulatory activities are political to a certain extent, but even in the mid-
night period, most rulemaking is routine and driven by the same 
considerations that motivate rulemaking during non-midnight periods. 
Second, judicial review and normal analytic standards that apply to agency 
action ensure that raw politics cannot displace the usual considerations that 
govern agency action in all periods. Third, incoming administrations have 
adequate tools to deal with ill-considered or unwise midnight rules.  
As far as the charge that midnight rulemaking is “unseemly,” it would 
not appear so if people understood that most midnight rulemaking is  
routine and they were not influenced by sensationalized accounts of major 
last-minute regulatory initiatives. 
The defenders of midnight rulemaking can answer the transition-based 
criticisms by observing that first, the problem is not really so bad, and 
second, that with constant, ongoing political competition, outgoing admin-
istrations should not be expected to smooth the transition for a President of 
the other political party.101 In fact, because so much regulatory activity, even 
at the very end of an administration, is routine, driven by statutory  
requirements and deadlines, and conducted by career officials, most mid-
night rulemaking is beneficial to the incoming administration if only 
because without midnight rulemaking, the new administration would be 
confronted with an enormous amount of work on which to catch up. This 
would more seriously impede the transition than the relatively few contro-
versial midnight rules that the incoming administration is likely to 
reexamine upon taking office.  
                                                                                                                      
 101. See Beermann & Marshall, supra note 88, at 1267–68. 
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Defenders can respond to the charge that midnight rulemaking is 
wasteful by noting that only a very small number of midnight rules are 
actually reversed by the new administration. Also, because most midnight 
rulemaking is necessary to keep the government moving forward, it is no 
more wasteful than rulemaking at any other time. 
On the issue of personnel burrowing, despite the problems associated 
with this practice, Mendelson concludes that personnel burrowing can have 
positive effects that may be sufficient to justify at least some of its uses. She 
sees the same benefits in some examples of midnight rulemaking, which she 
refers to as “policy burrowing.” Her basic point is that policy burrowing can 
fuel a healthy debate on issues that might not have been particularly salient 
during the election campaign102 and that personnel burrowing can help 
ensure a diversity of viewpoints within agencies so that policies are  
genuinely tested by debate before they are adopted.103 Mendelson believes 
that in both cases the quality and democratic legitimacy of agency action,  
including rulemaking, can improve because the agency’s proposals will be 
influenced by a greater diversity of viewpoints. Her view depends on her 
conclusion that presidential elections do not necessarily mean that the 
electorate has approved every policy espoused by the new President or his 
party or rejected every policy espoused by the outgoing President or his 
party. 
The final issue is quality—are midnight rules of lower quality than 
rules promulgated at other times? This is a difficult question to answer. 
Some midnight rules are promulgated more quickly than rules in non-
midnight periods and some rulemaking steps, such as OIRA review, are 
performed more quickly at midnight than at other times. It may be true that 
rules promulgated in less of a rush would be of higher quality, but most 
midnight rules are under consideration for a fairly long time and they go 
through the usual steps. As noted in Section II.A.1, Katzen explained that 
the rulemaking process was accelerated by performing multiple steps simul-
taneously rather than by skipping or truncating any of the normal steps for 
promulgating rules. Judicial review and reexamination by the incoming 
administration are adequate to deal with any small number of rules that 
might have been rushed out too quickly. 
                                                                                                                      
 102. Mendelson, supra note 24, at 627. Mendelson cites the policy debates that occurred 
in the early days of the GW Bush administration over the Clinton administration’s “roadless 
areas rule” and the rule reducing the permissible level of arsenic in drinking water as debates 
that benefited from the midnight timing of the rules. Id. at 619–32. 
 103. See id. at 641–42. 
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C. Summary 
Based on the above analysis and the interviews I conducted in connec-
tion with this Report, it appears that midnight rulemaking predominantly 
results from hurrying to complete work that has been pending since well 
before the November election, which agency officials fear might be scuttled 
or delayed by the transition. There is also a sense that outgoing administra-
tions are motivated by a belief that their policies are superior to those of the 
incoming administration and that this adds to the motivation to finish as 
much as possible before the transition. There are no more than isolated 
instances of delay (other than the common delay caused by the usual rigors 
of the rulemaking process) and little evidence that waiting to avoid the 
political consequences of rules is a widespread occurrence. 
III. EVALUATING MIDNIGHT RULES 
This Part of the Article discusses the quality of midnight rules. The 
question is whether there is any reason to believe that midnight rules are 
likely to be of lower quality than rules issued at other times. Performing 
this analysis faces the virtually insurmountable problem of measuring the 
quality of rules. It may be possible to identify qualitative problems with 
some rules anecdotally, but there is no simple, agreed-upon metric for  
determining the quality of agency rules. The quality of rules is likely to be 
in the eye of the beholder, informed heavily by political views and policy 
disagreements. One observer’s regulatory disaster may be another observer’s 
great regulatory victory. 
Without a direct measure of the quality of rules, some analysts have 
employed surrogate measures that are plausibly linked to the quality of 
rules. The two principal surrogates involve the length of time midnight 
rules are under consideration and whether the rules are rescinded or 
amended by the successor administration. These measures are undoubtedly 
imprecise and possibly of little value. However, given the difficulty of  
constructing more precise apolitical measures of quality, they may be the 
best measures available. The first portion of this Part of the Article  
discusses the published scholarship that attempts to measure the quality of 
midnight rules. 
The second portion of this Part discusses the results of the empirical 
study of the durability of midnight rules that I conducted in conjunction 
with preparing the Report upon which this Article is based. The study looks 
at the OIRA-reviewed midnight rules of the last three transitions from one 
party to the other and measures the likelihood that each administration’s 
midnight rules would be revised or rescinded by the subsequent administra-
tion. The midnight periods are compared to the same periods on the 
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calendar one year prior to the transition, as a control. The third portion of 
this Part looks at the quality of midnight rules in a different way, by asking 
whether certain categories of midnight rules are likely to suffer from the 
normative defects that many observers find in midnight rulemaking  
generally. In light of all of the published attacks on midnight rulemaking in 
recent years, this Part analyzes whether some midnight rules should be 
criticized even if it is generally very difficult to agree on a measure of  
quality that would serve as a basis for criticizing the bulk of midnight rules. 
This Part of the Article also summarizes interviews of government officials 
and observers on the subject of midnight rulemaking. 
A. Measuring the Quality of Midnight Rules 
Midnight rulemaking has been under attack at least since 2001, when 
Cochran published his quantitative look at the regulatory output of admin-
istrations as they left office. In addition to principled objections to 
midnight rulemaking, there has been concern expressed that the quality of 
midnight rules may be lower than the quality of rules issued without the 
pressure of the firm deadline presented by the change in administrations.104 
It is, however, very difficult to measure the quality of rules. Analysts’ views 
on the quality of rules are likely to be colored by their politics. 
In the interviews I conducted in late 2011 and early 2012 in connection 
with the ACUS Report upon which this Article is based, I asked each inter-
viewee105 whether they thought that midnight rules were of lower quality 
than rules issued at other times. Most interviewees did not believe that 
quality is a serious issue with regard to midnight rules. However, some 
interviewees expressed concern that in some cases OIRA review was done 
hastily and that some other rulemaking steps might have been rushed as 
well. GW Bush administration officials did not find quality problems with 
the EPA’s midnight rules, except for concerns about one rule that is  
discussed below. One interviewee thought that there were many rushed 
midnight rules in the GW Bush administration and that these rules were of 
lower quality. At least one official involved in the OIRA review process 
acknowledged that during the midnight period, OIRA may not go as deeply 
into some issues as it would if it had more time. Although there was some 
concern expressed that overly political rules without the usual basis in poli-
cy might be pushed through during the midnight period, the principal 
concern expressed by interviewees from both inside and outside govern-
ment was that the normal review process might be rushed and thus not as 
effective as usual in preventing problematic rules from being issued. One 
                                                                                                                      
 104. See Loring & Roth, supra note 11, at 1448. 
 105. See supra note * for a list of the interviewees with information on their experience 
and affiliations.  
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interviewee with lengthy experience in government stated that midnight 
rulemaking is not as serious of a problem as it once was because the review 
processes in place today are much better at preventing problematic rules 
from being issued. Thus, although some concerns were expressed, there was 
not a strong consensus that midnight rulemaking leads to lower quality 
rules. 
Due to the impossibility of constructing objective measures of the qual-
ity of rules, analysts have employed surrogate measures to attempt to shed 
light on whether midnight rules are likely to be of lower quality than rules 
issued at other times. The two primary surrogates employed are length of 
time under consideration and durability. The premises underlying the use 
of these as surrogate measures of quality are that lengthier consideration 
means more thorough consideration, which means higher quality, and that a 
durable rule is likely to be of higher quality than a rule that has been 
amended or rescinded. These premises are obviously subject to serious 
doubt. An administration can take its time and promulgate a low-quality 
rule and can hurry and promulgate a high-quality rule. A rule might be 
amended or rescinded because the subsequent administration disagrees with 
value laden policy aspects of the rule, not because the rule was of low  
quality. Thus, although these surrogates may be the best available, it is not 
clear that they are strongly indicative of quality. 
In terms of overall length of consideration, an analysis conducted for 
this Article by O’Connell106 of her data reveals that, on average, midnight 
rules are not under consideration for a shorter period of time than rules 
issued in non-midnight periods.107 O’Connell looked at the 16,826 completed 
rulemakings in her database (drawing from the Unified Agendas from the 
fall of 1983 through the spring of 2010)108 where both the NPRM and final 
action were issued between the start of the Reagan administration and the 
end of the GW Bush administration. She labeled rulemakings that had their 
final action between November 1 and January 20 of the final year of an 
administration as a midnight rulemaking, a slightly different definition of 
midnight rule than used in this Article. 
The average duration of rulemakings that did not end in the midnight 
period was 461.6 days. The average duration of rulemakings that did end in 
                                                                                                                      
 106. The author of this Article thanks Anne Joseph O’Connell for conducting this 
analysis of her data especially for the report on which this Article is based. 
 107. E-mail from Anne Joseph O’Connell, Professor, University of California, Berke-
ley, School of Law, to author (Dec. 29, 2011) (on file with author).  
 108. The Unified Agenda is the list of all pending and planned regulatory and deregu-
latory action by federal agencies. It is published twice per year, in Spring and Fall. See 
Current Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, OFFICE 
OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
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the midnight period was 487.7 days. The average duration of all these rule-
makings was 462.8 days.109 This is not much of a difference and to the 
extent there was a difference, rulemakings that ended in the midnight peri-
od were under consideration longer than non-midnight rules. 
O’Connell then narrowed her database to rulemakings that started and 
ended in the same administration. Among these rulemakings, the difference 
in duration between midnight rules and non-midnight rules was more pro-
nounced. Rulemakings that finished before the midnight period took 351.3 
days on average, whereas rulemakings that finished in the midnight period 
took 428.7 days on average. This pattern holds for every administration 
going back to the Reagan administration. 
O’Connell then checked her data to see whether there is an increase in 
rules of very short duration during the midnight period. Of the nearly 
17,000 final actions in her database, 4,664 of them (or about 25 percent) 
took 180 or fewer days.110 Of those 4,664 processes, 4,448 finished outside 
the midnight period and 216 finished within the midnight period. With 112 
total quarters and four midnight quarters, equal distribution of these short 
duration actions would produce about forty per quarter or 160 midnight 
rules. This means that there were proportionally more short-duration  
actions that ended during midnight periods (54 on average versus forty 
expected) than during non-midnight periods, with a total of, at most, 56 
additional short duration midnight rules since the Reagan administration 
than would exist if all short duration completions were evenly distributed. 
What does O’Connell’s analysis tell us about whether midnight rules 
are rushed through the process as compared to rules issued at other times? 
It appears that the data disprove the hypothesis that midnight rules are 
rushed. The data make it appear that midnight rulemaking is much more 
about completing work on rules that have long been under consideration 
than it is about rushing new initiatives out the door before the transition. 
The fact that rules issued during the midnight period were under considera-
tion on average longer than other rules suggests that some of these rules 
may have been of lower priority than other rules and that some of these 
rules may have been more difficult to complete, perhaps because they were 
complicated or controversial. This does not mean that there are no cases of 
rushed midnight rules. In fact, the greater than expected results for rules 
issued after being under consideration for fewer than 180 days during mid-
                                                                                                                      
 109. See generally O’Connell, supra note 16, at 513–18 (providing more information on 
duration of rulemaking proceedings). 
 110. O’Connell notes that the Unified Agenda lumps all final actions into one category 
whether they are rules or something else, so the data include completed proceedings that did 
not produce rules. 
Beermann_Final_Printer_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013 4:16 PM 
Spring 2013] Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda 321 
night periods suggests that there may be a slight tendency to rush a small 
number of rules through the process.  
Brito and de Rugy focused on one step of the process leading to rule-
making: review at OIRA.111 Their premise is that “[t]o the extent we believe 
that regulatory review is beneficial, midnight regulations are problematic 
because they undercut the benefits of the review process.”112 They fear that 
at the end of administrations, “[i]f the number of regulations OIRA must 
review goes up significantly and the man-hours and resources available to it 
remain constant, we can expect the quality of review to suffer.”113 To prove 
their point, Brito and de Rugy do not look at the actual duration of OIRA 
review of individual regulations. Rather, they merely considered the overall 
volume of rules.114 
The principal pieces of circumstantial evidence that Brito and de Rugy 
examined are the resources available to OIRA to conduct regulatory review 
and the number of rules reviewed by OIRA. In their view, because OIRA 
operates today with fewer resources than in the past115 and because those 
resources are not augmented to help it cope with the flood of midnight 
rules submitted for review, it is logical to conclude that “the amount of time 
and attention OIRA devoted to each regulation reviewed [is] considerably 
less during midnight periods.”116 
To support their conclusion, Brito and de Rugy relied on a study con-
ducted by Mercatus Center researcher Patrick A. McLaughlin.117 McLaughlin 
conducted a detailed study of OIRA review during midnight periods, in 
part, due to doubts that pages in the Federal Register is a good measure of 
the volume of regulatory activity.118 McLaughlin’s study revealed an increase 
in the number of economically significant119 rules submitted to OIRA for 
                                                                                                                      
 111. For an insider’s history of centralized review of regulations, see Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s 
Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Found-
ing, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 37 (2011). 
 112. Brito & de Rugy, supra note 15, at 183. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 186. 
 115. Id. at 183–84 (“[I]n real terms, OIRA’s budget has decreased since its inception.”). 
 116. Id. at 186. See also Patrick A. McLaughlin, The Consequences of Midnight Regulations 
and Other Surges in Regulatory Activity, 147 PUB. CHOICE 395, 409 (2011) (finding that, on 
average, review time was twenty-five days shorter during the midnight period). 
 117. See McLaughlin, supra note 50. 
 118. McLaughlin posits that the number of pages published in the Federal Register 
may not reflect the actual volume of regulatory activity because of the possibility that dereg-
ulatory action and other non-regulatory documents may inflate the page total. McLaughlin 
views the number of economically significant rules reviewed by OIRA as a potentially 
superior measure of the actual volume of regulatory activity. 
 119. Executive Order 12,866 section 3(f) defines as “significant” any regulatory action 
predicted to “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely 
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, 
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review during midnight periods of about six regulations per month or about 
7%.120 McLaughlin also found that the ratio of economically significant rules 
to all regulations increased and that the increase is due to a higher number 
of economically significant rules submitted, rather than a decrease in the 
review of non-significant rules.121 McLaughlin also found a significant  
decrease in the amount of time midnight rules are under review at OIRA: 
“[W]hen controlling for the number of economically significant and signifi-
cant rules as well as differences across administrations, the mean review 
time decreased during the midnight period by an astonishing twenty-five 
days. That is a 50 percent decrease relative to the mean review time over the 
entire period.”122 
McLaughlin acknowledges that it is not possible to draw the inference 
that faster review at OIRA reduces the quality of rules. As he notes, we 
don’t really know whether OIRA was operating at full capacity at any time 
and whether shorter total time under review actually indicates reduced 
scrutiny. As he states, “there is no way of knowing whether a rule that was 
‘under review’ by OIRA for twenty days was actually being worked on for 
twenty days or sat on someone’s desk for nineteen days and was worked on 
for one day.”123 We also do not know how much OIRA review actually con-
tributes to the quality of rules.124 All we really know is that during midnight 
                                                                                                                      
jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or 
communities[.]” See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 745 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 108 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 120. McLaughlin, supra note 50, at 16. McLaughlin’s analysis of the data eliminates any 
explanation other than timing, such as political party of the President, for the increase 
during midnight periods. 
 121. See id. at 17–19. McLaughlin found that this ratio increased by 42% during the 
entire period studied (1981–2007) and by 55% during the midnight periods from 1994 to 
2007. 
 122. Id. at 21–22. McLaughlin also found that an increase in the ratio between econom-
ically significant rules and non-significant rules also causes a decrease in review time. 
Although this finding is impressive, McLaughlin may not be completely correct in his 
apparent assumption that the volume of rules is what causes reduced time for review. As 
McLaughlin seems to understand, the transition between administrations is treated as a 
deadline for finishing work on regulations, especially now that all incoming administrations 
impose regulatory freezes upon taking office. See id. at 25–26. The reduced review time at 
OIRA during midnight periods may be due more to the impending deadline than to the fact 
that OIRA has more rules to review without increased resources. Even if only a single 
midnight rule were submitted to OIRA on December 15 of a transition year, it would be 
expected that this rule would be reviewed quickly to allow the rule to be promulgated before 
the end of the term on January 20. In fact, if volume were the only consideration, it would be 
expected that review time would increase with a higher volume of rules to review rather than 
decrease. 
 123. Id. at 19. 
 124. As McLaughlin states, “Is the quality of regulations affected by midnight regula-
tions and other election cycle phenomena? While this question seems important, it also 
seems unanswerable without some good definition and consistent measure of regulation 
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periods, review by OIRA is abbreviated as compared with review during 
other periods. 
Another study, by McLaughlin and Jerry Ellig, used the Mercatus Cen-
ter’s Regulatory Report Card project to examine how OIRA review affects 
the quality of regulatory impact analysis generally and of midnight rules in 
particular.125 Because they were looking only at rules proposed and issued in 
2008, they defined midnight rules as “any proposed regulation that had its 
OIRA review completed after June 1, [2008], in accordance with the Bolten 
memorandum,126 and that became a final rule during the period between 
Election Day and Inauguration Day, in accordance with the traditional 
definition of midnight regulations.”127 They found that although the midnight 
rules in their small sample were not under review for a shorter period of 
time at OIRA, the quality of regulatory analysis of midnight rules based on 
a score on twelve factors—four of which involve openness, four of which 
involve quality of analysis, and four of which involve the use of the  
analysis—was lower for what they called prescriptive rules, which are rules 
that regulate conduct (as opposed to transfer rules, which are rules that 
                                                                                                                      
quality . . . . If more OIRA review time leads to higher quality, then outbursts of regulatory 
activity such as those of midnight periods may lead to lower quality regulations. Of course, it 
is entirely possible that OIRA review time does not have any effect on regulation quality, 
but that does not eliminate the question. Also, even if OIRA review does improve regulation 
quality, it is not necessarily the case that the number of days a regulation is ‘under review’ 
actually correlates to a more thorough review.” Id. at 26–27. 
 125. See Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of 
Regulatory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush II Administration, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 179 (2011) [hereinafter Does OIRA Review]. The Merca-
tus Center’s Regulatory Report Card is a study by McLaughlin and Ellig that analyzed 
regulatory analyses performed in 2008 and scored them on 12 factors involving openness, 
quality of analysis, and use of the analysis. The four openness factors are accessibility of 
relevant documents, data documentation, model documentation (how verifiable the models 
and assumptions are used), and clarity of the analysis. The four quality of analysis factors are 
whether the outcomes identified are desirable, whether the analysis identifies systemic 
problems, how well the analysis assesses alternatives, and how well the analysis assesses costs 
and benefits. The four use of analysis factors are whether the agency used the analysis in its 
decisionmaking, whether the agency maximized net benefits or explained why it chose not 
to, whether the rule establishes verifiable measures and goals, and whether the agency indi-
cated what data it will use to assess the regulation’s performance. See Jerry Ellig & Patrick 
McLaughlin, The Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis in 2008 (Mercatus Ctr., George 
Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 10-34, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1639747. 
 126. The Bolten Memo instructed agencies not to initiate any new rulemaking pro-
ceedings after June 1, 2008, and to complete all rulemaking proceedings by November 1, 
2008. Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, White House Chief of Staff, to Heads of Exec. 
Dep’ts and Agencies and the Admin. of the Office of Info. and Regulatory Affairs (May 9, 
2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/ 
cos_memo_5_9_08.pdf. This Memorandum is reproduced in the Appendix to this Article, 
available at http://www.mjealonline.org/documents. 
 127. Does OIRA Review, supra note 125, at 196. 
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involve only revenue).128 While this study is interesting, its narrow focus 
and small sample render it of limited value in understanding the midnight 
rulemaking phenomenon. In particular, lower scores on the Mercatus Cen-
ter’s Regulatory Report Card may not translate into lower quality rules, and 
the small number of rules proposed and completed between June 1, 2008, 
and the end of the GW Bush administration may not be representative of 
midnight rules generally. 
Jason Loring and Liam Roth conducted a study aimed at another possi-
ble proxy for quality of rules: durability.129 Durability of a rule refers simply 
to whether a rule is still in effect. The assumption is that lower durability is 
correlated with lower quality. This is, of course, not necessarily a valid 
assumption. There are many reasons unrelated to quality that may result in 
the repeal or amendment of a rule, including policy differences, obsoles-
cence, and statutory changes in Congress. However, without a direct  
measure of quality, durability may provide some indication of the quality of 
rules, or at least an indication of whether it was worthwhile for the outgoing 
administration to promulgate midnight rules. 
Loring and Roth defined the midnight period as the period between 
the election and the inauguration of the new President. In their study of 
two transitions, GHW Bush to Clinton and Clinton to GW Bush, they 
identified all regulations promulgated by three agencies (EPA, OSHA, and 
NHTSA) during each midnight period, and they sorted them into signifi-
cant and non-significant categories pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 12,291 
and 12,866.130 Using the Federal Register database in Westlaw, they then 
determined whether each rule had been amended or rescinded. They con-
sidered a regulation as “accepted” by the subsequent administration if it was 
not amended or rescinded, even if it had been briefly delayed for further 
review pursuant to the common practices of incoming administrations.131 
Loring and Roth found that the three agencies issued twenty-three  
final rules during GHW Bush’s midnight period, ten of which were signifi-
cant.132 The same agencies published thirty-three regulations during the 
Clinton Midnight Period, sixteen of which were significant.133 In both 
administrations, EPA was the most prolific issuer of midnight rules,  
followed by NHTSA in the GHW Bush administration, and OSHA in the 
Clinton administration. The ratio of significant to non-significant rules in 
each administration was similar.134  
                                                                                                                      
 128. See id. at 198–202. 
 129. Loring & Roth, supra note 11. 
 130. Id. at 1451–52. 
 131. Id. at 1452. 
 132. Id. at 1455 tbl.3. 
 133. Id. at 1455 tbl.3. 
 134. Id. 
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The two incoming administrations reacted differently to their predeces-
sors’ midnight rules. The Clinton administration accepted 43% of the 
GHW Bush administration’s midnight rules, amended 48% of the rules, and 
rescinded 9% of them.135 The GW Bush administration accepted 82% of the 
Clinton administration’s midnight rules, amended 15%, and rescinded only 
3%.136 The Clinton administration was more aggressive in amending and 
rescinding significant midnight rules than midnight rules overall. It accept-
ed only 30% of the GHW Bush administration’s significant rules from the 
three agencies, while amending or repealing 70%.137 The GW Bush admin-
istration’s reaction to significant midnight rules was slightly more aggressive 
than its reaction to midnight rules generally, accepting 75% of significant 
rules and amending or repealing 25%.138  
Loring and Roth were struck by the low rate at which each administra-
tion rescinded midnight regulations (9 percent by Clinton and 3 percent by 
Bush), as opposed to amending them.139 They posited the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance140 as the explanation for this. They characterized State Farm as 
holding that “even deregulation requires a reasoned justification, using the 
same ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard under which a passed regulation 
must qualify.”141 They also posited that State Farm may explain the GW 
Bush administration’s greater reluctance to even amend the Clinton admin-
istration’s midnight rules: 
Given President George W. Bush’s anti-regulatory leaning, the  
administration may believe it faces an uphill battle in justifying 
partial reductions in existing, justified regulations. This would  
especially be the case in the area of health and safety, where  
deregulation may appear callous and prove more difficult to justify. 
This problem, however, would likely not be experienced by the pro-
regulatory Clinton administration. Justifying an amendment that 
raised the regulatory bar on health and safety would likely be easier 
than justifying one tearing it down. This may explain the Clinton 
                                                                                                                      
 135. Id. at 1456 tbl.4. 
 136. Id. at 1457 tbl.5. 
 137. Id. at 1458 tbl.6. 
 138. Id. at 1458 tbl.7. Loring and Roth’s study concludes with a useful appendix of all 
the midnight rules they looked at in their study, with information on whether each was 
significant or not and whether the incoming administration took any action to amend or 
repeal each rule. See id. at 1461–65 apps. A, B. 
 139. See id. at 1456–57. 
 140. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–
42 (1983). 
 141. See Loring & Roth, supra note 11, at 1457. 
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administration’s willingness to amend nearly half (48%) of the 
[GHW Bush] administration’s midnight regulations.142 
State Farm is a plausible explanation for an overall reluctance to repeal 
or amend any final rule, but it is not plausible as an explanation for greater 
reluctance to repeal than to amend, or as an explanation for the difference 
in behavior between the Clinton and GW Bush administrations. Until FCC 
v. Fox Television Stations, some understood State Farm as imposing height-
ened scrutiny on regulatory changes as compared to initial regulatory 
decisions.143 In other words, courts were thought to be more skeptical when 
agencies changed existing rules than when they promulgated a new rule in 
unregulated territory. This may have been the accepted understanding of 
the decision during both the Clinton and GW Bush administrations. But 
there is no support for Loring and Roth’s apparent understanding that State 
Farm imposed a higher standard of review on rescissions than amendments 
and on deregulation than regulation. Moreover, State Farm does not explain 
why administrations would prefer amendment to repeal. According to its 
principal holding, amendment, just as repeal, must meet the same “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard of judicial review. 
Perhaps Loring and Roth are correct about the GW Bush administra-
tion’s perceptions, but again this would be a serious misreading of even the 
pre-Fox Television understanding of State Farm. State Farm imposed the same 
standard of review on deregulation as had always existed for regulation. The 
reading of State Farm that was rejected in Fox Television was that change 
required greater justification than initial regulation. There was never a 
suggestion that deregulatory change required greater justification than pro-
regulatory change. 
There is a simpler explanation for the preponderance of amendments 
over rescissions. Many statutes passed by Congress require agency regula-
tions before they can have any effect. These laws, known as “intransitive 
laws,” require action by others, usually agencies, to put them into effect. 
When confronted with midnight regulations promulgated under such laws, 
the incoming administration’s only real choice is to accept or amend the 
rules, because repeal would leave the law unenforced and might violate 
statutory deadlines. This need to have regulations in place is a much more 
likely explanation for the tendency to amend rather than rescind regulations 
than Loring and Roth’s unprecedented misreading of State Farm. 
Loring and Roth also offer an explanation for the Clinton administra-
tion’s greater willingness to revisit midnight rules than the GW Bush 
                                                                                                                      
 142. Id. at 1457 (footnotes omitted). 
 143. See Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 45–46 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Jack M. Beermann, 
Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 352, 361–62 (2009). 
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administration’s. They raise the possibility that the Clinton administration 
started out very liberal, but became more moderate in its second term, so 
that GW Bush would be likely to accept more of the Clinton administra-
tion’s midnight rules than would the Clinton administration accept those of 
GHW Bush.144 This explanation is plausible but highly speculative. There 
are two alternative explanations that seem just as plausible: first, the very 
close election in 2000 meant the incoming Bush administration did not 
have a strong mandate for change, and second, the GW Bush administration 
was more interested in moving forward with its agenda than in revisiting 
the midnight rules of its predecessor.  
For the purposes of this Article, the Loring and Roth study illustrates 
that incoming administrations vary in the intensity of their willingness to 
revisit the midnight rules of their predecessors and that it is possible for 
incoming administrations to revisit, through amendment or repeal, a sub-
stantial proportion of the midnight rules they confront upon taking office. 
Further information on the durability of midnight rules is contained in 
a CRS Report authored by Copeland on GW Bush administration midnight 
rules, which contains anecdotal evidence on the status of notable midnight 
rules. Copeland describes three rules that went into effect after postpone-
ment, including one rule issued under the Endangered Species Act that 
Congress legislatively granted the Obama administration permission to 
withdraw,145 and twenty-five rules that, as of August 29, 2009, were under 
scrutiny. Many of these rules were not in effect, having been “delayed, 
stayed, amended, or rescinded.”146 This includes rules that were still under 
review by the Obama administration, were being considered for rejection by 
Congress, or were the subject of petitions for judicial review. This is not a 
particularly high number of rules in light of the total output of 341 rules 
                                                                                                                      
 144. See Loring & Roth, supra note 11, at 1441–42, 1456–58. 
 145. See COPELAND, supra note 22, at 6–7. See also Mandatory Country of Origin 
Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised Fish and Shell-
fish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 
74 Fed. Reg. 2658, (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 60, 65); Special Rule for 
the Polar Bear, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,249 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Rail 
Transportation Security, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,130 (Nov. 26, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 
pts. 1520, 1580). As Copeland reports, The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, enacted on 
March 11, 2009, granted the Secretary of the Interior permission for 60 days to withdraw the 
Polar Bear rule, but the Secretary decided to retain the rule, promising to closely monitor its 
implementation to decide whether additional measures are necessary to protect polar bears. 
See COPELAND, supra note 22, at 7. Another rule, on “Interagency Cooperation Under the 
Endangered Species Act” was withdrawn pursuant to Congress’s permission. See id. at 26 
tbl.1. 
 146. See COPELAND, supra note 22, at 7–27. Of the 25 rules, Copeland reports that as of 
the date of his report, 14 were fully or partially in effect, one was subject to a delay in its 
effective date, and the other 10 were not in effect due to agency or court-imposed delays or 
rescissions. See id. at 26–27 tbl.1. 
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that Copeland characterizes as midnight rules issued by the GW Bush 
administration, but it likely represents a higher percentage of rules than are 
challenged or revisited during non-midnight periods. 
What do these studies tell us about the quality of midnight rules? Not 
very much. It seems likely that some midnight rules receive somewhat less 
scrutiny from OIRA than rules promulgated at other times, and midnight 
rules may be somewhat more subject to amendment and rescission than 
rules issued at other times. However, these tendencies are not very pro-
nounced and it is not clear that these possibilities indicate that the rules 
issued are of lower quality. 
The next qualitative issue is whether midnight deregulation is a special 
case; i.e., is there something different when the outgoing administration’s 
midnight rules are deregulatory rather than regulatory in effect? As a matter 
of form, the GW Bush administration’s midnight rules were similar to the 
midnight rules issued by other administrations. By and large, they had been 
on the table long before the November election, and because the Bolten 
Memo set an early deadline for the completion of rulemaking,147 more of 
the administration’s late-term actions were completed before the midnight 
period than had been the case in prior transitions.148  
                                                                                                                      
 147. See infra Section IV.C.. 
 148. One noteworthy example of a rule that was published after the Bolten Memo’s 
June 15 deadline was a proposal by the Secretary of Labor concerning risk-assessment by 
OSHA. This rule, which was not included in the Department of Labor’s Regulatory Agenda 
until Fall, 2008, see Requirements for DOL Agencies’ Assessment of Occupational Health Risks, 
OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=200810&RIN=1290-AA23 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012), after the 
proposed rule was published, was viewed by some as an effort to make it very difficult for 
OSHA to enact new standards protecting workers. The GW Bush administration allegedly 
had promulgated only one OSHA standard in its eight years, and that under court order. See 
Carol D. Leonnig, U.S. Rushes to Change Workplace Toxin Rules, WASH. POST, July 23, 2008, at 
A1. The proposal was first made public via an internet posting on OMB’s website on July 7, 
2008, id., and the rule was proposed on August 29, 2008. Requirements for DOL Agencies’ 
Assessment of Occupational Health Risks, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,909 (proposed Aug. 29, 2008) (to 
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2). That it did not appear on the Department of Labor’s Unified 
Agenda until after it had already been proposed is unusual. Of the 29 rules listed as at the 
“Final Rule Stage” in the Department of Labor’s Fall 2008 Unified Agenda, this was one of 
only two that had not previously been included. The other was a rule concerning a newly 
authorized payment to survivors of certain federal employees who died while serving in the 
armed forces. That rule was finally promulgated as an interim final rule nearly a year later by 
the Obama administration. See Death Gratuity Under the Federal Employees’ Compensa-
tion Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,617 (Aug. 18, 2009) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 10). The risk 
assessment rule was not finalized during the GW Bush administration and the proposal was 
withdrawn by the Obama administration one year after it was made. Requirements for DOL 
Agencies’ Assessment of Occupational Health Risks, 74 Fed. Reg. 44,795 (proposed Aug. 31, 
2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2).  
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There was a perception that the midnight rules issued by the outgoing 
GW Bush administration were predominantly deregulatory in nature.149 
This perception is only partly accurate. While there was a healthy amount 
of deregulatory midnight rulemaking by the GW Bush administration,150 
some of that administration’s midnight rules imposed new regulatory bur-
dens, not in terms of new health and safety requirements, but rather in the 
form of increased compliance burdens in line with the administration’s 
ideological commitments.151 In general, the GW Bush administration’s 
midnight regulations reflected what one would expect based on the policies 
of the administration, deregulating in the environmental area and regulating 
labor unions and abortion providers more strictly. 
From one perspective, midnight action removing or easing regulatory 
burdens may appear more problematic than midnight action imposing 
                                                                                                                      
 149. See Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Deregulation in TRANSITIONS: LEGAL CHANGE, 
LEGAL MEANINGS 17 (Austin Sarat, ed., 2012); OMB WATCH, TURNING BACK THE CLOCK: 
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE LEGACY OF BUSH-ERA MIDNIGHT REGULATIONS 
(2009), available at http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10496 (“Many of these so-called mid-
night regulations were deregulatory in nature, targeting public protections for the environ-
ment, workers, and the general citizenry.”); Blake, supra at 3. 
 150. The OMB Watch report contains numerous examples. OMB WATCH, supra note 
149. Here are two of them: on December 19, 2008, the EPA published a rule reclassifying 
certain fuel wastes that would allow them to be burned rather than disposed of in a more 
sensitive manner as hazardous wastes. Expansion of RCRA Comparable Fuel Exclusion, 73 
Fed. Reg. 77,954 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 261). This rule was with-
drawn by the Obama administration. Withdrawal of Emission-Comparable Fuel Exclusion 
Under RCRA, 75 Fed. Reg. 33,712 (June 15, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261). On 
December 18, 2009, the EPA promulgated a rule exempting farms from the obligation to 
report emissions from animal wastes. CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemp-
tion for Air Releases of Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 Fed. Reg. 
76,948 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 302, 355). This rule apparently 
remains in effect.  
 151. For example, on January 21, 2009, a regulation promulgated by the GW Bush 
administration’s Department of Labor imposed increased reporting requirements on Labor 
Unions. Labor Organization Annual Financial Reports, 74 Fed. Reg. 3678 (Jan. 21, 2009) (to 
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 403, 408). This rule was rescinded by the Obama administra-
tion. Labor Organization Annual Financial Reports, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,401 (Oct. 13, 2009) (to 
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 403, 408). On December 19, 2008, the Department of Health 
and Human Services promulgated a rule requiring health care providers receiving federal 
funds to certify that they will allow their employees to withhold services based on religious 
or moral grounds. Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not 
Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 
Fed. Reg. 78,072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). This rule was rescinded 
in large part by the Obama administration. See Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal 
Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9968 (Feb. 23, 2011) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). In the article cited above entitled “The Midnight De-
Regulation Express,” two of the five rules discussed imposed new or increased regulatory 
burdens, including the health care rule discussed above and another rule increasing local 
governments’ intelligence gathering powers. See Blake, supra note 3. 
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them, because it appears to be the product of waiting for a period of  
reduced political accountability, rather than the simple completion of pending 
tasks before the transition deadline. The passage of broad, public interest 
programs such as environmental regulation and consumer protection occurs 
contrary to public choice predictions that narrow interests opposing regula-
tion are likely to dominate politically and prevent the imposition of 
regulatory burdens. Legislation or regulation with broadly enjoyed benefits 
and concentrated costs come about when the public demand for them is 
more intense than usual. During the midnight period, deregulation may 
reflect the narrow interests that were defeated when the regulation first 
went into effect. Although the accuracy of this portrayal is uncertain, it is 
how some portrayed the GW Bush midnight deregulation, and the ideologi-
cal nature of the midnight rules imposing increased reporting and other 
regulatory burdens exacerbates this perception.  
However, the relative desirability of midnight deregulation may simply 
be a reflection of one’s views on the merits of regulation generally. From the 
perspective of many, a great deal of regulation is contrary to the public 
interest, so that any effort to ease regulatory burdens is consistent with the 
public interest. Under this view, midnight deregulation is more likely to 
reflect the public interest than midnight regulation. People with different 
views on the general wisdom of regulation may have irreconcilably different 
views on the desirability of midnight deregulation. Understood in this way, 
midnight rules reflecting a deregulatory policy are no different from mid-
night rules imposing additional regulatory burdens. 
B. The Volume and Durability of Midnight Rules 
This Part reports the results of the study I conducted of midnight rules 
that looks at the durability of the midnight rules of the last three admin-
istrations.152 While durability is a weak proxy for quality of midnight rules, 
using durability has another advantage. It tests whether incoming admin-
istrations are spending time reviewing and revising (or rescinding) 
midnight rules, which has implications for the general normative desirabil-
ity of midnight rulemaking.  
For purposes of this study, I have designated the final three months of 
each administration as the midnight period. This captures all rules issued 
from October 20th of the election year through Inauguration Day.153 The 
                                                                                                                      
 152. For a disclaimer concerning the statistical validity of the data reported here, see 
supra note 4. 
 153. Despite the fact that much of the discussion of midnight regulation focuses on 
post-election activity, the three-month period, which includes two weeks before the election, 
is appropriate for several reasons. First, some of the studies already done, including 
Cochran’s seminal work, used this measure. Using a different measure would reduce the 
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study takes all the OIRA-reviewed rules during the last three midnight 
periods and checks whether they have been suspended, rescinded or amend-
ed, (or whether amendments have been proposed).154 It then takes the rules 
from three non-midnight periods one year prior to each studied midnight 
period, does the same analysis, and then compares the durability of non-
midnight rules to the durability of midnight rules. 
The methodology of the study involved first conducting a search for 
“final rules” using the OIRA official website155 with the aid of three  
research assistants. I then searched and identified all amendments made to 
those rules during the succeeding presidential term using the Government 
Printing Office Federal Digital System database156 and the Westlaw Federal 
Register database. The amendments were further distinguished by two cate-
gories: amendments that delayed the effective date of the final rule in order 
to give the agency more time to review it, and actual amendments in the 
form of proposed rules or final rules.  
In order to assess the relative durability of midnight regulations, I set 
up three corresponding control periods for each midnight rule period. I 
selected the same period on the calendar one year prior to each midnight 
regulations period to serve as the corresponding control term (e.g., October 
20, 2007, to January 20, 2008, served as the control period for the Bush to 
Obama transition). I applied the same three-step search method to identify 
the final rules and amendments for the control periods.  
In selecting the control periods for this study, I considered which year 
within a presidential term is most likely to represent a “normal” sample of 
regulatory activity. Factors that may distort regulatory activity, like mid-
                                                                                                                      
utility of much of the earlier work on the subject or would require re-analysis of the data 
using the new period. Second, the proportion of the period before the election is relatively 
short, making it unlikely that including it will skew the results in any way. Third, while the 
most controversial practice may be to wait to promulgate important rules until after the 
election, rules issued earlier, for example, once the campaign is in full swing, are still prob-
lematic if they are timed for political reasons. If anything, there are good arguments that it 
would be appropriate to study regulatory activity throughout the election campaign. However, 
the three-month period at the end of an administration is a reasonable time period that 
focuses primarily on the post-election period but includes at least a small period of pre-
election activity, during which the timing of regulatory activity might raise questions. The 
post-election period is obviously when political accountability is the most serious issue, but 
focus on that period should not be to the exclusion of considering whether actions taken in 
other periods are suspect. 
 154. Originally, this study was to include examination of whether the rules had been 
rejected, in whole or in part, on judicial review. However, this aspect of the study proved 
infeasible because of the volume of rules and the difficulty of discerning whether a particular 
C.F.R. section under judicial review was derived from a particular rulemaking. 
 155. Historical Reports, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport (last visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
 156. Federal Digital System, U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
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term elections, eliminated the second year following a presidential election 
as a potential control term. I disqualified the first year of a presidential 
administration as a control period because of the historical tendency for 
administrative overhaul in the early years of a presidential term. The year 
immediately preceding a midnight regulations year was chosen as the con-
trol period because it has the fewest potentially distortive external factors, 
and therefore reflects the most “normal” comparable period of regulatory 
activity.  
The final rules, amendments, and judicial review actions were used to 
construct a comprehensive database of OIRA-reviewed rulemaking during 
the last three midnight periods and their corresponding control periods. 
The database is organized by agency name and displays the following  
information for each rule if it was available: 
Rule name 
Federal Register citation 
Code of Federal Regulations citation 
Date rule was published in the Federal Register 
Date the rule became effective 
Summary of the rule 
Amendment’s Federal Register citation, publication date, effective 
date, and summary 
Beermann
Spring 2
The st
TABL
 
As
issued 
were a
the co
posed.
OIRA
amend
of whi
GW B
rules i
posed,
contro
Th
amend
          
 157. 
istration
Order 1
significa
RULEMA
(2004) (
of Exec
D
A
F
_Final_Printer_Read
013] 
udy results ap
E 3: OIRA-R
 illustrated b
during the G
mended or ha
ntrol period, 
157 During the
-reviewed fin
ments propos
ch 25 were eit
ush to Obam
ssued, of wh
 as compared
l period of wh
e data revea
ments were 
                     
The absolute 
 are higher than
2,866, 3 C.F.R. 
ntly. See CURT
KING: THE ROL
describing signi
. Order No. 12,86
elays
mendments (propo
inal Rules
y_FINAL_12June201
Midnight
pear in the ta
EVIEWED M
y Table 3, th
HW Bush t
d amendmen
of which 38
 Clinton to G
al rules issu
ed, as compa
her amended 
a Midnight P
ich 44 were e
 to 64 OIRA
ich 23 were a
l a very sma
either finalize
                    
numbers of OIR
 in other period
638 (1994), the 
IS W. COPELAN
E OF THE OFFIC
ficant drop in vo
6, 3 C.F.R. 117 
GH
Bush
Clin
(M
9
sed or final) 74
23
31
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
3
 Rules: A Reform 
ble below: 
IDNIGHT R
ere were 235
o Clinton M
ts proposed, a
were amende
W Bush Mid
ed, of which
red to 63 rule
or had amend
eriod there w
ither amende
 reviewed f
mended or ha
ll difference 
d or propos
                    
A reviewed rul
s because after P
number of rules
D, CONG. RESE
E OF INFORMAT
lume of rules re
(1982)). 
W 
 to 
ton 
)
GHW 
Bush to 
Clinton 
(C) 
Cli
to 
B
(
4
38
5 109 1
8
151
1
Agenda
EGULATION
 OIRA-revie
idnight Perio
s compared w
d or had am
night Period
 45 were am
s during the 
ments propo
ere 121 OIRA
d or had am
inal rules iss
d amendment
between the
ed with rega
                    
es during the G
resident Clinto
 subject to OIR
ARCH SERV., R
ION AND REGUL
viewed by OIRA
nton 
GW 
ush 
M)
Clinton 
to GW 
Bush (C) 
B
O
35 1
45 25
10 63
90
89
7/18/2013 4:16 
3
S, 1992–200
wed final rul
d, of which 
ith 109 duri
endments pr
, there were 1
ended or h
control perio
sed. During t
-reviewed fin
endments pr
ued during t
s proposed.  
 rate at whi
rd to midnig
                     
HW Bush adm
n issued Execut
A review declin
L32397, FEDER
ATORY AFFAIRS
 after the issuan
GW 
ush to 
bama 
(M)
GW 
Bush to 
Obama 
(C) 
9 0
44 23
121 64
174
87
PM 
33 
9 
es  
74 
ng 
o-
10 
ad 
d, 
he 
al 
o-
he 
ch 
ht 
    
in-
ive 
ed 
AL 
 12 
ce 
Beermann_Final_Printer_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013 4:16 PM 
334 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
rules as compared with the relevant control periods. In the GHW Bush to 
Clinton transition, surprisingly, non-midnight rules provoked amendments 
more often than midnight rules: 31.4% of midnight rules were either 
amended or had amendments proposed, as compared to 34.9% in the con-
trol period. In the Clinton to GW Bush transition, 40.1% of midnight rules 
were either amended or had amendments proposed, as compared to 39.7% 
of rules issued during the control period. In the GW Bush to Obama transi-
tion, midnight and control period rules had amendments adopted or 
proposed in almost identical proportions: 36.3% of the midnight rules and 
35.9% of the non-midnight rules. This study reveals virtually no difference 
with regard to the durability of midnight rules, except perhaps in the GHW 
Bush to Clinton transition, when midnight rules were slightly less durable 
than non-midnight rules. This confirms the sense among most of the inter-
viewees that there are not significant qualitative differences between 
midnight rules and non-midnight rules.  
C. Interviews on the Quality of Midnight Rules 
As part of the preparation of the Report upon which this Article is 
based, interviews158 were conducted with experts on midnight rulemaking, 
including several people with experience concerning midnight rulemaking 
as officials in outgoing administrations, incoming administrations, or both. 
The interviewees with experience inside government expressed similar 
views regarding midnight rules. As a matter of principle, they generally 
considered midnight rulemaking as a legitimate exercise of government 
power, since the outgoing administration retains full power to act until the 
moment of transition. Principled objections to midnight rulemaking were 
also expressed, however, by some. Those involved in reviewing midnight 
rules at the outset of administrations found that most rules did not suffer 
from any quality problems and that most were routine actions generated by 
career staff. Many, including officials involved in reviewing rules at the 
outset of the new administration, also expressed the view that incoming 
administrations have adequate tools to deal with any problematic midnight 
rules. Interviewees reacted skeptically to the suggestion that midnight rules 
were timed to overload or embarrass the incoming administration. One 
pointed out that rulemaking is very expensive and takes a great deal of time 
and effort and thus is unlikely to be used to cause difficulty for the incom-
ing administration. However, at least one interviewee expressed the view 
that outgoing administrations sometimes defer decisions in order to push 
off an important decision onto the next administration. Further, an inter-
                                                                                                                      
 158. See supra note * for a list of the interviewees with information on their experience 
and affiliations. Notes on the interviews are on file with author, and interviewees have not 
been directly quoted in this Article. 
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viewee with lengthy government experience expressed the view that rule-
making slows down during the election campaign to minimize controversy 
until after the election. 
In addition to the principled view that there is something wrong with 
increased rulemaking during the midnight period, there were some other 
concerns expressed that were mainly on two fronts: rushed rules and dimin-
ished public participation. One interviewee thought that at least one 
outgoing administration rushed through important ill-considered rules with 
inadequate time for review and for genuine public input. There was one 
example cited of a rule that was approved by OIRA in one day. Interview-
ees also claimed that public participation was reduced because comment 
periods were short and agencies did not have sufficient time to digest the 
comments received. One case was cited in which the agency had to review 
300,000 comments in one week to issue the rule on time. Despite these 
concerns, however, most interviewees concluded that the negative appear-
ance of midnight rulemaking was much worse than the reality. 
IV. REACTIONS OF INCOMING ADMINISTRATIONS TO MIDNIGHT 
RULEMAKING 
As midnight rulemaking has become a common feature of presidential 
transitions, it has produced legal and political consequences. This Part of 
the Article details three aspects of these consequences. The first portion of 
this Part analyzes the strategies that incoming administrations have devel-
oped to deal with the high volume of late-term rules they confront upon 
taking office. The second portion of this Part discusses the sparse case law 
on the legality of the strategies employed by incoming administrations to 
deal with midnight rulemaking. The third Section of this Part explores the 
GW Bush administration’s effort to avoid producing midnight rules by 
finishing its regulatory work earlier than previous administrations.  
A. Reactions of Incoming Administrations to Midnight Rules 
On January 29, 1981, on his tenth day in office, President Ronald 
Reagan issued a memorandum to twelve department heads and the Admin-
istrator of the EPA, directing them to delay the effective dates of recently 
published regulations for sixty days and not to promulgate any new regula-
tions during the sixty days following the date of the memorandum.159 The 
                                                                                                                      
 159. Memorandum from Ronald Reagan, Pres. of the U.S., to the Sec’y of the Treas-
ury, the Attorney Gen., the Sec’y of the Interior, the Sec’y of Agric., the Sec’y of Commerce, 
the Sec’y of Labor, the Sec’y of Health and Human Services, the Sec’y of Housing and 
Urban Dev., the Sec’y of Transp., the Sec’y of Energy and the Sec’y of Educ., and the Adm’r 
of the Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 29, 1981), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
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memorandum was a precursor to Reagan’s creation of the centralized review 
process established by Executive Order No. 12,291.160 The memorandum’s 
timing was prompted, in part, by the midnight regulatory activity of the 
Carter administration. The memorandum stated that the freeze was neces-
sary “to subject to full and appropriate review many of the prior 
Administration’s last-minute decisions that would increase rather than  
relieve the current burden of restrictive regulation.” The sixty-day period 
was apparently designed to allow Reagan’s appointees to gain control of the 
agencies involved and for him to establish the centralized review process 
adverted to in the memorandum.161 
Reagan’s memorandum served as a model for the actions of subsequent 
administrations dealing with midnight rules and gaining control of adminis-
trative agencies.162 On January 25, 1993, Leon Panetta, the incoming 
Clinton administration’s Director of OMB, issued a memorandum instruct-
ing agencies not to send any regulations to the Federal Register for 
publication until they had been reviewed by a Clinton-appointed agency 
head and requesting agencies to withdraw any regulations that had been 
submitted to the Federal Register but not yet published.163 On January 20, 
2001, President Bush’s Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, issued a memorandum 
(the “Card Memorandum”) to the “Heads and Acting Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies” directing them not to send any proposed or 
                                                                                                                      
ws/index.php?pid=44134]#axzz1b4iGvpBn. President Reagan’s Memorandum is reproduced 
in the Appendix to this Article, available at http://www.mjealonline.org/documents. The 
memorandum contained several exceptions including “regulations that respond to emergency 
situations or for which a postponement pursuant to this memorandum would conflict with a 
statutory or judicial deadline,” and regulations “issued in accordance with the formal rule-
making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . ; regulations issued with respect 
to a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; . . . regulations related to 
Federal government procurement; . . . matters related to agency organization, management, 
or personnel; [and] . . . regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service.” Id.  
 160. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 
C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
 161. Executive Order 12,291, which established centralized review of agency regula-
tions by the Office of Management and Budget, was issued on February 17, 1981. Id. The 
Reagan administration issued a comprehensive fact sheet detailing its regulatory program on 
February 18, 1981, which included, inter alia, discussion of the regulatory freeze, its examina-
tion of Carter administration midnight rules and the establishment of regulatory review 
under Executive Order 12,291. Office of the Press Secretary of the White House, Fact Sheet: 
President Reagan’s Initiatives to Reduce Regulatory Burdens (Feb. 18, 1981), available at 
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Reagan_RegainInitiatives.PDF. It was released in conjunction 
with an address by President Reagan before a Joint Session of Congress on his Program for 
Economic Recovery. See Ronald Reagan, Pres. of the U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of the 
Congress on the Program for Economic Recovery (Feb. 18, 1981), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43425#ixzz1iLPpYk97. 
 162. Anne Joseph O’Connell endorses these strategies. See O’Connell, supra note 16, at 
529–30. 
 163. See Regulatory Review Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993). 
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final regulation to the Federal Register unless it had been reviewed by an 
agency head appointed by Bush, to withdraw any regulations that had been 
submitted to the Federal Register, but not yet published, so that they could 
be reviewed, and to postpone the effective date of published, but not yet 
effective, regulations for sixty days.164  
On January 20, 2009, President Obama’s Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, 
issued a memorandum instructing executive departments and agencies not 
to issue new rules until they had been reviewed and approved by an appoin-
tee of Obama, to withdraw any rules from the Federal Register that had not 
yet been published, and to “[c]onsider extending for 60 days the effective 
date of regulations that have been published in the Federal Register but not 
yet taken effect . . . for the purpose of reviewing questions of law and policy 
raised by those regulations.”165 
                                                                                                                      
 164. Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the Pres. and Chief of 
Staff, to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 20, 
2001), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=79291. On January 26, 
2009, President GW Bush’s OMB Director Mitch Daniels issued a follow-up memorandum, 
instructing agencies to withdraw pending rules from OIRA and not to submit new rules or 
re-submit withdrawn rules until they have been reviewed by an appointee of the new admin-
istration. Memorandum from Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., OMB Director, to the Heads and 
Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 26, 2001) (reproduced in the 
Appendix to this Article, available at http://www.mjealonline.org/documents). This Memo-
randum also instructed agencies to inform OMB before publishing any rules not subject to 
OIRA reviews. Id. 
 165. Memorandum from Rahm Emanuel, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, 
The White House, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 20, 2009), in 
74 Fed. Reg. 4435, 4435–36 (Jan. 26, 2009). The Emanuel Memorandum was followed the 
next day by a memorandum issued by Peter R. Orszag, Director of OMB, directed to heads 
and acting heads of executive departments and agencies, with further instructions on the 
implementation of the Emanuel Memorandum. The Orszag Memorandum was apparently 
not published in the Federal Register, but is available online and is reproduced in the  
Appendix to this Article, available at http://www.mjealonline.org/documents. Memorandum 
from Peter R. Orszag, Director of OMB, to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/assets/agencyinformation_memoranda_2009_pdf/m09-08.pdf. The memo-
randum instructs agency heads to be selective concerning the postponement of effective 
dates of regulations, not to postpone effective dates indefinitely, and to seek comments on 
postponements when possible and on the substantive issues raised by any rules postponed. It 
instructed agencies to use their judgment on whether to postpone the effective date of rules 
and reopen comment periods based on the following considerations: 
(1) whether the rulemaking process was procedurally adequate; (2) whether the 
rule reflected proper consideration of all relevant facts; (3) whether the rule re-
flected due consideration of the agency’s statutory or other legal obligations; (4) 
whether the rule is based on a reasonable judgment about the legally relevant poli-
cy considerations; (5) whether the rulemaking process was open and transparent; 
(6) whether objections to the rule were adequately considered, including whether 
interested parties had fair opportunities to present contrary facts and arguments; 
(7) whether interested parties had the benefit of access to the facts, data, or other 
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The Clinton, Bush, and Obama memoranda contained exceptions for 
rules governed by statutory or judicial deadlines. The Bush and Obama 
memoranda contained a further exception for specified urgent or emergency 
situations, while the Clinton memorandum simply provided for the possi-
bility of additional exceptions to be requested from the Director of OMB. 
Obama’s memorandum contained one new feature—it instructed agencies to 
reopen the comment period for delayed rules for thirty days, “to allow 
interested parties to provide comments about issues of law and policy raised 
by those rules.”166 
The provisions of these memoranda requiring that no new rules be pub-
lished until they have been reviewed by an appointee of the new 
administration in effect impose a moratorium on new regulations for a short 
period after the transition. These were part of efforts by each administra-
tion to gain control over the agencies going forward, regardless of any 
midnight rules that may have been promulgated before the transition. In 
the case of Reagan, this also involved allowing time for his administration 
to establish the new centralized review procedure that was being planned.  
It appears that incoming administrations have been successful in exe-
cuting the instructions in these memoranda. For rules that were not yet 
published, rule withdrawals have not been reported, except in one case, in 
which a rule was later withdrawn on the ground that it should not have been 
published because it was pending at the Office of the Federal Register 
(OFR) when the Card Memorandum was issued.167 According to an OFR 
official interviewed for this Article, before a rule is filed for public inspec-
tion, the OFR keeps all activity regarding the rule confidential, including 
withdrawal before the rule is made public. It does appear, however, that 
agencies have succeeded in withdrawing unpublished rules from the Federal 
Register.168  
                                                                                                                      
analyses on which the agency relied; and (8) whether the final rule found adequate 
support in the rulemaking record. 
Id. 
 166. Emanuel Memorandum, supra note 165. 
 167. See Methodology for Coverage of Phase II and Phase III Clinical Trials Sponsored 
by the National Institutes of Health, 66 Fed. Reg. 9199 (Feb. 7, 2001) (to be codified at 32 
C.F.R. pt. 1999), discussed in William M. Jack, Comment, Taking Care that Presidential 
Oversight of the Regulatory Process is Faithfully Executed: A Review of Rule Withdrawals 
and Rule Suspensions under the Bush Administration’s Card Memorandum, 54 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1479, 1485 n.24 (2002). Jack recommends that information on rule withdrawals be made 
publicly available.  
 168. See Jack, supra note 167, at 1485–86 (“According to an ‘informal’ poll performed by 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), agencies promptly responded to 
the directives of the Card Memorandum and withdrew a total of 124 regulations, forty of 
them final rules, from the OFR’s ‘publication queue’ between January 21, 2001 and early 
February 2001.”) (citing OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, MAKING SENSE OF 
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To understand the power of incoming administrations to withdraw  
documents from the Federal Register after they have been submitted but 
before they have been published, it is important to understand exactly how 
the process works at the OFR. Documents submitted to the OFR go 
through three stages. The first stage is submission, which is simply the act 
of the agency delivering the document to the OFR for publication in the 
Federal Register.169 The second stage is known as “filing for public inspec-
tion,” which happens on the second working day after the document is 
submitted to the OFR for documents received before 2:00 PM and happens 
on the third working day for documents received after 2:00 PM.170 This 
schedule gives the OFR time to review the document before it is filed for 
public inspection and prepared for publication. Documents are available for 
public inspection at the OFR immediately upon filing, and filing is consid-
ered legally sufficient notice for the rule to take effect.171 The third stage is 
actual publication in the Federal Register, which happens on the working day 
after filing.172 There are also provisions for faster filing and publication in 
emergencies.173  
OFR regulations allow for withdrawal of documents from the Federal 
Register by the submitting agency only. OFR regulations do not mention 
withdrawal before filing, so presumably this can be freely done. Because the 
OFR maintains confidentiality concerning documents until they are filed 
for public inspection, there would not necessarily be any public record of a 
withdrawal before filing. With regard to documents that have been filed for 
public inspection, the relevant regulation174 states such documents “may” be 
withdrawn or corrected. Whether an agency can actually withdraw a docu-
ment depends on how far along production of the printed Federal Register 
                                                                                                                      
REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS 
AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 34–35 (2001), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/costbenefit 
report.pdf.). 
 169. In addition to the statutes and regulations cited in this Part, information on the 
workings of the Federal Register was gathered in correspondence with Jim Wickliffe, former 
OFR Scheduling Supervisor and Amy P. Bunk, Director of Legal Affairs and Policy, Office 
of the Federal Register. 
 170. 1 C.F.R. § 17.2 (2012).  
 171. 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (“[F]iling of a document, required or authorized to be published 
by section 1505 of this title, except in cases where notice by publication is insufficient in law, 
is sufficient to give notice of the contents of the document to a person subject to or affected 
by it.”). This section is the provision of the Federal Register Act requiring the publication of 
Proclamations, Executive Orders, documents having general applicability and legal effect, 
and documents required by Congress to be published. 
 172. The Federal Register Filing and Publication schedule is contained in the Code of 
Federal Regulations. 1 C.F.R. § 17.2 (2012). 
 173. 1 C.F.R. §§ 17.3–.6 (2012).  
 174. 1 C.F.R. § 18.13 (2012). 
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is and, in some circumstances, whether the OFR is convinced that there are 
adequate reasons for withdrawal.175 When an agency requests withdrawal of 
a document that has already been filed for public inspection, the OFR 
insists on a legal justification such as a legal mistake in the drafting of the 
document. If the OFR is not convinced that there is an adequate reason for 
withdrawal, it may, in conjunction with the agency, consult the OMB or the 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice for guidance. 
Because filing occurs on the opening of the OFR each day at 8:45 AM, 
withdrawal is simplest before the day of filing. 
Agencies, however, have successfully delayed the effective dates of pub-
lished midnight rules that have not yet gone into effect.176 For example, on 
February 4, 1981, the Reagan Administration’s Secretary of Transportation 
issued a blanket notice postponing the effective dates of all Department 
rules covered by the memorandum.177 Sometimes changes were made to the 
delayed rules, but in many instances, after review, the regulations promul-
gated by the previous administration were allowed to go into effect as 
originally promulgated. Whether incoming administrations were happy 
about this, or whether they decided that it was not worth the time or atten-
tion to change the prior administration’s rules rather than focus on moving 
forward with the new agenda is uncertain.178 Not surprisingly, in some 
instances, a new administration’s efforts to change or rescind the prior  
administration’s midnight rules were met with resistance by those who 
favored the midnight rules.179 
The APA’s notice and comment procedures have not prevented incom-
ing administrations from acting quickly to prevent midnight rules from 
taking effect before they can be reviewed by the incoming administration. 
Agencies in the Reagan administration set a precedent of suspending the 
effective dates of midnight rules without notice and comment.180 In the 
notices announcing suspensions, agencies in the Reagan administration 
                                                                                                                      
 175. Any document withdrawn after filing remains available for public inspection at 
the OFR even if it is not published in the Federal Register. Id. 
 176. For example, a comment in the Administrative Law Review reported that during 
the period between January 21, 2001 and early February 2001, President GW Bush’s admin-
istration withdrew 40 final rules and delayed the effective dates of 90 more. See Jack, supra 
note 167, at 1485–86. 
 177. Notice of Postponement of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 10,706 (Feb. 4, 
1981). 
 178. Senior EPA officials during the early days of President GW Bush’s presidency 
reported that the EPA reexamined many Clinton administration midnight rules and found 
no problems with the vast majority of them. 
 179. See Howell & Mayer, supra note 30, at 544 (discussing how interest groups fight 
to retain what they gained at the end of the prior administration). 
 180. APA sections 553(b)(A) and (B) contain several exceptions to the notice and 
comment requirement. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)–(B) (2012).  
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relied on APA section 553(b)’s provision that allows an agency to promul-
gate a rule without notice and comment when the agency “for good cause 
finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor 
in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracti-
cable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”181 The Reagan 
administration also found “good cause” for delaying the effective dates 
immediately, i.e., without waiting thirty days as specified in APA  
section 553(d).182 For example, the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) 
notice suspending the effective dates of numerous midnight rules found in 
the nation’s “economic condition” good cause for dispensing with notice and 
comment and for the need for time to review regulations with imminent 
effective dates.183 
In some instances, agencies satisfied the APA by finding that notice and 
comment would be “impracticable, unnecessary and contrary to the public 
interest” because there was insufficient time before the rules’ effective dates 
to conduct the review ordered by the President and a notice and comment 
period, and because the review was necessary for the health of the econo-
my.184 In at least one instance, a notice of postponement of an effective date 
by the National Park Service was justified merely by the existence of 
Reagan’s directive, with no finding of good cause for delay and no specifica-
tion that the usual thirty day delay of rules’ effectiveness was waived.185 
During the Reagan administration, when rules were postponed again  
beyond the initial sixty days required by the President’s directive, notice 
and comment was not employed on the question of whether the rule should 
be postponed again. For example, the effective date of a rule issued by the 
Materials Transportation Board within DOT concerning the addition of 
water to pipelines transporting anhydrous ammonia was postponed for a 
second time without notice and comment based on a finding that “no  
                                                                                                                      
 181. Id. at § 553(b)(3)(B). 
 182. Id. at § 553(d). 
 183. Postponement of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 10,706 (Feb. 4, 1981). Similar 
language was used in support of delay without notice and comment in several additional 
Department of Transportation notices. See, e.g., Amendments of Effective Date of Part 125 
and Amendments Adopted in Relation to Part 125, 46 Fed. Reg. 10,705 (Feb. 4, 1981); 
Postponement of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 10,906 (Feb. 5, 1981).  
 184. Standards of Fill for Wine; Deferral of Effective Date, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,493, 12,493 
(Feb. 17, 1981) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pt.4). The Department of the Treasury used very 
similar language in Napa Valley Viticultural Area; Deferral of Effective Date, 46 Fed. Reg. 
12,493, 12,494 (Feb. 17, 1981) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pt.9) and Completely Denatured 
Alcohol Formula No. 20; Deferral of Effective Date, 46 FR 12,494 (Feb. 17, 1981) (to be 
codified at 27 C.F.R. pts. 211, 212).  
 185. This notice was issued after the effective date of the original rule, and characterizes 
President Reagan’s directive itself as “postponing the effective date of all final regulations for 
60-days.” Special Regulations, Areas of the National Park System; Glacier Bay National 
Monument, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,496, 12,496 (Feb. 17, 1981) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt.7).  
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further information would be provided beyond that already in the record of 
this rulemaking.”186 The need for time to perform a review of the benefits of 
the rule was cited as the reason for the further delay.187 The finding that 
notice and comment is not necessary because “no further information would 
be provided beyond that already in the record of this rulemaking” is equiva-
lent to a finding under APA section 553(b) that notice and comment is 
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” 
During the early days of the Reagan administration, there were further 
postponements of the effective dates of rules to comply with Executive 
Order No. 12,291. Section 7 of that Order required agencies to “suspend or 
postpone the effective dates of all major rules” to the extent allowed by law 
except in case of emergency.188 Further suspensions of the effective dates of 
rules to allow for review under Executive Order No. 12,291 were ordered, 
apparently without notice and comment.189 
I was able to find in the Federal Register only one Clinton administration 
notice delaying the effective date of a GHW Bush administration midnight 
rule. This involved a rule issued on January 19, 1993, by the Health Care 
Financing Authority within the Department of Health and Human  
Services. In this instance, the agency did not employ notice and comment 
procedures and did not give any reason for not employing notice and  
comment. It stated as the reason for the delay that “the new administration 
wants to fully review the policies in these regulations.”190 The notice did not 
refer to the Panetta Memorandum delaying rules at the outset of the admin-
istration.191  
In a famous non-midnight example, the Clinton administration, in its 
first month in office, suspended without notice and comment the effective-
                                                                                                                      
 186. Transportation of Liquids by Pipeline; Addition of Water to Pipelines Transport-
ing Anhydrous Ammonia, 46 Fed. Reg. 20,556, 20,556 (Apr. 6, 1981) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 195).  
 187. Id.  
 188. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 
3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
 189. Extension of Effective Dates for Final Rules; Request for Comments, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 19,233 (Mar. 30, 1981). Comments were requested on whether the rules were “major 
rules” under Executive Order 12,291. 
 190. Medicaid Program; Eligibility and Coverage Requirements, 58 Fed. Reg. 9120 
(Feb. 19, 1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 435, 436, 440) 
 191. Id. (“This notice delays by 6 months the effective dates and compliance dates of 
the final rule with comment period on Medicaid Eligibility and Coverage Requirements 
published January 19, 1993 in the Federal Register (58 Fed. Reg. 4908)”). There is an exam-
ple of a delayed effective date of a rule in the early Clinton administration not related to the 
midnight rules issue, and in this case, the agency issued the delay as “Interim Final Rules” 
without notice and comment, indicating an administration view that notice and comment is 
not necessary to delay the effective date of a final rule. Delay in Application Date for Small 
Vehicles, 58 Fed. Reg. 10,989 (Feb. 23, 1993) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 665). 
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ness of the Reagan administration’s abortion “gag rule,” which regulated 
communications between health care providers and patients about abortion 
in federally funded family planning clinics. It did not promulgate a substi-
tute for more than seven years.192 In this instance, the agency found “good 
cause” for dispensing with notice and comment before suspending the rule, 
mainly based on substantive reasons relating to the administration’s view of 
the wisdom of the rule.193  
Pursuant to the Card Memorandum, the incoming GW Bush admin-
istration delayed the effective dates of numerous midnight rules 
promulgated by the outgoing Clinton administration. Initial delays were 
done by publishing a notice in the Federal Register without notice and com-
ment.194 The GW Bush administration introduced a new reason for 
dispensing with notice and comment for the postponement of the effective 
dates of midnight rules. In addition to the familiar “good cause” claim, 
agencies asserted that actions suspending the effective dates of rules are 
exempt from notice and comment as procedural rules.195 
                                                                                                                      
 192. Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning 
Services Projects, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,270 (July 3, 2000) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59). 
 193. Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning 
Service Projects, 58 Fed. Reg. 7462 (Feb. 5, 1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59). This 
Rule had been issued by the Reagan administration and then reinterpreted during the 
administration of GHW Bush. See Nat’l Family Planning and Reprod. Health Ass’n v. 
Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 194. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-370R, REGULATORY REVIEW: DELAY 
OF EFFECTIVE DATES OF FINAL RULES SUBJECT TO THE ADMINISTRATION’S JANUARY 20, 
2001, MEMORANDUM 6 (Feb. 15, 2002). 
 195. Each suspension by the GW Bush administration was published in the Federal 
Register using language similar to the following example to justify the lack of notice and 
comment on the delay:  
To the extent that 5 U.S.C. section 553 applies to this action, the action is exempt 
from notice and comment because it constitutes a rule of procedure under 5 
U.S.C. section 553(b)(A). Alternatively, the Department’s implementation of this 
action without opportunity for public comment, effective immediately upon pub-
lication today in the Federal Register, is based on the good cause exceptions in 5 
U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) and 553(d)(3), in that seeking public comment is impractical, 
unnecessary and contrary to the public interest. The temporary 60-day delay in  
effective date is necessary to give Department officials the opportunity for further 
review and consideration of new regulations, consistent with the Assistant to the 
President’s memorandum of January 20, 2001. Given the imminence of the effec-
tive date, seeking prior public comment on this temporary delay would have been 
impractical, as sell [sic] as contrary to the public interest in the orderly promulga-
tion and implementation of regulations. 
Areas of the National Park System: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,366, 8,367 (Jan. 
31, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7). A Westlaw search revealed 64 uses of this 
language in 2001 in notices delaying effective dates, four of which were for second delays 
and one of which was for a third delay. See, e.g., Partial Stay, Amendments, and Correction, 
66 Fed. Reg. 12,848, 12,848 (Mar. 1, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 14, 16) (initial 
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In some cases, if the regulation was still under review when the sixty-
day delay expired, this same language was used to justify further delays 
without notice and comment.196 In one case, when comments were taken on 
whether to retain the rule, the GW Bush administration ordered a further 
delay in the effective date without notice and comment using the same 
language with an additional justification that time was needed to review 
comments received.197 
A report prepared by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
provides details on the number and nature of rules postponed by the GW 
Bush administration pursuant to the Card Memorandum.198 The GAO 
summarized the effects of the Card Memorandum as follows: 
Our review . . . indicated that federal agencies delayed the effective 
dates for 90 of the 371 final rules that were subject to the Card 
memorandum. The effective dates for the remaining 281 rules were 
either not delayed or we could find no indication in the Federal 
Register of a delay. The Departments of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS), Transportation (DOT), and Agriculture (USDA), 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) delayed more 
than half of the 90 rules. The agencies considered 65 of the 90  
delayed rules to be substantive in nature, and considered 12 to be 
“major” rules (e.g., rules with at least a $100 million impact on the 
economy).  
As of the 1-year anniversary of the Card memorandum, 67 of the 
90 delayed rules were postponed for one 60-day period and then 
appeared to have taken effect. Eight other rules were delayed for 
more than 60 days but appeared to have taken effect. The 15  
remaining delayed rules had not taken effect by January 20, 2002.  
Although most of the delayed rules had not been changed by the 1-
year anniversary of the Card memorandum, one had been with-
drawn, three had been withdrawn and replaced by new rules, and 
nine others had been altered in some way (e.g., changing the  
implementation date or modifying a reporting requirement). The 
agencies indicated that other rules might be changed in the future, 
                                                                                                                      
delay); Medicaid Managed Care: Further Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,776, 
32,777 (June 18, 2001) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 430, 431, 434, 435, 438, 440, 
447) (second delay); Oil and Gas Leasing: Onshore Oil and Gas Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 
41,149, 41,149 (Aug. 7, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160) (third delay). 
 196. Medicaid Managed Care: Further Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,777. 
 197. Oil and Gas Leasing: Onshore Oil and Gas Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. at 41,149 
(Aug. 7, 2001).  
 198. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 194. 
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and OIRA has placed five of the delayed rules on a list for “high 
priority” review. The agencies generally did not provide the public 
with a prior opportunity to comment on the delays in effective 
dates or rule changes, frequently indicating that notice and com-
ment procedures were either not applicable, impracticable, or were 
contrary to the public interest.199 
This GAO report explains why only 90 of the 371 rules covered by the 
Card Memorandum were actually affected. First, the 371 total includes rules 
by independent agencies that were asked, but not required, to follow the 
Card Memorandum. According to the report, none of the 30 rules issued by 
independent agencies that would have been covered by the Card Memoran-
dum were delayed.200 Second, agencies did not postpone the effective dates 
of rules when there was sufficient time before that date to review the 
rules.201 Third, the GAO reported that shortly after the Card Memorandum 
was issued, it was determined that “certain types of numerous and noncon-
troversial rules (e.g., air worthiness directives issued by the Federal Aviation 
Administration and bridge opening schedules published by the Coast 
Guard) should be allowed to take effect as scheduled.”202 The GAO report 
states that these rules, and others not delayed pursuant to the Card Memo-
randum, were allowed to take effect as scheduled with no further notice in 
the Federal Register indicating why they were not delayed pursuant to the 
Card Memorandum.203 The GAO report also states that within a year of 
President GW Bush’s inauguration, 75 of the 90 delayed rules had gone into 
effect, most (67) after a single 60-day or shorter delay.204 
The GW Bush administration’s review of the previous administration’s 
rulemaking activities extended beyond rules that had actually been finalized 
in the midnight period. O’Connell reports that “[b]y the end of the first 
year of the Administration, hundreds of regulations started but not yet 
completed before Bush took office were formally withdrawn.”205 According 
to O’Connell, proposed rules that span a presidential transition are 14 per-
cent more likely to be withdrawn than other rulemaking proposals. 
                                                                                                                      
 199. Id. at 2–3. 
 200. See id. at 4, Table 1. 
 201. See id. at 4–5. 
 202. Id. at 5. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 7. In most cases, the rules went into effect without further notice in the 
Federal Register. 
 205. O’Connell, supra note 16 at 473; see also id. at 508 fig.10, 509 (detailing the number 
of withdrawn rules in President Clinton’s third year (383) and President GW Bush’s second 
year (433)). 
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When time allowed, the Obama administration sought comment on 
whether the effective dates of rules should be postponed.206 Like prior 
administrations, when time did not allow, the Obama administration did not 
seek comment on whether effective dates should be postponed; however, 
this was clearly a disfavored strategy. In one instance, comments were 
sought for a remarkably short three days on whether to delay the effective 
date of the rule even though the effective date was only seven days after the 
opening of the comment period.207 When comments were not sought, there 
was less consistency in terms of justifying the lack of notice and comment 
before imposing delays than during some other administrations. Interest-
ingly, the language used in some of the notices postponing rules’ effective 
dates without notice and comment asserted that normally notice and com-
ment would be required to take such action, but that there was good cause 
for dispensing with it in the particular cases. Further, standard practice 
during the Obama administration was for agencies to reopen the comment 
period for at least thirty days on virtually all rules postponed, as instructed 
by the Emanuel Memorandum. Comments were sought on whether the 
rules should be retained or altered in any way.  
The primary justifications given by agencies in the Obama administra-
tion for delay without notice and comment (and for immediate delay 
without observing the APA’s minimum thirty-day waiting period for put-
ting new rules into effect) were to allow the public to comment on the rules 
and to allow the agency time to consider any new comments received.208 For 
                                                                                                                      
 206. See, e.g., Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,007 
(Feb. 4, 2009) (seeking comment on proposal postponing, for 60 days, the effective date of a 
rule scheduled to take effect on March 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). Two 
more final rules were subsequently issued staying the effective date of the rule in question 
twice. Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,847 (Mar. 20, 
2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550); Investment Advice—Participants and Benefi-
ciaries, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,951 (May 22, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). This 
example is discussed in Curtis Copeland’s CRS report, supra note 22, at 8 nn. 41–43. Subse-
quent to the publication of Copeland’s report, this rule was withdrawn and a new rule was 
promulgated in its place. See Investment Advice-Participants and Beneficiaries, 74 Fed. Reg. 
60,156 (Nov. 20, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (withdrawal of GW Bush 
administration rule); Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 76 Fed. Reg. 
66,136-01 (Oct. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (promulgation, after notice 
and comment, of substitute final rule). This final rule became effective on December 27, 
2011, 21 months after the GW Bush administration’s midnight rule would have taken effect. 
 207. See Medicare Program; Changes to the Competitive Acquisition of Certain Dura-
ble Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics and Supplies (DMEPOS) by Certain 
Provisions of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), 
74 Fed. Reg. 6557 (Feb. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.414).  
 208. These reasons for delay and re-opening the comment period seem to be founded 
on a distrust of midnight rules, since presumably the public already had an opportunity to 
comment on the rules before they were adopted and the agency already considered those 
comments. 
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example, in a notice delaying the effective dates of midnight rules concern-
ing Medicaid premiums, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
within the Department of Health and Human Services stated: “The 60-day 
delay in the effective date is necessary to give the public the opportunity to 
submit additional comments on the policies set forth in the November 25, 
2008 final rule, and to provide an opportunity for CMS to consider all 
additional public comments.”209 In language that was used in several other 
notices, the agency explained its decision not to seek comment on the delay 
as follows:  
A delay in effective date and reopening of the comment period is 
necessary to ensure that we have the opportunity to receive  
additional public comments to fully inform our decisions before the 
policies contained in the final rule become effective. Moreover, we 
believe it would be contrary to the public interest for the  
November 25, 2008 final rule to become effective until we are cer-
tain that all public comments, including any additional comments 
that are submitted in the reopened comment period, are consid-
ered. To do otherwise could potentially result in uncertainty and 
confusion as to the finality of the final rule. For the reasons stated 
above, we find that both notice and comment and the 30-day delay 
in effective date for this action are unnecessary. Therefore, we find 
there is good cause to waive notice and comment procedures and 
the 30-day delay in effective date for this action.210 
In some instances, agencies at the outset of the Obama administration 
did not find it necessary to justify the lack of notice and comment on  
actions delaying the effective dates of final midnight rules. Rather, some-
times agencies simply declared that the rules’ effective dates were delayed 
in order to comply with the Emanuel Memorandum, and reopened them 
for further notice and comment on issues and concerns about the rule.211  
                                                                                                                      
 209. Medicaid Program; Premiums and Cost Sharing, 74 Fed. Reg. 4888 (Jan. 27, 2009) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 447, 457). 
 210. Id. at 4888–89. An example using similar language is Medicare Program; Changes 
to the Competitive Acquisition of Certain Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthot-
ics and Supplies (DMEPOS) by Certain Provisions of the Medicare Improvements for 
Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), 74 Fed. Reg. 7653, 7654 (Feb. 19, 2009) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 414). 
 211. Sale and Disposal of National Forest System Timber; Special Forest Products and 
Forest Botanical Products, 74 Fed. Reg. 5107 (Jan. 29, 2009) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 
223, 261). The EPA at the outset of the Obama administration also delayed the effective date 
of midnight rules without citing reasons or making findings in support of the delay. See, e.g., 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review 
(NSR): Aggregation, 74 Fed. Reg. 7284 (Feb. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 
52). 
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In some cases, agencies gave reasons for delay without adverting to 
APA section 553 or any requirement that good cause exist for either the 
delay itself or the immediate effectiveness of the delay. For example, the 
Department of Defense delayed the implementation of a new hospital 
payment system with a notice, which cited both the Emanuel Memorandum 
and the need for more time for implementation as reasons for delay. After 
adverting to these two factors, the agency concluded:  
In view of both of these developments, the Department is delaying 
the effective date of TRICARE’s OPPS until May 1, 2009, and is 
inviting additional public comment on the final rule. Any timely 
public comments received will be considered and any changes to 
the final rule will be published in the Federal Register.212  
When agencies at the outset of the Obama administration sought com-
ments on proposals to delay the effective dates of rules, the language 
announcing the proposal for the delay in effective date often adverted to the 
Emanuel Memorandum and the Orszag Memorandum implementing it. For 
example, on February 3, 2009, the Employment Standards Administration 
within the Department of Labor published a notice requesting comment on 
whether the February 20, 2009, effective date of a rule published on January 
21, 2009, should be extended for sixty days.213 The agency gave as the  
reason for proposing delay: “to provide an opportunity for further review 
and consideration of the questions of law and policy raised by it.”214 The 
agency thus sought comments not only on the question of delay but also 
“comments generally on the rule, including comments on the merits of 
rescinding or retaining the rule.”215 The notice specified two different com-
ment periods: a ten-day comment period on whether to implement the 
delay (because otherwise the rule would have gone into effect before the 
delay could be implemented) and a thirty-day comment period on the sub-
stantive merits of the rule. Because the agency undertook notice and 
comment, there was no need for a finding of cause to proceed without those 
procedures. However, there was no discussion of why it was appropriate to 
revisit a rule that had just been published. 
In a curious case on February 11, 2009, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development published a notice seeking comment on whether the 
                                                                                                                      
 212. Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS): Delay of Effective 
Date and Additional Opportunity for Public Comment, 74 Fed. Reg. 6228, 6228 (Feb. 6, 
2009) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 199). 
 213. Labor Organization Annual Financial Reports, 74 Fed. Reg. 5899, 5899 (Feb. 3, 
2009) (to be codified 29 C.F.R. pts. 403, 408). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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March 30, 2009, effective date of a rule published on January 27, 2009, 
should be extended for sixty days “[i]n accordance with the memorandum of 
January 20, 2009, from the assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, 
entitled ‘Regulatory Review.’ ”216 The comment period was thirty days, 
which allowed the agency time to decide on postponement before the rule 
went into effect. This example is curious because the rule was originally 
published on January 27, 2009, one week after Obama became President. It 
is not clear how, in light of the Emanuel Memorandum, this rule was pub-
lished. Perhaps it was issued in violation of the instruction not to issue any 
new rules without the approval of an appointee of the new administration. 
In some situations, agencies may be legally authorized or even required 
to reconsider rules shortly after their issuance, including midnight rules. 
The APA grants all interested persons the right to petition for the “issu-
ance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”217 As Copeland reports, the 
implementation of some rules has been delayed while the agency acts on 
petitions for reconsideration. The Clean Air Act explicitly grants the EPA 
the discretion to stay the effectiveness of a rule under reconsideration for 
up to three months.218 Copeland reports that in 2009, the EPA granted 
reconsideration of three midnight rules and stayed the effective date of at 
least one of them.219 
Other tools that incoming administrations can use to mute the conse-
quences of midnight rules involve administrative control over rule 
enforcement and the settlement of litigation directed at midnight rules. 
Many rules depend on agency enforcement, and the actual substantive 
effects of rules can vary widely depending on how they are enforced. In 
some situations, the implementation of a final rule depends on further steps 
taken by the agency, and if the agency does not act, implementation may be 
delayed or even stymied. For example, Copeland reports on two instances 
in which a final midnight rule was not enforced by the Obama administra-
tion.220 The first involves a Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) midnight rule that was issued on December 19, 2008, with an effec-
tive date of January 20, 2009.221 This rule required HHS to collect 
information, which may not be done by a federal agency without OMB 
                                                                                                                      
 216. Refinement of Income and Rent Determination Requirements in Public and 
Assisted Housing Programs: Proposed Delay of Effective Date, 74 Fed. Reg. 6839, 6839–40 
(proposed Feb. 11, 2009) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 92, 908). 
 217. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006). 
 218. Air Pollution Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2006). 
 219. See COPELAND, supra note 22, at 26 tbl.1. 
 220. See COPELAND, supra note 22, at 30–31. 
 221. Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Sup-
port Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 78,072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
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approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act. Copeland reports that as of 
the date of his report, HHS had not requested OMB approval, which 
means the rule had no effect.222 Subsequent to the publication of Copeland’s 
report, HHS proposed and adopted a final rule rescinding in part and revis-
ing the December 2008 rule.223 The other example involves a Department 
of the Interior midnight rule on shale oil deposits on federal land.224 The 
outgoing Bush administration had begun to implement the rule in January 
2009 by issuing a solicitation for bids on a demonstration project under the 
rule.225 In February 2009, the Obama administration withdrew the solicita-
tion and opened the matter for comments on the terms and conditions of 
leases under the program.226 A new solicitation, with revised terms, was 
issued on November 3, 2009.227 
Judicial review also presents incoming administrations with the oppor-
tunity to affect the substance of midnight rules by using the discretion 
agencies have over litigation strategy and settlement agreements. As Rossi 
has pointed out, if rules are challenged, an incoming administration might 
settle litigation with an agreement to enforce the rules in a manner more in 
line with its policy views than with those of the prior administration that 
issued the midnight rule being challenged.228  
The incoming administration also has enforcement discretion and may 
shape the enforcement of a midnight rule to conform to its policy views. 
This discretion is not unlimited. In one case, a federal court issued an  
injunction requiring implementation of a midnight rule issued by the  
Department of Labor on December 18, 2008, that had been challenged on 
judicial review by labor interests and suspended by the Department of 
Labor after President Obama took office.229 Business interests joined the 
                                                                                                                      
 222. COPELAND, supra note 22, at 30. 
 223. Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience 
Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9968 (Feb. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88), 
discussed in COPELAND, supra note 22, at 30. 
 224. Oil Shale Management—General, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,414 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to be 
codified at 3 C.F.R. pts. 3900, 3910, 3920, 3930), discussed in COPELAND, supra note 22, at 
30–31. 
 225. COPELAND, supra note 22, at 31. 
 226. See Withdrawal of the Call for Nominations—Oil Shale Research, Development, 
and Demonstration (R, D, and D) Program and Request for Public Comment, 74 Fed. Reg. 
8983 (Feb. 27, 2009), discussed in COPELAND, supra note 22, at 31. 
 227. Call for Nominations—Oil Shale Research Development and Demonstration 
Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,867 (Nov. 3, 2009). 
 228. Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in 
Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1039–40 (2001). 
 229. The rule at issue concerned visas for temporary agricultural workers. Temporary 
Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 77,110 (Dec. 18, 
2008) (to be codified at 229 C.F.R. pts. 501, 780, 788). This example is discussed at various 
places in Copeland’s CRS report. See Copeland, supra note 22 at 22, 32. 
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litigation in support of the 2008 rule. When the agency suspended the new 
rule, it put back in place the prior rule that had been issued in 1987. This 
was problematic because although the agency sought comments on the 
suspension, which it stated was necessary because it did not have the time 
or resources to implement the new rule, it explicitly excluded comments on 
the merits of the 2008 rule or its 1987 predecessor.230 The court enjoined 
the suspension on the ground that the agency violated APA section 553 by 
not considering comments on the merits of the action it took, which was to 
reinstate, even if temporarily, the 1987 rule.231 
A final strategy that incoming administrations might use against mid-
night rulemaking is to support rejection under the Congressional Review 
Act (CRA)232 or other negative action in Congress. The CRA provides an 
expedited procedure for Congress to consider whether to legislatively reject 
an agency rule. This procedure has been used only once, to reject OSHA’s 
ergonomics rule, which was promulgated in the final year of the Clinton 
administration. The CRA was the subject of a separate ACUS study233 and 
thus was not considered in any depth in the Report upon which this Article 
is based. The important point for purposes of this Article is that CRA 
rejection is more likely to be effective with regard to midnight rules, since 
the President would be less likely to veto Congress’s resolution rejecting a 
rule promulgated by a former administration than by the President’s own.234 
Even if Congress does not take action under the CRA, it can legisla-
tively rescind, amend, or delay regulations, as it has done on more than one 
occasion with regard to midnight rules. For example, in the economic 
stimulus bill enacted by Congress in February 2009, Congress legislatively 
precluded the implementation of an HHS midnight rule issued on Novem-
                                                                                                                      
 230. Temporary Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,408 
(proposed March 17, 2009) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655, 29 C.F.R. pts. 501, 780, 788) 
(“Please provide written comments only on whether the Department should suspend the 
December 18, 2008 final rule for further review and consideration of the issues that have 
arisen since the final rule’s publication. Comments concerning the substance or merits of the 
December 18, 2008 final rule or the prior rule will not be considered.”). 
 231. North Carolina Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Solis, 644 F. Supp. 2d 664 (M.D.N.C. 
2009) (grant of preliminary injunction), aff ’d, North Carolina Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. United 
Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 232. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2006). 
 233. Although ACUS studied the CRA, the committee overseeing the study ultimately 
decided not to go forward with any recommendations based on it. See Congressional Review 
Act, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., http://www.acus.gov/research/the-conference-current-
projects/congressional-review-act/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
 234. Presentment to the President is required under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983). 
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ber 7, 2008, for a period of six and one-half months.235 During that period, 
the agency proposed and adopted a final rule rescinding the rule in ques-
tion.236 This episode shows how, under some circumstances, support from 
the incoming administration for congressional action directed at midnight 
rules might advance the incoming administration’s efforts to alter or revoke 
such rules. 
Incoming administrations have tools to deal with some, but not all, of 
the other actions that have been taken by administrations just before they 
have left office. Executive orders are freely revocable and subject to altera-
tion by the new President, and there are many instances in which incoming 
Presidents have revoked executive orders (sometimes quite recent ones) 
issued by their predecessor.237 For example, on January 30, 2009, Obama 
revoked two of GW Bush’s executive orders concerning regulatory planning 
and review, one issued in 2002 and the other issued in 2007.238 Interpreta-
tive rules, policy statements, guidance documents, and other regulatory 
documents issued without notice and comment are also easily revocable by 
an incoming administration. There may, however, be political constraints to 
revoking some of these, especially those that must be published in the Fed-
eral Register. It also takes time and effort to make sure that revocation is 
done properly and that regulatory systems function properly after revoca-
tion. Pardons and clemencies issued by an outgoing President are immune 
from revocation or alteration by an incoming administration, except perhaps 
in the rare circumstance in which they have not been delivered before revo-
cation is ordered.239  
Incoming administrations thus have powerful tools to deal with the 
previous administration’s midnight rules, but these tools might not be ade-
quate to deal with the entire problem. One issue is the timing of midnight 
rules. Although the midnight period that causes the most concern is the 
period between the election and the inauguration of the new President, the 
volume of regulatory activity appears to increase throughout the entire final 
year of two-term presidencies.240 As discussed below, if an outgoing admin-
                                                                                                                      
 235. Copeland, supra note 22, at 20 (discussing implementation of Clarification of 
Outpatient Hospital Facility (Including Outpatient Hospital Clinic) Services Definition, 73 
Fed. Reg. 66,187 (Nov. 7, 2008)). 
 236. Id. at 20, 20 n.117–118 (citing Medicaid Program: Rescission of School-Based 
Administration/Transportation Final Rule, Outpatient Hospital Services Final Rule, and 
Partial Rescission of Case Management Interim Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,183 (June 30, 
2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 440, 441)). 
 237. See HALCHIN supra note 30, at 11 n.38. 
 238. Exec. Order No 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010) (revoking Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 
C.F.R. 204 (2003) and Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008) (concerning regulatory 
planning and review), amending Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994)). 
 239. See supra note 34. 
 240. See generally O’Connell, supra note 17. 
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istration succeeds in finishing the bulk of its work more than sixty days 
before the end of the term, the incoming administration may not have the 
power to suspend the effective dates of rules, since significant rules can be 
made effective sixty days after promulgation. Even though such rules would 
not meet the technical definition of midnight rules, and there would be no 
political accountability concern, given that all rules were done well before 
the election, similar concerns of quality and projection of the agenda may 
arise if an administration engages in a high volume of regulatory activity 
earlier in its eighth year, especially if it appears that agencies rushed to meet 
an earlier deadline and increased the volume of activity substantially over 
prior years.  
The incoming administrations’ regulatory agenda may embody or affect 
the new administration’s reactions to midnight rules and leftover rulemak-
ing proposals.241 When an administration takes office, it must decide how 
much time and energy to spend looking back and how much time and ener-
gy to devote to moving forward with the administration’s own agenda. It 
may choose to allow midnight rules to take effect in order to free up  
resources to pursue the administration’s own agenda. For rules not yet  
completed, the new administration may not be concerned with the effort 
that the prior administration put into formulating proposals, and may prefer 
to work from scratch on its own proposals instead of completing pending 
rules. 
B. The Legality of Strategies for Dealing with Midnight Rules 
There have not been many cases raising procedural challenges to  
incoming administrations’ reactions to midnight rules promulgated by the 
previous administration. This is likely due to a combination of factors. In 
the vast majority of cases, any challenge to a delay in the effective date of 
agency rules is likely to be moot before the challenge would get very far. 
Most of the time, after the sixty-day delay to allow the incoming admin-
istration to review the previous administration’s midnight rules, the rules 
are allowed to go into effect. A case challenging the sixty-day delay is  
unlikely to be adjudicated before the sixty days has ended. Cases in which 
the incoming administration decides to rescind a midnight rule, or delay its 
effective date more than sixty days to allow for further review, are more 
likely to be adjudicated by the federal courts on judicial review, but this has 
not happened very often. One reason is that once the sixty-day period 
expires, the tendency has been to either allow the rule to go into effect, or, 
in some cases, to use notice and comment rulemaking to promulgate a  
further delay. This would ultimately meet any procedural objection to the 
                                                                                                                      
 241. See O’Connell, supra note 16, at 532. 
Beermann_Final_Printer_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013 4:16 PM 
354 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
further delay, except in those cases in which additional delays have been 
ordered without notice and comment.  
1. Legal Views in the Executive Branch and Commentary 
The OLC provided an opinion to the Reagan administration on the  
legality of Reagan’s order to agency and department heads delaying the 
effective dates of rules for sixty days and ordering a freeze until the central-
ized review process could be put into place.242 The OLC concluded that 
Reagan’s order was lawful. As to rules that had not yet been finalized and 
published, the OLC concluded that the delays were lawful because the APA 
does not impose any procedural requirements on such an action.243 It  
further concluded that even if the delay were subject to substantive judicial 
review, “[t]he explanation here—that the new Administration needs time to 
review initiatives proposed by its predecessor—is, we believe, sufficient.”244 
The OLC opinion offered a different analysis of the President’s power 
to delay the effective dates of rules that have been published but had not yet 
reached their effective dates. Here, the opinion first proposed that a sixty-
day extension of a rule’s effective date is within the agency’s power because 
while the APA prescribes only a thirty-day minimum between promulga-
tion and legal effect, it does not prohibit or even discourage agencies from 
providing more than thirty-days’ notice of the effective dates of rules.245 
The opinion implies that if it would have been lawful to prescribe a longer 
period when the rule was first promulgated, the agency retains the power to 
lengthen the period even after the rule has been published.246 The opinion 
further concludes that extending the effective date of a rule is not itself a 
rule and thus does not require advance notice and comment.247 The opinion 
                                                                                                                      
 242. Presidential Memorandum Delaying Proposed and Pending Regulations, 5 Op. 
O.L.C. 55 (1981). 
 243. Id. at 56. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 56–57. 
 246. Id. at 57. 
 247. Id.: 
[W]e conclude that a 60-day delay in the effective date should not be regarded as 
‘rule making’ for the purposes of the APA. Although such a delay technically alters 
the date on which a rule has legal effect, nothing in the APA or in any judicial  
decision suggests that a delay in effective date is the sort of agency action that 
Congress intended to include within the procedural requirements of § 553(b). 
This conclusion is supported by the clear congressional intent to give agencies  
discretion to extend the effective date provision beyond 30 days. The purposes of 
the minimum 30-day requirement would plainly be furthered if an extension of 
the effective date were not considered ‘rule making,’ for such an extension would 
permit the new Administration to review the pertinent regulations and would free 
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does acknowledge that extensions of effective dates might be subject to 
judicial review under the APA, but concludes that although a statement of 
reasons for the delay might be required, “a reference to the President’s 
Memorandum should be sufficient in most cases.”248 
The OLC opinion also concludes that even if a delay in a rule’s effec-
tive date is considered rulemaking, agencies have good cause for dispensing 
with notice and comment on the delay.  
A new President assuming office during a time of economic  
distress must have some period in which to evaluate the nature and 
effect of regulations promulgated by a previous Administration . . . . 
If notice and comment procedures were required, the President 
would not be permitted to undertake such an evaluation until the 
regulations at issue had become effective. A notice and comment 
period, preventing the new Administration from reviewing pending 
regulations until they imposed possibly burdensome and disruptive 
costs of compliance on private parties, would for this reason be 
‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.’ 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B). This rationale furnishes good cause for  
dispensing with public procedures for a brief suspension of an  
effective date.249  
Note that due to its reliance on the nation being in a period of “economic 
distress,” this reasoning may not justify dispensing with notice and com-
ment in transitions that occur under different conditions. 
One law review note250 disagrees with the OLC opinion and has argued 
strongly that the delays imposed by incoming administrations are unlawful. 
The note argues that:  
As a matter of administrative law doctrine, [the delays] were 
arbitrary and capricious because they did not provide adequate  
reasons for their promulgation and because they did not rely on 
factors that Congress contemplated when it delegated its legislative 
                                                                                                                      
private parties from having to adjust their conduct to regulations that are  
simultaneously under review. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 248. Id. The opinion notes that if the effective date of the original rule had been a 
“matter of controversy” during the original rulemaking, more specific reasons for delay 
would be required. Id. at 57–58. 
 249. Id. at 58. 
 250. B.J. Sanford, Note, Midnight Regulations, Judicial Review, and the Formal Limits of 
Presidential Rulemaking, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782 (2003). 
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power. Therefore, a reviewing court should invalidate such delays if 
they ever are attempted again.251 
The note sorts the documents agencies have employed to announce delays 
into two categories: those that rely simply on the President’s order and 
those that justify the delay based on the policies underlying the President’s 
order. The note finds both deficient for different reasons. “[T]hose that 
merely cite the President’s authority should fail automatically because they 
do not offer any reason for the delays . . . . Although agencies need not give 
elaborate justifications for every brief delay, they must provide some expla-
nation.”252 For those that rely on the reasons underlying the President’s 
order to delay the effective dates of midnight rules, the note concludes that 
such reasons are inadequate because they are not based on any policy  
Congress enacted in the statute underlying the rules: “[T]he cited policies 
were the President’s, not those that Congress expressed in the statute creat-
ing the agency’s rulemaking authority. In fact, the President’s policies may 
even have been hostile to the statute and constituted an attempt to effect its 
administrative repeal.”253 The note’s argument rests on the principle that 
agencies may justify rulemaking based only on reasons embodied in the 
statute that form the basis for the rules.254  
Another commentator has taken a more equivocal position on the legal-
ity of the actions of incoming administrations directed at midnight rules.255 
This commentator concludes that in most cases, a sixty-day delay in the 
effective date of a rule may be exempt from notice and comment as a  
procedural rule because “a temporary delay may not substantially affect a 
party’s interest in a final rule . . . .”256 However, the comment also  
concludes that in some cases, a sixty-day delay, and longer delays, may not 
be procedural:  
If the delay had a substantive impact on a regulated entity or on the 
public, the agency should have considered those interests and  
determined if the delay could be characterized as procedural. 
Without considering these interests, agencies should not have  
                                                                                                                      
 251. Id. at 785 (footnote omitted). 
 252. Id. at 803. 
 253. Id. at 803. 
 254. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (“To the extent that [the 
statute] constrains agency discretion to pursue other priorities of the Administrator or the 
President, this is the congressional design.”). 
 255. See Jack, supra note 167. 
 256. Id. at 1506. 
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relied on the blanket explanation that all of the delays were mere 
procedural rules.257 
The comment assumes that delays in effective dates are rules presump-
tively subject to notice and comment, and is not persuaded by the repeated, 
apparently pro forma assertions by the GW Bush administration that notice 
and comment would be “impracticable or contrary to the public interest” 
and that “good cause” existed for dispensing with notice and comment. The 
bases for the comment’s negative view of these justifications for dispensing 
with notice and comment are: first, the brief notice and comment periods 
that were held in some cases illustrate that notice and comment was possi-
ble; and second, it does not appear that the agencies engaged in a serious 
weighing of the costs and benefits of notice and comment before asserting 
that it was contrary to the public interest or that good cause existed for not 
seeking advance comment.258 The comment allows that notice and comment 
for a brief delay might be “unnecessary” and would thus survive scrutiny 
under APA section 553.259 The argument is that in such cases the delay “will 
not substantially affect a party’s rights and interests because it will not 
ultimately restrict a party’s rights created by a duly promulgated rule or 
conclusively relieve a regulated entity of the requirements of a duly  
promulgated rule.”260 
2. Case Law on Reactions to Midnight Regulation 
a. Withdrawal of Rules from the Federal Register 
The case law suggests that incoming Presidents’ strategy of ordering 
agencies to withdraw regulations from the Federal Register before they are 
published is lawful and renders the withdrawn rule null and void.261 In 
Kennecott Utah Copper v. Department of Interior, the Department of the  
Interior (DOI) promulgated a midnight rule concerning certain hazardous 
wastes and sent it to the OFR where it was received in the afternoon of 
January 19, 1993, the last full day of the GHW Bush administration.262 On 
January 21, 1993, the second day of the Clinton administration, the DOI 
withdrew the rule before it was published.263 After the DOI promulgated 
substitute regulations less favorable to industry, Kennecott Copper sought 
                                                                                                                      
 257. Id. at 1507–08 (footnote omitted). 
 258. Id. at 1509–10. 
 259. Id. at 1510–11. 
 260. Id. at 1511. 
 261. See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1206 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996); Chen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 95 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 262. Kennecott Copper, 88 F.3d at 1200. 
 263. Id. at 1200–01. 
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judicial review on numerous grounds, including claims that withdrawing the 
regulation from the Federal Register before publication violated the APA and 
the Federal Register Act. The court of appeals rejected claims under the 
Federal Register Act, holding that the OFR’s understanding and application 
of the Federal Register Act allowing withdrawal was reasonable and that it 
lacked jurisdiction over Kennecott’s APA claim because the withdrawal of a 
rule before publication is not itself a rule subject to judicial review.264 The 
court of appeals ignored the midnight rule context of the case, and instead 
upheld the OFR’s interpretation allowing withdrawal of rules before publi-
cation as a reasonable way of allowing agencies to correct mistakes and 
avoid the “needless expense and effort of amending regulations through the 
public comment process” later.265 
The court also rejected claims, brought by different petitioners, that the 
DOI could not withdraw the rule without first allowing notice and com-
ment.266 The DOI argued in response that any violation of the APA was 
cured by allowing notice and comment on the substitute regulations that 
were promulgated the following year.267 Although the court rejected this 
argument on the ground that “the two sets of regulations . . . did not cover 
the same issues,”268 it held that the challengers were not entitled to notice 
and comment on the withdrawal of the rule from the OFR for two different 
reasons. First, the court held that the withdrawn rule had never gone into 
effect as a binding rule.269 Second, the act of withdrawal was not a rule 
within the APA’s definition of that term mainly because the withdrawn rule 
had never gone into effect. Notice and comment, therefore, was not  
required before the agency withdrew the not-yet published document.270 
This reasoning basically approves of the common presidential strategy of 
ordering the withdrawal from the OFR of all rules that had been submitted 
but not yet published before the transition. 
In Chen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, an asylum applicant 
relied, in part, on a rule that had been sent to the OFR by the outgoing 
administration of GHW Bush but was withdrawn before publication by the 
incoming Clinton administration.271 The Ninth Circuit held that the with-
drawn rule had no legal effect: “In accordance with President Clinton’s 
directive, this rule was withdrawn from publication. It was never subse-
                                                                                                                      
 264. Id. at 1206–07. 
 265. Id. at 1206. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (explanation of OFR proce-
dures and the withdrawal of unpublished rules). 
 266. Kennecott Copper, 88 F.3d at 1207. 
 267. Id. at 1208. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 1208. 
 270. Id. at 1208–09. 
 271. Chen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 95 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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quently published; therefore, it has no legal effect and is not binding on this 
court.”272 Several additional decisions affirm or assume that the unpublished 
rule at issue in Chen has no legal effect because it was withdrawn before 
publication.273 
One court has taken the contrary view. In Xin-Chang v. Slattery, the  
district court held that the withdrawn rule involved in Chen was effective 
even though it had not been published.274 This court viewed publication as a 
formality unrelated to the legal effectiveness of the rule. The court  
considered the rule effective at some earlier (unspecified) stage of adoption,  
perhaps when the rule was signed by the agency head and sent to the OFR 
for publication. Publication, according to this court, is required only  
because, under the APA, an unpublished rule cannot be used against a 
member of the public.275 The court concluded that “where a rule confers a 
substantive benefit to a person, an agency must comply with it, even if the 
rule is not published.”276 The district court’s conclusion was rejected on 
appeal by the Second Circuit, which held that the unpublished rule never 
became effective.277 The Second Circuit had a technical basis for its  
decision: the unpublished version of the rule had no effective date because 
the intent of the outgoing administration was for the OFR to insert the 
date of publication as the rule’s effective date. Since the rule was never 
published, it contained no effective date and thus could not have become 
effective without publication.278  
An official at the OFR has confirmed that many rules arrive at the 
OFR with instructions to insert an effective date, often thirty or sixty days 
after publication. OFR regulations contain instructions for computing 
effective dates based on agency instructions.279 The reasoning in Zhang v. 
                                                                                                                      
 272. Id. at 805.  
 273. See Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 744 (2d Cir. 1995); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 
48 F.3d 1331, 1338 (4th Cir. 1995); Shan Ming Wang v. Slattery, 877 F. Supp. 133, 140 
(S.D.N.Y 1995); Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp. 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y 1994); Chen v. Carroll, 866 
F. Supp. 283, 287 (E.D. Va. 1994); Gao v. Waters, 869 F. Supp. 1474, 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 274. Xin-Chang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d, Zhang v. 
Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 275. Id. at 712. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(E) (West, 
current through P.L. 112–174); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232–33 (1974). 
 276. Xin-Chang, 859 F. Supp. at 712. 
 277. Zhang, 55 F.3d at 749. 
 278. Id. at 749. 
 279. OFR regulations contemplate computation of effective dates when the submitted 
rule specifies an effective date measured as a number of days after publication. See 1 C.F.R. 
§ 18.17 (2012). The possibility of OFR inserting the date of publication as the effective date 
of a rule that states it is effective immediately upon publication is not explicitly contemplat-
ed. However, it seems implicit that OFR would have power to insert the date of publication 
as the effective date, if the agency specified that the rule goes into at that time. According to 
the OFR official interviewed for this project, agencies tend to designate specific effective 
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Slattery raises the possibility that the court would not allow an incoming 
administration to withdraw a rule sent to the Federal Register with an effec-
tive date already designated, as is the case with a substantial number of 
rules. However, the court of appeals also appeared to endorse the notion 
that the incoming Clinton administration had the power to prevent an 
unpublished rule from becoming effective by withdrawing it from the 
OFR.280 
There is at least one state supreme court decision that found against the 
authority of an incoming governor to order withdrawal of unpublished rules 
from the state equivalent of the Federal Register. In New Mexico, incoming 
governor Susana Martinez issued an executive order upon taking office, 
suspending “all proposed and pending rules and regulations under the  
Governor’s authority for a ninety-day review period.”281 Claiming authority 
under the order, the Acting Secretary of the state Environment Department 
instructed the Director of the State Records Center not to publish envi-
ronmental rules in the New Mexico Register that had been promulgated 
during the prior administration. On petitions for mandamus filed by pro-
ponents of the rules, the New Mexico Supreme Court ordered the Records 
Center to publish the rules, relying on two sets of reasons. First, the court 
held that the executive order, which specifically suspended rules under the 
Governor’s authority, did not apply to the rules at issue because the Rec-
ords Center and the environmental agencies involved were statutorily 
removed from control by the Secretary and thus the Governor.282 Further, 
the Records Center is itself an independent agency not subject to the gov-
ernor’s control. Second, the Records Center’s own rules require publication 
of rules properly submitted unless the issuing authority requests withdraw-
al, and in this case the withdrawal request was invalid because it was made 
by the Acting Cabinet Secretary of the New Mexico Environment Depart-
ment, rather than the chairs of the agencies that had promulgated the 
rules.283 It does not appear that the New Mexico court’s reasoning would 
apply to the typical actions of incoming presidential administrations, mainly 
because incoming administrations have not applied their regulatory review 
procedures to independent agencies, and the federal rule withdrawals have 
apparently all been requested by the proper federal agencies. 
                                                                                                                      
dates when there are statutory deadlines involved or when a rule must go into effect on a 
weekend, which normally would not be the effective date under OFR rules. 
 280. Zhang, 55 F.3d at 749 (“This failure to publish was a deliberate step by an incom-
ing Administration to terminate all open initiatives of the outgoing administration. By its 
own terms, the Rule never became effective.”). 
 281. New Energy Economy, Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286, 288 (N.M. 2011) (citing 
N.M. Exec. Order No. 2011-001 (Jan. 1, 2011)). 
 282. See id. at 293. 
 283. See id. 
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b. Suspension of the Effective Dates of Published Rules 
Suspension or postponement of the effective dates of published rules 
raises issues different from those raised by withdrawal of rules that have not 
yet made it into the Federal Register. It is generally understood that a rule 
is final upon publication in the Federal Register, even if it has an effective 
date after the date of publication.284 The legal issues in such cases are: first, 
whether a postponement or suspension of the effective date of a rule is itself 
a rule under the APA; and second, if so, whether such a rule may be issued 
without notice and comment.285  
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, the Third Circuit in-
validated the Reagan administration’s suspension of a Carter administration 
midnight rule286 on discharge of waste into public water treatment works.287 
The rule, which had been promulgated to comply with the government’s 
obligations under a settlement agreement, was published on January 28, 
1981, and carried an effective date of March 13, 1981. On February 12, 1981, 
however, pursuant to Reagan’s instructions, the effective date of the rule was 
postponed until March 30, 1981.288 Then, on March 27, 1981, the EPA  
administrator indefinitely postponed the effective date of the rule, relying 
solely on Executive Order No. 12,291 as authority for the postponement.289 
The indefinite postponement was challenged on the basis that it was a rule 
and thus was subject to the APA’s notice and comment requirements.290 
The court of appeals first concluded that the postponement was a rule 
under the APA’s definition, presumptively subject to the APA’s notice and 
comment requirements.291 The court next determined that the postpone-
                                                                                                                      
 284. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 285. JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 119–122 (4th 
ed. 2006). 
 286. Technically, the rule was promulgated by the Reagan administration. However, it 
was clearly a project of the EPA under President Carter, coming out less than 10 days after 
President Reagan took office, and the rule was suspended to comply with President Reagan’s 
instructions to suspend new rules to allow his administration to review the work of the 
Carter administration and put in place the new centralized review process that was in the 
works. 
 287. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 288. Id. at 755. 
 289. Id. at 756; see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
 290. Natural Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d at 753. 
 291. Id. at 761–62 (“In general, an effective date is ‘part of an agency statement of 
general or particular applicability and of future effect.’ It is an essential part of any rule: 
without an effective date, the ‘agency statement’ could have no ‘future effect,’ and could not 
serve to ‘implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.’ In short, without an effective date 
a rule would be a nullity because it would never require adherence.”). The D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.3d 802, appears to agree with 
this conclusion. 
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ment was subject to the APA’s notice and comment requirement because it 
had “a substantial impact upon the public and upon the regulated  
industry . . . .”292 The EPA also argued that “good cause” excused its failure 
to employ notice and comment procedures because the effective date of the 
rule was imminent and it needed additional time to satisfy the Regulatory 
Impact Analysis (RIA) requirement of Executive Order No. 12,291. The 
court rejected this argument, concluding that nothing prevented the EPA 
from complying with the APA and the Executive Order by allowing the rule 
to go into effect, preparing an RIA after the fact, and conducting notice and 
comment rulemaking on whether to suspend the effectiveness of the rule 
based on its findings in the RIA or for other reasons.293 The decision thus 
appears to reject the assertion that compliance with the President’s regula-
tory review instructions and the imminent effective date constitute good 
cause to dispense with notice and comment. It is unclear what the court 
would hold if the Executive Order and the APA were in irreconcilable 
conflict, for example, if the President were to order agencies to suspend the 
effective dates of rules immediately, without notice and comment. 
In Council of Southern Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, the court of appeals 
approved a six-month “Midnight Suspension” of the effective date of a rule 
that the Mine Safety and Health Administration had promulgated two 
years earlier.294 The regulation at issue, promulgated in 1978, required mines 
to equip their miners with certain safety equipment by December 21, 
1980.295 On December 5, 1980, without notice and comment, the Depart-
ment of Labor extended the compliance date to June 21, 1981, by which time 
Reagan would have assumed the presidency, succeeding Carter.296 The 
agency argued that there was good cause for dispensing with notice and 
comment because the deadline was imminent and there were serious ques-
tions about the safety and availability of the new equipment.297 The court 
first strongly rejected the argument that the approach of a deadline alone 
can provide good cause for dispensing with notice and comment to extend 
the deadline, especially when the agency either knew the deadline all along 
or created the deadline itself.298 The court then characterized the case as 
“close,” but found the agency had good cause for acting without notice and 
                                                                                                                      
 292. Natural Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d at 764. 
 293. Id. at 765–66. In fact, this is exactly what the EPA did while the litigation chal-
lenging the March 27 postponement was pending. Id. at 757 (citing General Pretreatment 
Regulations for Existing and New Sources, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,503 (Oct. 13, 1981) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 125, 403)). 
 294. Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 295. Id. at 575. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 579. 
 298. Id. at 580–81. 
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comment, mainly because the unavailability of necessary equipment was 
beyond the agency’s control and the agency was working diligently to  
implement the rule as soon as possible.299 
At a minimum, these decisions indicate that courts will require good 
reasons for delaying the implementation of published rules without notice 
and comment beyond the mere desire of incoming administrations to  
reexamine midnight rules before they go into effect. 
 Another court of appeals decision that disallowed the suspension of a 
midnight rule is Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, but it arose in 
a special situation in which the relevant statute prohibited the agency from 
“backsliding,” and thus may not be generalizable.300 The Department of 
Energy (DOE) published in the Federal Register midnight rules under the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) regarding the energy effi-
ciency of air conditioners with heat pumps on January 22, 2001,301 two days 
after Bush became President. Due to the publication schedule, these rules 
apparently could not be withdrawn from the Federal Register before publi-
cation. The rule listed an effective date of February 21, 2001. On February 
2, 2001, adverting to the Card Memorandum, the DOE issued a final rule 
without notice and comment302 delaying the effective date of the new effi-
ciency standards until April 23, 2001, or approximately sixty days after the 
original effective date.303 On July 25, 2001, the DOE published an NPRM 
proposing to withdraw the January 22 rule and substitute less stringent 
efficiency standards.304 On May 23, 2002, the DOE adopted these proposed 
rules, as well as a related proposal to define terms contained in the EPCA’s 
anti-backsliding provision.305 The anti-backsliding provision, in substance, 
makes it unlawful for the DOE to relax any previously adopted efficiency 
                                                                                                                      
 299. Id. at 582. No further notices appear in the Federal Register, so presumably the 
rule was implemented as of that date. As further evidence that the rule was allowed to go 
into effect after the delay, the agency issued an emergency training requirement concerning 
use of the new equipment in 1987. See Self-Contained Self-Rescue Devices; Emergency 
Temporary Standard, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,374 (June 30, 1987) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 
75). 
 300. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 301. Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps Energy Conservation Standards, 66 
Fed. Reg. 7170 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430). 
 302. The rule delaying the standards’ effective date found that notice and comment 
were not necessary because the delay was a procedural rule and that in any case notice and 
comment could be dispensed with for good cause and because it was impracticable, given the 
need to impose the delay quickly. Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps Energy Con-
servation Standards, 66 Fed. Reg. 8745 (Feb. 2, 2001) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. 430). 
 303. Id.  
 304. Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps Energy Conservation Standards, 66 
Fed. Reg. 38,822 (July 25, 2001) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).  
 305. Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps Energy Conservation Standards, 67 
Fed. Reg. 36,368 (May 23, 2002). 
Beermann_Final_Printer_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013 4:16 PM 
364 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
standard, and the Bush administration’s definitional provisions were  
designed to make clear that its actions with regard to these rules did not 
constitute backsliding. On judicial review, the Second Circuit held that the 
DOE’s amendments violated the EPCA’s anti-backsliding provision and 
thus were unlawful. The court rejected the DOE’s interpretation of the 
statute, refusing to defer to it under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council.306 
For purposes of this Article, the most interesting aspect of Abraham was 
the court’s rejection of the DOE’s claim that it has inherent power to  
suspend the effective date of published rules before their effective dates.307 
In this particular case, the DOE may have been able to suspend and revise 
the rules based on some peculiarities of the statutory structure, if its  
February 1, 2001, suspension of the rule had been valid. However, the  
Second Circuit found that the February 1 suspension without notice and 
comment was not valid because it had the substantive effect of allowing the 
DOE to substitute less stringent standards.308 This violated even the DOE’s 
own interpretation of the anti-backsliding provision.309 
The court also rejected the DOE’s argument that good cause existed for 
dispensing with notice and comment for the delay in the rule’s effective 
date. Here, the court rejected the implicit argument that the midnight 
nature of the rule contributed to good cause for suspending it without  
notice and comment. Basically, the court considered the DOE during the 
two administrations a single entity, and thus because the emergency (the 
imminent effectiveness of the new rules) that necessitated quick action was 
created by the DOE itself, there was no good reason for suspension without 
notice and comment.310 
The court also rejected the argument that the notice and comment pro-
cedures the DOE conducted on the replacement standards cured any defect 
                                                                                                                      
 306. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 198–200 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(referring to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
 307. Id. at 202–04. 
 308. Id. at 204–05. 
 309. Id. at 205. 
 310. Id.: 
We cannot agree . . . that an emergency of DOE’s own making can constitute 
good cause. . . . Furthermore, we fail to see the emergency. The only thing that 
was imminent was the impending operation of a statute intended to limit the 
agency’s discretion (under DOE’s interpretation), which cannot constitute a threat 
to the public interest . . . . Therefore, because the February 2 delay was promulgated 
without complying with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements, and  
because the final rule failed to meet any of the exceptions to those requirements, it 
was an invalid rule. 
Id. 
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in the process for suspending the rule.311 The court provided two reasons 
for rejecting this argument: first, that the notice and comment procedure 
concerning the new rule did not address whether the original rule should 
have been suspended; and second, that if the suspension was not effective 
without notice and comment, the anti-backsliding provision rendered the 
replacement standards substantively invalid regardless of the process  
employed.312 
Abraham apparently rejects one of the common justifications used by 
incoming administrations to act without notice and comment when they 
delay rules that have already been published—namely, that the incoming 
administration needs time to review rules with imminent effective dates. If 
the agencies are a single entity before and after the transition, then this 
argument is basically unintelligible—the agency has already fully considered 
the rule during the initial notice and comment process. Under Abraham, 
rather than simply announcing that the prior administration’s published 
midnight rule is suspended, the incoming administration may have to  
conduct notice and comment rulemaking to prevent the rule from taking 
effect.313 This might be impossible in some situations when there is inade-
quate time for notice and comment before the midnight rule is scheduled to 
go into effect. 
In another case, discussed above, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit found an agency’s suspension of a midnight rule314 contrary to the 
APA, but not on grounds applicable to most midnight rule suspensions. In 
North Carolina Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. United Farm Workers,315 the court  
affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction against the suspension, with 
                                                                                                                      
 311. Id. at 206, n.14. 
 312. Id. 
 313. In most situations, an incoming administration would still be able to revise a 
midnight rule by conducting a new notice and comment process. If the incoming administra-
tion conducts a new notice and comment rulemaking, it doesn’t really matter whether the 
original rule had gone into effect—the second rule would replace the original rule through 
the normal process of rulemaking. In Abraham, however, because of the relevant statute’s 
anti-backsliding provision, the incoming administration might not have had the power to 
revise the standard at all, even via notice and comment rulemaking, at least if the revision 
would impose less stringent efficiency standards. With the anti-backsliding provision, even a 
new notice and comment process could not replace the old rule with a less-protective one. 
 314. See Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 73 
Fed. Reg. 77,110 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 501, 780, 788). This exam-
ple is discussed at various places in Copeland’s CRS report. See Copeland, supra note 22, at 
22, 32. 
 315. N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755 (4th Cir. 2012), 
aff ’g N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Solis, 644 F. Supp. 2d 664 (M.D.N.C. 2009). The Court of 
Appeals also rejected a purported class action counterclaim brought by the United Farm 
Workers to collect additional wages that temporary agricultural workers would have received 
had the 2008 rule been validly suspended. See id.  
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notice and comment, of a midnight rule concerning visas for temporary 
agricultural workers. In the notice requesting comments on the possibility 
of suspension, the Department of Labor stated that the suspension was 
necessary because it did not have the time or resources to implement the 
new rule.316 The court found that the Department of Labor had violated  
the APA by suspending the rule and putting back into place a prior rule on 
the subject after it explicitly stated that it would not consider comments  
on the merits of the 2008 rule or its 1987 predecessor.317 Because most 
postponements or suspensions pursuant to notice and comment do not 
involve the refusal to consider comments on the merits of reinstating a prior 
rule, this application of APA section 553 does not necessarily affect most 
suspensions or postponements of midnight rules.318 
There is a body of non-midnight case law that subjects rule suspensions 
to judicial review on substantive and procedural grounds.319 In a non-
midnight context, it has been held that agency action suspending a rule is 
subject to judicial review, and that the agency must have a sufficient policy 
justification for the suspension to meet the arbitrary or capricious standard 
of judicial review.320  
The GW Bush administration relied on an additional justification for 
postponing effective dates without notice and comment—namely, that such 
actions are “rules of procedure” exempt from the notice and comment  
requirements of APA section 553. There is no case law on the specific ques-
tion of whether this application of the procedural rule exception to notice 
and comment is correct. As discussed below, it appears, however, that the 
more general case law interpreting the exception supports the conclusion 
that a brief delay in the effective date of a rule is a rule of procedure exempt 
from section 553’s notice and comment requirements.  
                                                                                                                      
 316. Temporary Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,408 
(proposed Mar. 17, 2009) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655, 29 C.F.R. pts. 501, 780, 788). 
The proposed rule, basically restoring the substance of the pre-2008 rule, was adopted on 
February 12, 2010. See Temporary Agricultural Employment of H–2A Aliens, 75 Fed. Reg. 
6884 (Feb. 12, 2010). Thus, the litigation concerned the 2009 growing season only. 
 317. N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, Inc., 702 F.3d at 769–70. 
 318. In a concurring opinion, Judge Wilkinson recognized the midnight rulemaking 
context of the case. See North Carolina Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 
755, 771–72 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wilkinson, J., concurring). He noted that the changing rules 
were the result of a political “seesaw” between employers and agricultural workers and that 
the court’s decision was “not a matter of tying an agency’s hands in the face of a fresh elec-
toral mandate” but rather an insistence on compliance with the APA. Id. at 772. In his view, 
“[t]o have approved the process at issue in this case . . . would have been to generate a 
blueprint for agency unaccountability, at odds with the very idea that government at all 
levels is subject to the written law.” Id. 
 319. See O’Connell, supra note 16, at 530 n.198. 
 320. See Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (voiding the suspen-
sion of tire treadwear grading requirements). 
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There is no authoritative understanding of the meaning of the proce-
dural rule exception to the notice and comment requirement. In early cases, 
the courts appear to have focused on whether a rule had a substantial impact 
on the private party’s substantive rights—the greater the impact, the more 
likely a rule would be found to be subject to section 553’s notice and com-
ment requirements.321 In later cases, the courts recognized that many rules 
that are truly procedural can have substantial impacts on regulated parties 
and have moved away from an emphasis on impact toward a more direct 
inquiry into the nature of the rule claimed by the agency to be procedural. 
A leading case on the procedural rule exception is American Hospital Ass’n v. 
Bowen.322 In that decision, the D.C. Circuit stated that in determining 
whether a rule is procedural, the D.C. Circuit “has gradually shifted focus 
from asking whether a given procedure has a ‘substantial impact’ on parties 
to inquiring more broadly whether the agency action also encodes a sub-
stantive value judgment or puts a stamp of approval or disapproval on a 
given type of behavior.”323 A brief delay of a rule’s effective date appears 
procedural under this standard—the freeze does not necessarily reflect 
approval or disapproval of the substance of the rule, it merely provides time 
for the agency to review the rule and perhaps take further substantive  
action.324 
Another legal issue that incoming administrations may confront  
involves the standard of review that would be applied to rescissions of, or 
amendments to, midnight rules that have become final. In general, a rule is 
considered to be final upon publication in the Federal Register, and once that 
                                                                                                                      
 321. See, e.g., Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  
 322. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 323. Id. at 1047 (citation omitted). At the Supreme Court, Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 
(1993), held that a decision closing a health clinic serving needy Indian children and reallo-
cating the clinic’s resources to a national program was a rule of agency organization or a 
general statement of policy and thus exempt from the APA’s notice and comment require-
ment despite the fact that the decision had a substantial impact on those who had previously 
obtained services at the clinic. 
 324. Consistent with the move away from considering the impact of a rule when 
determining whether it is procedural under the APA, the D.C. Circuit has held that rules 
with great impact on private parties may nonetheless be procedural. See, e.g., Bachow 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 237 F.3d 683 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The rules held procedural in Bachow 
prohibited broadcast license applicants from amending their applications to cure substantive 
problems and shortened the period that the FCC would wait before processing applications 
(to make sure no mutually exclusive application precluded a license grant). Id. These cases, 
especially Bachow, lend support to the argument that a rule delaying the effective date of 
another rule is procedural. Although this conclusion means that agencies are legally free to 
impose these delays without notice and comment, ACUS has recommended in the past that 
agencies voluntarily use notice and comment when promulgating rules of procedure. ADMIN. 
CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 92-1: THE PROCEDURAL AND PRACTICE RULE 
EXEMPTION FROM THE APA NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS 
(1992). 
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happens, a new rulemaking is necessary to amend or rescind the rule.  
Incoming administrations always have the option of rescinding or revising 
midnight rules by conducting a new notice and comment rulemaking. As a 
substantive matter, rules rescinding or amending other rules must meet the 
standard of review applicable to rules made under the particular statute 
involved.325 In State Farm, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that 
rescissions should be reviewed on an extra-deferential standard (the argu-
ment being that because rescissions are deregulatory in operation, they 
should be treated like decisions not to regulate).326 Rather, the Court held 
that rescissions should be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard that applies to most rules issued after notice and comment.327 
State Farm was originally understood to be a potentially serious imped-
iment to rescission or revision of midnight rules. More than one scholar 
interpreted State Farm as placing serious restrictions on agencies’ ability to 
rescind or amend their rules.328 Under this understanding of State Farm, the 
existing rule constituted the regulatory baseline, and any change would need 
to be supported by reasons that made the new rule better than the old rule. 
Recently, the Supreme Court has clarified that this reading of State Farm 
was erroneous. In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Court read the 
APA to more freely allow revision and rescission of rules than was previously 
thought.329 Under Fox, although agencies must display awareness that they 
are making a change, the new rule is not judged as to whether it is a better 
                                                                                                                      
 325. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 
(1983) (stating that the procedural and judicial review provisions of the APA apply to orders 
establishing, amending, or revoking standards under the National Traffic and Motor Safety 
Act because the Act does not suggest a “difference in the scope of judicial review depending 
upon the nature of the agency’s action.”).  
 326. See id. at 40–44. 
 327. Id. at 42–43. 
 328. See Beermann, supra note 10, at 1010; Loring & Roth, supra note 11, at 1457. 
 329. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009). In Fox Televi-
sion, the Court stated that the understanding that State Farm significantly restricted agencies’ 
ability to amend rules was based on a misreading of a key passage in the State Farm opinion. 
That passage stated that rescission of a rule requires “a reasoned analysis for the change 
beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.” Id. at 514 
(emphasis added) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42). This, according to the Court in Fox 
Television, “neither held nor implied that every agency action representing a policy change 
must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in the 
first instance.” Id. In other words, the passage in State Farm was misread to imply that 
agency decisions to alter existing policy required greater justification than initial agency 
decisions to impose regulations. What the State Farm Court actually said was that agency 
decisions to alter existing policy needed greater justification than decisions not to act in the 
first instance. Decisions to not act in the first instance are normally reviewed under a highly 
deferential version of arbitrary, capricious review. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
527–28 (2007). Decisions to impose new regulatory burdens or alter existing ones are  
normally reviewed under the standard version of the arbitrary, capricious standard.  
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rule than the prior rule, but rather, whether it is adequately supported by 
the rulemaking record.330 After Fox, incoming administrations have more 
perceived freedom to rescind and revise midnight rules than was previously 
thought to exist under State Farm, although as noted, notice and comment is 
probably required to change or rescind any rule that has already been  
published in the Federal Register at the time of the transition. 
3. The Florida Courts’ Reactions to Midnight Rulemaking 
Although it is not directly relevant to the legal issues surrounding mid-
night rulemaking in federal agencies, it is worth considering a recent 
controversy in the State of Florida that occurred when a new governor took 
steps similar to those taken by incoming presidents. Upon taking office in 
January 2011, Governor Rick Scott issued an executive order suspending all 
rulemaking in the state and establishing a centralized review mechanism 
similar to that employed at the federal level under Executive Order No. 
12,866 and related orders, to be administered by the Office of Fiscal  
Accountability and Regulatory Reform (OFARR).331 After the transition 
period was over, Scott replaced this order with an order omitting the  
suspension of rulemaking, but reiterating that all rules must be reviewed by 
the OFARR before issuance.332 These orders were challenged in state court, 
and the Florida Supreme Court decided that the governor lacked the power 
to suspend rulemaking and require that rules be submitted to centralized 
review before promulgation.333 In so holding, the Florida Supreme Court 
found that rulemaking is essentially a legislative function with which the 
governor could not constitutionally interfere:  
[T]he Governor’s executive orders at issue here, to the extent each 
suspends and terminates rulemaking by precluding notice publica-
tion and other compliance with Chapter 120 absent prior approval 
from OFARR—contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act—
infringe upon the very process of rulemaking and encroach upon 
the Legislature’s delegation of its rulemaking power as set forth in 
the Florida Statutes.334  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 330. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515. 
 331. Fla. Exec. Order Nos. 2011–01 (Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://www.flgov.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/orders/2011/11-01-rulemaking.pdf. 
 332. Fla. Exec. Order Nos. 2011–72 (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.flgov.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/orders/2011/11-72-fiscal.pdf. 
 333. See Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011). 
 334. Id. at 713. 
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The Florida court further explained:  
Executive Orders 11–01 and 11–72 supplant legislative delegations 
by redefining the terms of those delegations through binding direc-
tives to state agencies, i.e., first by suspending and terminating 
rulemaking, second, by requiring agencies to submit to OFARR 
any amendments or new rules the agency would want to propose, 
and then by causing OFARR to interject itself as the decisive entity 
as to whether and what will be proposed.335 
If federal courts followed this reasoning, presidential authority to act 
against midnight rules, and more generally to supervise the rulemaking 
process, would be in doubt. This seems extremely unlikely, because the 
principles of Florida law, upon which the Florida Supreme Court relies, do 
not appear to be consistent with the federal understanding of presidential 
power. Although the legality of centralized review was attacked in the  
aftermath of Reagan’s issuance of Executive Order No. 12,291, such review 
is now an accepted element of the federal administrative process. Further, 
although early cases may have understood rulemaking as a quasi-legislative 
function, the current understanding seems to be that the President has a 
great deal of authority to supervise the execution of the law as delegated to 
agencies by legislation. In sum, federal law is not likely to follow Florida’s 
precedent as exemplified by the acceptance of withdrawal of rules before 
publication pursuant to presidential directives. 
4. Summary and Conclusions Concerning the Legality of Reactions 
to Midnight Rulemaking 
First, it is lawful for incoming administrations to withdraw rules that 
have been submitted to the Federal Register but not yet published and to 
order executive branch agencies not to submit any new rules to the Federal 
Register until an appointee or designee of the new administration has  
reviewed them. Both the OLC opinion and the weight of judicial decisions 
support the view that the APA does not prescribe any procedure for with-
drawing a submitted rule before publication. The only uncertainty 
regarding the first half of this proposition is the view expressed by the 
district court in the Xin-Chang336 decision, that publication is a formality 
and that a rule, at least one benefiting a member of the public, becomes 
effective when it is finalized at the agency; this view was not completely 
rejected by the Second Circuit. As to rules that had not been submitted to 
                                                                                                                      
 335. Id. at 715. 
 336. Xin-Chang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d, Zhang v. Slattery, 
55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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the OFR for publication at the time of the transition in administrations, the 
power to delay agency action while the new administration puts its officials 
into place is inherent in the President’s role as the superintendent of the 
executive branch. The only caveat here is that legislative and judicially-
imposed deadlines should be observed. However, even when such deadlines 
exist, agencies are often able to delay the rulemaking process because courts 
do not tend to order immediate compliance with deadlines.337 
Second, the power of agencies to delay the effective dates to simply  
allow the new administration to review rules that have been published but 
have not yet reached their effective dates without notice and comment is 
uncertain. The weight of the authority is mixed on whether notice and 
comment is required to delay the effective date of a published rule. The 
weight of the case law supports the view that a delay in the effective date of 
a published rule is itself a rule presumptively subject to the APA’s notice 
and comment requirements.338 There is also support for the contrary view 
that a delay in the effective date of a rule is not itself a rule subject to the 
APA’s procedural requirements. Assuming that delays are rules, it is less 
clear whether rules delaying the effective dates of published rules are within 
any of the APA’s exceptions to the notice and comment requirement. What 
little case law there is appears to reject the view that the desire of the new 
administration to review midnight rules before they go into effect provides 
good cause to proceed without notice and comment.339 The GW Bush  
administration may, however, have been correct that a brief delay in the 
effective date of a rule can be considered a rule of agency procedure, unless 
the delay appears to embody value judgments about particular types of 
conduct.340 However, a lengthy delay, or a second delay targeting a particu-
lar rule for revision, may not be viewed as procedural and may require 
notice and comment. Further, courts may require agencies to support delays 
with reasons consistent with the policies embodied in the substantive  
statutes involved.  
                                                                                                                      
 337. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 159 (3d Cir. 
2002) (establishing mediation process to determine schedule for promulgation of rule held 
to have been unreasonably delayed). 
 338. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 761–62 (3d Cir. 1982); 
Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
 339. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2004); Natural 
Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d 752. Council of Southern Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573 
(D.C. Cir. 1981), approved a delay in the effective date of a rule without notice and comment, 
but only because there were serious questions about the availability of equipment necessary 
to comply with the rule, and the rule’s effective date was imminent. 
 340. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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C. The Bush Administration’s Effort to Curb  
Its Own Midnight Rulemaking 
On May 9, 2008, Bush Chief of Staff Josh Bolten issued a memorandum 
(the “Bolten Memo”) directed to “Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies” under the subject heading “Issuance of Regulations at the End of 
the Administration,” directing them to propose any remaining rules by June 
1, 2008, and to finalize all rules by November 1, 2008.341 The Bolten Memo 
clearly explained the reason for establishing this timetable: after reciting the 
Administration’s approach to regulation, the memorandum stated, “[w]e 
need to continue this principled approach to regulation as we sprint to the 
finish, and resist the historical tendency of administrations to increase regulatory 
activity in their final months.”342 
The June 1 deadline for proposing rules and the November 1 deadline 
for finalizing rules would mean that the GW Bush administration would 
issue virtually no midnight rules under the definition used in this Article. 
All proposals would be public and subject to comment well before the  
election, and all rules would be issued before the election, eliminating the 
possibility that rules were held back until after the election to avoid political 
consequences.  
These deadlines might also, for several reasons, have the effect of  
increasing the durability of rules that might otherwise have been issued 
later. First, there would be no unpublished rules subject to simple  
withdrawal from the Federal Register by the succeeding administration, since 
the November 1 deadline would ensure that all finalized rules would be 
published in the Federal Register. Second, rules finished by November 1 
could theoretically all be final and in effect before the transition. The APA 
requires at least thirty days between publication and effectiveness, and the 
CRA requires sixty days for rules to which it applies. Assuming no addi-
tional particular statutory constraints, any rule that is issued by November 1 
could be fully effective by January 1. 
It does not appear that the schedule anticipated by the Bolten Memo 
would prevent Congress from disapproving rules under the CRA. Due to 
the way that certain features of the CRA interact with congressional proce-
dures, it is impossible to know in advance the exact cutoff date between 
rules that are subject to action by the new Congress under the CRA and 
rules that are not. A report prepared by the CRS concluded the following 
                                                                                                                      
 341. Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, White House Chief of Staff, to Heads of 
Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (May 9, 2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/cos_memo_5_9_08.pdf. This Memorandum is repro-
duced in the Appendix to this Article, available at http://www.mjealonline.org/documents. 
 342. Id. (emphasis added). 
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concerning the effect of the Bolten Memo’s deadlines on Congress’s power 
under the CRA: 
If Congress follows [its] general pattern in the second session of 
the 110th Congress, the data suggest that any final rule submitted to 
Congress after June 2008 may be carried over to the first session of 
the 111th Congress, and may be subject to a resolution of disapprov-
al during that session. However, the starting point for the carryover 
period could slip to late September or early October if an unprece-
dented level of congressional activity occurs late in the session.343 
The Bolten Memo did not succeed in eliminating midnight rulemaking 
in the GW Bush administration, but it reduced it at least somewhat.  
According to Susan Dudley, OIRA Administrator at the end of the GW 
Bush administration, the number of post-election rules issued in 2008–09 
was 100, compared to 143 in 2000–01.344 The number of post-election  
economically significant rules was much closer: 27 in 2008–09, compared to 
31 in 2000–01.345 The final three weeks of the GW Bush administration 
were much less busy than the same period during the Clinton administra-
tion, with 20 final rules issued in 2008–09, compared to 72 final rules in the 
final 3 weeks of the Clinton administration.346 
Dudley also reports that the deadlines in the Bolten Memo were  
received with displeasure, both by political appointees and by career officials, 
who, as she reports, “had worked hard on many of the regulations nearing 
the finish line, and were disappointed when they did not make it across 
before January 20.”347 There was great pressure to waive the deadlines, 
which the Bolten Memo had promised would occur only in “extraordinary 
circumstances.”348 Dudley reports that Bolten decided to allow waivers in 
four circumstances. First, in what appears to be the largest category of 
waivers, the deadline was waived for “draft final regulations submitted to 
OIRA for interagency review before mid-October (two weeks before the 
deadline to issue a final rule), [and] OIRA and the agencies worked expedi-
tiously to conclude review.”349 Second, an exemption was provided for 
“[f]inal regulations that an agency identified as a high priority and had 
provided adequate public notice and opportunity for comment (generally 
                                                                                                                      
 343. HALCHIN, supra note 30, at 7. 
 344. See Susan E. Dudley, Regulatory Activity in the Bush Administration at the Stroke of 
Midnight, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y, 28 (July, 2009), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/ 
20090720_Engage102.pdf. 
 345. Id.  
 346. Id. at 29.  
 347. Id. at 27. 
 348. Bolten, supra note 126. 
 349. Dudley, supra note 344, at 28. 
Beermann_Final_Printer_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013 4:16 PM 
374 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
defined as having met the June 1 deadline for publication of the proposed 
rule) . . . .”350 Third, “[r]egulations that faced statutory or judicial deadlines 
were also granted exceptions, even if they did not meet the first two  
criteria . . . .” Fourth, “regulations that were considered presidential priori-
ties” were also exempted.351 Dudley summarizes the effects of the memo as 
follows: 
[M]idnight regulations are inevitable. But the Bolten memoran-
dum, which supported OIRA’s efforts to impose some restraint on 
last minute regulatory activity, had a positive effect. If nothing else, 
the early efforts to counteract the midnight regulation tendency 
spread out the completion of regulations over a longer period, 
providing more time for constructive interagency review. For the 
most part, the criteria for receiving an extraordinary circumstance 
exemption also ensured an opportunity for public comment.352 
Dudley recommends that future administrations issue similar memoranda, 
perhaps earlier in their administrations, to reduce midnight rulemaking as 
much as possible.353 
The Bolten Memo was viewed by some as concerned less with eliminat-
ing midnight rulemaking than immunizing rules from easy alteration or 
rescission by the next administration.354 This would be the case if there were 
a rush to issue a higher than normal number of rules just before the earlier 
deadline established by the memo. In 2008, the final full year of the GW 
Bush administration, O’Connell found 649 final actions by cabinet agencies 
and 118 actions by executive branch agencies, for a total of 767 total final 
actions.355 For comparison purposes, in 2000, the final full year of the Clin-
ton administration, cabinet agencies completed 694 actions and executive 
branch agencies completed approximately 159 final actions, for a total of 853 
                                                                                                                      
 350. Id. 
 351. Id.  
 352. Susan Dudley, Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 
113, 124–25 (2011). 
 353. See id. at 125; Telephone Interview with Susan Dudley, former OIRA Adm’r (Nov. 
15, 2011). 
 354. See Christopher Carlberg, Essay, Early to Bed for Federal Regulations: A New At-
tempt to Avoid “Midnight Regulations” and Its Effect on Political Accountability, 77 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 992, 997–98 (2009); O’Connell, supra note 16, at 504 (characterizing Bolten Memo 
as one of GW Bush’s “unprecedented steps to make the rules issued in his final year harder 
to overturn”). Carlberg does recognize that “placing a moratorium on federal regulations 
during the [M]idnight [P]eriod increases political accountability . . . by prohibiting regula-
tion promulgation during the period the outgoing President is least politically accountable.” 
Carlberg, supra at 1001. 
 355. These figures are drawn from the text of O’Connell’s article, supra note 16, at 503, 
and from supporting data supplied by O’Connell and on file with the author of this Article.  
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actions.356 The difference in the number of final actions between the two 
administrations (86) is substantial, but not overwhelmingly large. The total 
difference in late actions by the two administrations is greater because of 
the higher number of rules issued during January by the outgoing Clinton 
administration than by the GW Bush administration during its final three 
weeks in office.357  
The overall picture of late-term rulemaking in the GW Bush admin-
istration shows a clear increase in action near the end of the term, even in 
the final quarter when, had it been enforced, the Bolten Memo would have 
sharply limited rulemaking. The GW Bush administration actually promul-
gated more economically significant rules in its final quarter than the 
record-setting Clinton administration had eight years earlier: 
In terms of presidential transitions, cabinet departments finished 
more important actions in the last quarter of President Clinton’s 
Administration (83 actions) than in any other quarter in the data 
for that presidency (the next highest was the second quarter of 
1996 with 55 actions). Similarly, cabinet departments and executive 
agencies promulgated more final actions (95 and 22 actions, respec-
tively) in the final quarter of President George W. Bush’s 
Administration than in any other quarter of his presidency (the 
next highest were 72 and 20 actions in the third quarter of the  
final year for cabinet departments and executive agencies,  
respectively).358 
Thus, because many waivers were granted, the effect of the Bolten 
Memo appears to be a modest shift of rulemaking to earlier in the GW 
Bush administration’s final year. If that is an accurate depiction, then the 
Bolten Memo would have addressed only one set of concerns related to 
midnight rulemaking, that of delaying the issuance of rules until after the 
election to avoid accountability. It would not have addressed the other set of 
concerns related to the quality of midnight rules. To the extent that agen-
cies increased the volume of rulemaking and rushed to complete rules 
before a slightly earlier deadline, the concerns over the quality of the rules 
would be exactly the same if the deadline had been Inauguration Day, as in 
prior administrations. 
It remains to be seen whether the Bolten Memo will set a precedent for 
future administrations. The Obama administration did not issue a similar 
directive in 2012 while President Obama was standing for re-election. Now 
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that President Obama has been reelected, the opportunity for a directive 
like the Bolten Memo will arise in 2016. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Administrative Conference has adopted a set of recommendations 
to Congress and agencies relating to the problem of midnight rules. In this 
Part, I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of reforms others have  
proposed. In the next Part, I provide the Administrative Conference’s  
recommendations. 
A. Prior Reform Proposals 
There have been many proposals for reform of midnight rulemaking, 
some directed at limiting the ability of outgoing administrations to engage 
in midnight rulemaking and others at enhancing the ability of incoming 
administrations to revise or rescind midnight rules. 
The simplest proposal that has been floated is for Congress to simply 
prohibit midnight rulemaking. Congress could statutorily prohibit rulemak-
ing during the period between Presidential Election Day and Inauguration 
Day. This was suggested by Federal Circuit Judge Jay Plager in a debate 
reported in the spring 2001 issue of Administrative Law & Regulatory 
News.359 Judge Plager suggested: 
[One possible] measure would be to have Congress pass a law pro-
hibiting submission of final regulations during the interregnum. Or 
Congress might permit publication of regulations during this  
period but subject them to special rules, such as automatically  
extending them, making them subject to extension without notice 
and comment, attaching a presumption of irregularity to them, or 
denying them Chevron deference.360 
Prohibiting all final rules during the midnight period is unrealistic. 
Most midnight rules are routine and are required to implement statutes. 
Prohibiting all rulemaking for more than two months would create a back-
log that the incoming administration would have to deal with just when it 
wants most to get started on its own program. Thus, although it may be 
desirable to defer significant and especially controversial rulemakings until 
after the transition, shutting the rulemaking process down would not be a 
desirable reform. 
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One legislative proposal was directed at both the power of outgoing 
administrations to issue midnight rules and the power of incoming admin-
istrations to rescind them. In January 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler 
introduced a bill entitled the “Midnight Rule Act” with the stated purpose 
to “delay the implementation of agency rules adopted within the final 90 
days of the final term a President serves.”361 The operative provisions of this 
proposal simply provided that “a midnight rule shall not take effect until 90 
days after the agency head is appointed by the new President” and that 
“[t]he agency head appointed by the new President may disapprove of a 
midnight rule no later than 90 days after being appointed.”362 “Midnight 
rule” was defined as “a rule adopted by an agency within the final 90 days a 
President serves in office.”363 The bill allowed the outgoing President to 
avoid the ninety-day delay by making a determination, in an executive 
order, that the rule is necessary due to an imminent threat to health or 
safety or other emergency, necessary to enforce criminal law, necessary for 
national security, or issued pursuant to a statute implementing an interna-
tional trade agreement. 
This proposal would provide the incoming administration with a pow-
erful tool to deal with midnight rules, but although it might provide the 
basis for reform, it suffers from some weaknesses that should give pause.364 
For one, the bill’s language does not provide exceptions for instances in 
which the incoming administration would rather have the midnight rules go 
into effect immediately, for example, if the incoming administration is of 
the same party, likes the rules, or if midnight rules were the product of 
cooperation between the incoming and outgoing administrations. At a min-
imum, any reform along the lines of this proposal should allow the 
incoming administration the option of putting midnight rules into effect 
immediately. Another problem is that the proposal fails to account for rules 
for which a delay may be legally questionable or unnecessary. There is, for 
example, no indication that rules required by statutory deadlines or court 
orders are exempt. The most significant problem with the proposal is that 
the incoming administration’s only option is to disapprove the midnight 
rule or allow it to go into effect as written. There is no option to revise a 
midnight rule. This means that if the new agency head concludes that a rule 
is necessary, even one that is very close to the one promulgated by the prior 
administration, the agency must either accept the imperfect rule or engage 
in a new rulemaking proceedings to promulgate what might be an only 
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slightly different rule. It would be preferable if the incoming administration 
could issue a new rule based on the original rulemaking record,365 supple-
mented by comments solicited by the incoming administration.  
Another proposal aimed at the power of outgoing administrations was 
made by Brito and de Rugy. Their proposal grows out of their concern that 
during midnight periods, institutional review mechanisms are overwhelmed 
by the high volume of rules. They are most concerned with review of signif-
icant rules by OIRA under Executive Order No. 12,866.366 Their proposal is 
to “cap the number of significant regulations an agency is allowed to submit 
to OIRA during a given period.”367 They assert that this reform could be 
accomplished either by executive order or by a statute, although given that 
they recommend a flexible cap based on resources available to OIRA, it 
seems more realistic that the cap would be imposed and administered by the 
executive branch.368 
Assuming that the volume of rules during the midnight period is a seri-
ous problem, Brito and de Rugy’s proposal to cap the number of significant 
rules each agency is allowed to submit to OIRA does not seem like an effec-
tive reform. To allow for the usual increase in regulatory activity as the 
deadline approaches, the authors suggest that the “number should be well 
above the ‘normal’ levels of regulatory activity we see during non-midnight 
periods . . . .”369 If each agency is allowed to submit rules to OIRA “well” in 
excess of the norm during non-midnight periods, this proposal would ap-
parently allow for a great deal of midnight rulemaking, perhaps dampening 
but not resolving the problem. Further, it is unclear exactly how much 
dampening would occur if rulemaking “well above the normal levels” would 
still be allowed. 
On another level, the focus on OIRA review seems misplaced. OIRA 
review is not a legislatively mandated element of the rulemaking process. 
Given that OIRA review was created by an Executive Order, each President 
has the unilateral power to abolish it with the stroke of a pen. Rather, it is 
part of each President’s internal management of the regulatory system. 
Congress has enacted many procedural and substantive requirements for 
rulemaking, but it has not required that all regulations or even all significant 
regulations go through a review process like OIRA review. The party of 
interest in OIRA review is the President, and it is up to the President to 
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determine whether the somewhat more rapid review during the midnight 
period is adequate. Perhaps a revised Bolten Memorandum could incorpo-
rate this suggestion, but it seems to be an unlikely subject of legislation, 
given that Congress has not mandated OIRA review under any  
circumstances. 
A less drastic and more complex suggestion made by Andrew Morriss 
and his co-authors is to place regulators on a “budget” and limit their regu-
latory activity during the midnight period to that allowed by the budget.370 
This proposal is consistent with the desire to reduce the amount of mid-
night rulemaking that is shared by many. The main concern with this 
proposal is whether it is necessary given the routine nature of much rule-
making even during the midnight period and whether it would be effective 
at curbing the midnight rules that critics believe ought to be curbed, since 
agencies could spend their budgets on the most controversial midnight rules 
and leave the routine rules to the incoming administration. 
Additional proposals have been aimed at enhancing the power of  
incoming administrations to deal with the midnight rules left behind. As 
discussed above, the legality of the common strategies administrations have 
employed to deal with midnight rules is subject to some doubt, especially 
the practice of postponing the effective dates of published rules without 
notice and comment. In this regard, Judge Plager suggests either automati-
cally suspending midnight rules or making them subject to suspension 
without notice and comment.371 As discussed above, the last several incom-
ing administrations have taken this step, and its legality has not been  
definitively established, one way or the other. This modest reform would 
allow the incoming administration the power and time to reexamine  
midnight rules to ensure that they are consistent with the administration’s 
policy and not the product of a rushed regulatory process. 
Andrew Morriss and his co-authors suggest a related but more substan-
tial reform. Their suggestion is “[m]aking regulations issued ‘at midnight’ 
(after the election, for example) able to be repealed without a new rulemak-
ing process but simply by issuing a notice in the Federal Register . . . .”372 
This is similar to Representative Nadler’s legislative proposal, and it suffers 
from the same defect, that it does not appear to allow the incoming admin-
istration to take the less drastic step of amending midnight rules and then 
allowing them to go into effect as amended. Perhaps the authors would view 
this as a friendly amendment to their suggestion, since it is designed, as is 
their proposal, to enhance the power of incoming administrations to deal 
with midnight rules. The authors make an alternative, related suggestion, 
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that “[r]ules might also be prohibited from going into effect for a period 
after the new administration was inaugurated, allowing withdrawal of pro-
posed final rules without new rulemaking.”373 This proposal is based on the 
assumption that the incoming administration has the power to withdraw any 
published midnight rule before its effective date. That assumption is doubt-
ful and thus if enacted, the reform should include both the extension of the 
effective date of all rules issued during the midnight period and an explicit 
grant of power to the new administration to withdraw any rules before their 
effective dates. 
It has also been suggested that incoming administrations might encour-
age Congress to use the CRA to override midnight rules.374 As discussed 
above, the CRA has been used only once, to void Clinton’s ergonomics rule. 
While this may support the notion that the CRA is more likely to be suc-
cessfully used when a new President has taken office and is willing to sign 
the resolution of disapproval, the CRA has not proven to be a useful tool to 
combat midnight rulemaking. It has been suggested that a new President 
could, independent of the CRA, submit a bill to Congress containing a 
package of midnight rules that the incoming administrations recommends 
Congress legislatively reject.375 This seems even less likely to succeed in 
Congress than CRA rejection, since there is likely to be a group in Con-
gress that supports at least one of the rules in the package and has sufficient 
strength to prevent passage of the bill. Legislative disapproval thus does not 
seem to be a likely avenue for combating midnight rulemaking. 
Another question related to possible reforms is whether the Bolten 
Memo was desirable and, if so, whether it should be adopted as a model for 
future transitions. The Bolten Memo was viewed by some as an effort to 
shield the GW Bush administration’s midnight rules from reversal by the 
Obama administration and as ineffective since it merely moved midnight up 
to “11 PM.” To those concerned with rushed rulemaking processes, an earli-
er deadline poses the exact same problem as the end of the term—agencies 
might rush rules through the process to beat the new “11 PM” deadline. To 
critics who view midnight rules as illegitimate attempts to extend the out-
going administration’s agenda into the future, the fact that the GW Bush 
administration issued fewer true midnight rules may not be sufficient, given 
the high volume of rules (and proposed rules) prior to the Bolten memo’s 
deadlines. 
To those opposed to midnight rulemaking on principle and those con-
cerned with the incoming administration’s need to review midnight rules, 
the Bolten Memo has its virtues. GW Bush administration OIRA Adminis-
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trator Dudley viewed the Bolten Memo as consistent with her principled 
stand against midnight rulemaking.376 To those who share her view, the 
specter of dozens or even hundreds of midnight rules is ugly and under-
mines the perceived legitimacy of the administrative state. Fewer post-
election rules means less avoidance of political accountability. Additionally, 
the incoming administration benefits when the outgoing administration 
issues fewer rules with effective dates after the transition because it will not 
need to devote resources to reviewing as many rules that have not gone into 
effect as of Inauguration Day. It is likely to seem less urgent for the new 
administration to review rules that have been final and in effect for several 
months than to review those rules that have not gone into effect when the 
administration took office. 
O’Connell has discussed variants of many of the proposed reforms to 
both midnight rulemaking and the responses of incoming administrations, 
including making rulemaking more difficult during the midnight period; 
subjecting midnight rules to less deferential judicial review; and either 
explicitly requiring notice and comment before incoming Presidents sus-
pend the effective dates of midnight rules, or explicitly exempting such 
actions from notice and comment.377 She is skeptical of the utility of any of 
the many reforms that have been proposed and predicts that agencies and 
other political actors will react strategically to any changes: 
For instance, agencies might try to evade these restrictions by 
promulgating policies through informal adjudications, guidance, or 
policy statements. If rescission of finalized regulations were made 
more procedurally difficult, agencies might forego trying to change 
the regulations and instead just refuse to enforce them. In addition, 
what counts as “midnight” might be pushed back to right before an 
election, creating the same problems as before. And if the reforms 
were to apply to congressional as well as presidential transitions, 
agencies would have little time to act without these additional  
restraints. 
Finally, even assuming that these proposals would be beneficial and 
effective, they may not be politically feasible to implement.378  
In sum, while some of the proposed reforms relating to midnight rule-
making have merit, no proposal offered to date provides an appropriate 
measured response to the realities of the midnight rulemaking  
phenomenon. 
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VI. ACUS RECOMMENDATIONS379  
A. Recommendations to Incumbent Presidential Administrations 
1. Incumbent administrations should manage each step of the 
rulemaking process throughout their terms in a way that avoids 
an actual or perceived rush of the final stages of the process. 
2. Incumbent administrations should encourage agencies to put 
significant rulemaking proposals out for public comment well 
before the date of the upcoming presidential election and to 
complete rulemakings before the election whenever possible. 
3. When incumbent administrations issue a significant “midnight” 
rule—meaning one issued by an outgoing administration after 
the presidential election—they should explain the timing of the 
rule in the preamble of the final rule (and, if feasible, in the  
preamble of the proposed rule). The outgoing administration 
should also consider selecting an effective date that falls ninety 
days or more into the new administration so as to ensure that 
the new administration has an opportunity to review the final 
action and, if desired, withdraw it after notice and comment,  
before the effective date. 
4. Incumbent administrations should refrain from issuing midnight 
rules that address internal government operations, such as con-
sultation requirements and funding restrictions, unless there is a 
pressing need to act before the transition. While incumbent  
administrations can suggest such changes to the incoming  
administration, it is more appropriate to leave the final decision 
to those who would operate under the new requirements or  
restrictions. 
5. Incumbent administrations should continue the practice of shar-
ing appropriate information about pending rulemaking actions 
and new regulatory initiatives with incoming administrations. 
B. Recommendations to Incoming Presidential Administrations 
6. Where an incoming administration undertakes to review a mid-
night rule that has already been published, and the effective date 
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of the rule is not imminent, the administration should, before 
taking any action to alter the rule or its effective date, allow a 
notice-and-comment period of at least thirty days. The comment 
period should invite the public to express views on the legal and 
policy issues raised by the rule as well as whether the rule should 
be amended, rescinded, delayed pending further review by the 
agency, or allowed to go into effect. The administration should 
then take account of the public comments in determining 
whether to amend, rescind, delay the rule, or allow the rule to go 
into effect. If possible, the administration should initiate, if not 
complete, any such process prior to the effective date of the rule. 
7. When the imminence of the effective date of a midnight rule 
precludes full adherence to the process described in paragraph 
six, the incoming administration should consider delaying the 
effective date of the rule, for up to sixty days to facilitate its re-
view, if such an action is permitted by law. Before deciding 
whether to delay the effective date, however, the administration 
should, where feasible, allow at least a short comment period re-
garding the desirability of delaying the effective date. If the 
administration cannot provide a comment period before delay-
ing the effective date of the rule, it should instead offer the 
public a subsequent opportunity to comment on when, if ever, 
the rule should take effect and whether the rule itself should be 
amended or rescinded.  
C. Recommendation to Congress 
8. In order to facilitate incoming administrations’ review of mid-
night rules that would not otherwise qualify for one of the APA 
exceptions to notice and comment, Congress should consider 
expressly authorizing agencies to delay for up to sixty days, 
without notice and comment, the effective dates of such rules 
that have not yet gone into effect but would take effect within 
the first sixty days of a new administration. 
D. Recommendation to the Office of the Federal Register 
9. The Office of the Federal Register should maintain its current 
practice (whether during the midnight period or not) of allow-
ing withdrawal of rules before filing for public inspection and 
not allowing rules to be withdrawn once they have been filed for 
public inspection or published, absent exceptional circumstances. 
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CONCLUSION 
The midnight rulemaking phenomenon has become a familiar element 
of presidential transitions. Whenever an outgoing President is replaced by a 
President of a different political party, there is a noticeable increase in 
regulatory activity at the end of the incumbent’s term, followed by a freeze 
on new rulemaking and a review of the midnight rules promulgated by the 
incoming administration. Midnight rulemaking has been condemned by 
commentators and media observers from across the political spectrum, 
although it is not clear exactly what is wrong with the practice. There are no 
strong indications that midnight rules are of lower quality than rules prom-
ulgated in non-midnight periods, and it appears that incoming 
administrations have tools that are adequate to deal with those few rules 
that are problematic. Clearly, however, midnight rulemaking breeds cyni-
cism and distrust of government, and it has negative effects on the 
transition of administrations. Because most rulemaking is routine and  
necessary to keep the government operating, shutting down all rulemaking 
activity once a new President is elected may be a cure that is worse than the 
disease. Any reforms directed at midnight rulemaking should take account 
of these considerations. Outgoing administrations should aim to complete 
their rulemaking activities as early in the final year as possible, should  
explain the timing of midnight rules, should minimize the promulgation of 
controversial rules during the midnight period, and should smooth the 
transition to the new administration as much as possible. 
